Ethnic Conflicts | Sociology Optional for UPSC (Notes) PDF Download

The Problem of Ethnicity

• The problem of ethnicity and national building has been widely discussed over the past few decades. The phenomenon of ethnicity has become all intrinsic component of the socio-political realities of multi-ethnic or plural cultural societies, specially in a country like India.
• In India, with its variety of pluralities, in terms of language, race, religion and so on ethnic conflict has become a part of the political scenario. In most countries, including ours, the processes of development and change have generated conditions for ethnic conflict, as the fruits of these development processes have come to be distributed unevenly. Also the nature and character of the 1ower structure and rule of the political leadership have their role to play.

Definition of Ethnicity
The definition of concept in any field of social science is usually difficult. And a term such as ethnicity is loaded with meanings, values and prejudices and therefore, is even more difficult to define.

• Ethnicity pertains to the word ethnic which is a distinction of mankind based on race. Ethnicity has now lost the original connotation. “It is now employed in a broader sense to signify selfconsciousness of a group of people united, or closely related, by shared experience such as language, religious belief, common heritage, etc. While race usually denotes the attributes of a group, ethnic identity typifies creative response of a group who consider themselves marginalised in society” (Barun De and Sunanjan Das, 1992: 69). Barth and Benedict Anderson feel that boundary is an important criterion for self defintion by ethnic group, to separate themselves from ‘others’.

Ethnic Identity : A Psycho-sociological Reality

• William G. Sumner observed that people have their own group as the center of their lives, and rate all other groups with reference to their own. He called this tendency of individuals to cling to their clan ethnocentricism. It is a generalised prejudice.
• Why do human beings slip so easily into ethnic prejudice? Human beings have a natural tendency to form generalisations, concepts and categories. Their categories are close to their first-hand experiences. They also categorise basing on hearsay, fantasy and emotions. This process of social categorisation leads to the formation of an “in-group” and “out-group”. All groups develop a way of living with characteristic codes and beliefs. 
• Therefore, the formation of ethnic attitude is functionally related to becoming a group member. According to the social categorisation theories given by H. Tajfel (1981) as well as J.C. Turner (1982), every social group attempts to achieve an identity in contradiction to the “out-group” Identity can be broadly characterise as the process by which an individual is bound to his/her social group and by which he/she realises his/her social self. In the context of the Indian political identity, such a formulation has several implications. The emotional fervour associated with linguistic issues can perhaps be viewed in the context of this definition of social identity structure of the different language groups in the country.
• The normative character of ethnic prejudices involve far more than the fact that attitudes are shared by members of a majority or minority group. Each member is expected to hold such attitudes and various kinds of pressures are brought on those who fail to conform to it. A sense of identity is a very natural human tendency but when an ethnic identity is consolidated and used as a reference point for mobilisation to share in the power structure, the mobilisation becomes far more effective.
• While ethnic attributes are categorisation for the purpose of classification which is a static formulation, ethnicity is a dynamic process, whereby a group of people or community regroups itself as an adaptive strategy in response to specific demands of the situations.

Some Characteristics of Ethnicity
Following are some of the characteristics of ethnicity.

1. Ethnicity relates to ascriptive identities like caste, language religion, region etc.
2. Inequality in terms of sharing power between two ethnic groups results into conflict. The ethnicity is socially mobilised and territorially confined. It has numerically sufficient population, and is a pool of symbols depicting distinctiveness. It has a reference group in relation to which/whom a sense of relative deprivation (real or imagined) is aggregated
3. Being left out of the developmental process or even being a victim of uneven development, ethnicity causes ethnic movements.
4. Ethnicity is manifested in Indian politics not merely due to grassroot discontent but is also a creation of vested political interest.
5. Ethnic groups that use ethnicity to make demands in the political arena for alteration in their status, in their economic well-being, etc. are engaged very often in a form of interest group politics.

• Before we try to understand the role of ethnicity in Indian politics, it is important to stress that whatever the difference between ethnic groups, the focus of their interaction finally boils down to the centrality of politics of who gets what, when and how? As already stated the focus of interests of an ethnic group, is to get some benefits for itself. The group often uses ethnic criterion like religion, language or caste to mobilise itself to give identity to itself which separates it from other group or groups. Thus, delineation of boundary of an ethnic group of community is an important aspect of ethnicity markers. 
• But exactly which one will get projected at a specific point of time would usually depend on where or how the person draws the boundary. Since delineation of the nature of boundary rests on the conditions existing at a given moment, the whole exercise becomes a response to the specific conditions. This adds fluidity to the situation and makes the identity projection a dynamic phenomenon. The nature of identity shifts along with changing circumstances and calls for change in boundary or a change in identification. The seeming singularity of identity, by and large, conveys a notion only. In reality, plurality of identities appears much more widespread than it ordinarily appears to be.

Patterns of Ethnic Conflict in the North-East: A Study on Manipur

Kuki- Naga conflict in Manipur has seen armed clashes

• While studying ethnic conflicts in the ‘north-east of India’, one cannot but look at Manipur which exhibits as many problems that could possibly appear in the discourse of collective conflict. Perhaps it is the only state in the entire north-east which experiences such varied forms of issues and problems. A study on the state will show the complexity of ethnicity and politics that a composite culture would possess. Identity formation by more than 30 communities and tribes harping on exclusivity, integration and dominance, often results in several forms of conflict that would provide ground for several observations and narratives, that may not even have meeting points. 
• This is not to show pessimism but to highlight the difficulties – that of drawing possible unity of observations. The added advantage, however, is quite clear – not because ethnic conflict is most widespread in the state but of the nature of demographic composition and identity formation. The pace in which the assertions of identities, of ‘nation’ or ‘subnation’ characters, have been floated often mutually exclusive is fast and alarming. This development calls for serious reflection, not only for the state of Manipur but also for the Indian state, which is more than willing to come out with quick political solutions. 
• The complexity of ethno-demographic relationships and subsequent conflicts in Manipur can however provide a wider theoretical framework explaining a particular pattern of conflict. It is a different issue if such a pattern would successfully explain all other instances of ethnic conflict in the region or the country, but the attempt is to provide a generic picture of conflict as it seems in a territorial entity having multi -ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-sub-national identities. Manipur is a case in point, the most appropriate miniature of the Indian state. The paper further proposes to highlight the factors behind emergence of such patterns of conflict. The emphasis is on the form of relationship that exists between composition and distribution of population on the one hand and nature of ethnic violence on the other.
• The logic behind  targeting Manipur as the laboratory  of experiment lies in  seeing  the state as ‘miniature Indian state.’ Multiplicity in ethnic composition and demographic variations in the state have substantive similarities with the kind of equation, mainland India has with the rest of the country. A major difference, however, lies in land-and-people relationship,  which is extremely unequal in the state.
• Out of a small population of 2.38 million (2001 Census) by the Indian standard, the demographic composition of Manipur shows several ethnic communities and tribes found all over the state either exclusively confined or scattered or coexist. The majority Meiteis comprise of 56.9 per cent of the total population, who mostly profess Vaisnava faith, are confined to the valley. The valley all surrounded by hills is only one-tenth of the total geographical area. The state’s land act does not allow the Meiteis and other non-tribals (by the schedule list) to buy land in the hills and settle. That is, nine-tenth of the state’s area has been reserved for the scheduled tribes.
• On the other hand, density of population shows a contrasting picture. While the two most populous districts of Imphal east and Imphal west put together have a density of 607 per sq km, the least populous district of Tamenglong is 19 per sq km The total population of tribes in the state is little more than 0.71 million. The tribal population comprises of 29 tribes in the scheduled list and many other smaller tribes and sub-tribes who are included in the category of ‘unspecified tribes’ in the list. The two major tribes by current nomenclature are the Nagas and the Kukis. Most of the 29 tribes in the scheduled list are clubbed under either of these groups. 
• The fate of those tribes who prefer to maintain their distinct identities, not to be called either as Naga or Kuki, has to face threats and at times severe atrocities in the hands of those who want to encompass them into the larger folds of ethnic identity. For instance, while Hmars and Koms have been able to retain their separate identities, other tribes like Paite, Lamkang, Maring, etc, have called themselves as Nagas. Most of the instances of such assertions are marked by the politics of survival rather than ideological influences. Apart from the respective dialects, Manipuri serves as the lingua franca for most of the communities and tribes in the state. 
• Recently it was found that some tribes within the Naga fold, particularly Tangkhuls, have expressed their reservation over making Manipuri1 as official language of the state though it is altogether a different matter that two different tribes (in the state) within the Naga fold may speak Manipuri as the lingua franca.2 The issue is more political in nature. The demographic distribution as of present is that Nagas inhabit in the three north-western and northern districts of Tamenglong, Senapati and Ukhrul, and partly in the south-eastern district of Chandel. Kukis mostly inhabit in the south-western district of Churachandpur and partly in the district of Senapati. 
• The tribal population mostly are Christians with some traces of Rongmei, Purum and few other tribes practising their traditional religions. The Meitei Pangals (Manipuri Muslims),  constituting a substantive part of the state’s population (1,67,204 by 2001 Census), speak Manipuri as the mother tongue and are scattered mainly in the valley and adjoining hills. Given such a complex picture, one is bound to visualise possible tensions and conflicts that are in store for such material entity having varied forms of ethnic composition and settlement.

Patterns of Conflict

• The complexity of demographic configuration, emerging community conflicts, and violence erupting out of such conflicts, shapes into particular forms or patterns. It will be worthwhile to study the conflict taking both mediate and immediate factors into account rather than study the violence and its occurrences in isolation. The mode of violence has close interlinkages with other issues mentioned earlier. The series of ethnic conflicts in the state; first the long years of Naga -Kuki clash, followed by the Kuki-Paite clash, and currently the much covert Meitei-Naga tension, find causal reference to the type of demographic configuration giving rise to different identity formation and subsequent clash of interests. Unless one sees these either in totality or in continuity, talking about ‘pattern’ will make little sense.
• The nature of conflict largely marked by violence is twofold. In one form or pattern, conflict is not confined at one place but spreads over all other areas where both tribes cohabit. This pattern has broad similarities with those found in a communal clash. The Naga -Kuki clash was not confined to Chandel district alone but spread over all other places where both tribes cohabit. The state boundary does not operate in such a conflict for the discourse of conflict is beyond electoral administrative boundary, is ethnically defined and marked by a sense of fraternity.
• Kukis in Senapati district extended the Naga -Kuki conflict from Chandel district to their area of dominance. So have Zeliangrong Nagas to Tamenglong district. The majority of the warring groups initiate the clash in the areas where they dominate. This is true of both warring groups. Though Naga-Kuki clash started over control of Moreh town of Manipur in the Indo-Mayanmar border, it spread over all the Naga and Kuki inhabited areas not only in the state of Manipur, but also to the adjoining states of Nagaland and Assam. Moreh is a commercial town mainly flourishing on border trade where wide range of smuggling operates starting from household items to drugs and narcotics.
• The town is the financial nerve centre of the insurgent organisations, particularly the Nagas and the Kukis. It was over control of this town that the tussle started between these two groups. Chandel district, where Moreh is located, is mainly inhabited by Thadou Kukis and Maring Nagas.3 With the UNC’s increasing anti-Kuki stand, the outburst took place on May 12, 1992 when NSCN (IM) burnt down Kuki villages at Molphei. Subsequently, on May 30,1992 Kuki National Army (KNA) collected tax from the Maring villages, an amount of 30,000 kyats with further reports of atrocities [NPMHR 1992]. On June 3, 1992, some armed groups believed to be cadres of NSCN (IM) attacked a Haokip Kuki village killing the village headman and few others. 
• Kukis retaliated by attacking Maring villages in Chandel district (Yamthang nd). Thus chain of massacre started. Immediate reasons behind Naga -Kuki clash are:
  (i) control and occupation of Moreh,
  (ii) tax on Kuki residents in Naga territory by the Naga militants and refusal by the Kukis, and
  (iii) refusal to renew the land agreement by the Nagas to the Kukis [Laba 1994].
• The second pattern operates in an intriguing manner. Though it is difficult to see a clearcut causal relationship between two or more than two instances of conflict, the type of discourse is similar – all on ethnic line. However, the relationship between such two instances of conflicts in this pattern is not influenced by a sense of fraternity. The parties involved in these instances are of different ethnic identities. Though Naga-Kuki clash was followed by Kuki-Paite clash, the causal factor is determined not by extension of fraternity among the warring groups but by other factors largely material in nature. This is of course not to undermine the importance of the fast emerging political consciousness among these communities. 
• The much covert Meitei-Naga tension shows the complexity of the relationship and the factors determining the same. The conflict, rather tension, between the two is not related to any extension of fraternal feelings from the Naga-Kuki conflict. The prominent cause for the development in the latter is due to fast expanding ‘Naga nationalism’. This is quite different from ‘fraternity feelings’ of two tribes under one ethnic bond. The Meitei-Naga tension emerging posterior to the Naga-Kuki clash does not share the causal fraternity bond of Meiteis siding with the Kukis.
• The difference between the two patterns can be highlighted through the example quoted above, viz ‘fraternity feelings’ and ‘expansion of nationalism’. Naga-Kuki clash, which initially started between the Maring Nagas and Thadou Kukis, was joined by other Nagas and Kukis in different parts of Manipur. Once the conflict takes shape through a chain of fraternity it spreads beyond the Manipur to adjoining states where the two populations coexist. While in the former the conflict is exclusively between two groups having distinct (ethnic) identities spreading over places of their habitation, the latter is in reality different conflicts, though not completely unrelated. 
• Take for instance the cases of Naga-Kuki conflict and Naga-Meitei tension. I would see these two cases, which otherwise are two different instances, as a result of an ever increasing Naga nation’s expansionism. The factors determining the latter are much more complex and bear far-reaching consequences. Though these two patterns bear different natures, there are few common factors determining these events.
• Relationships between these distinct events of conflict are tied by what I would call, ‘semi-causal connectives’. This may be seen as a formal construct, a kind of objective relationship that exists between two or more than two spacio-temporally distinct events of conflict. The relationship is neither completely determined by the change of event or by praxiological intervention, but somewhat a combination of both. This is where I emphasise on the role of human praxis guided by material conditions. I am not in search for an ideal-type. I have only been trying to capture the complexity of the nature of conflict many of which may not be ethnic at all. Studying the conflicts of the latter form, there seems to exist a chain of relationships where a preceding conflict ignites the succeeding one. 
• But this is not to draw a hypothesis that the connectives are drawn exclusively by a collective social consciousness determining the very nature of the connectives. That would be drawing too much out of collective praxis.Yet one should not completely rule out the possibility of such a consciousness operating behind the political moves and social celebrations of few communities and tribes in the last few decades. I would propose a sort of (weak) hypothesis on collective consciousness moving the praxis. But importance of material factors that determines these connectives cannot be overlooked. Of course, material conditions are man-governed.
• Observing the intensity of violence, not only the barbarism involved but also the ideological messages that are so strongly meted out, one may conclude with certain amount of confidence that causal factors are extremely strong and often have a reaching impact in future inter -ethnic relationship. When causal reference is made to demographic configuration, it is not to mean the demographic configuration per se. Demographic configuration with all its forms in the region is a historical fact as much as inter tribal rivalry and conflicts are [Singh 1989]. But the nature of conflict as witnessed today is a more recent phenomenon. Rather than the facts per se, it is the way in which facts are being perceived and projected that is the igniting ground for conflict. 
• This I shall take up little later. The formation of identities by the tribes and sub-tribes, and more importantly in few cases assertion of tribes to form community identity, not necessarily ethnic though often claimed, is also an equally important causal factor. At least, at present, I see these two as all-important factors leading to rise of conflict and subsequent violence. Problem of migration and settlement as constituting sub-factors within the demographic  factor will be taken up.  Though highlights may be of demographic composition and distribution these are more generic, the core issue being contentions on migration and settlement.

Question of Identity

• Collective consciousness has emerged among the tribes in the region through formation of separate political identities. In addition to their earlier existing identities both as a cultural and political unit, a new form of assertion attempting internalisation of new political ethos is in the process. The tribes in the state are not only trying to redefine themselves through this new consciousness, but many (larger) tribes are moving out of tribal identity to that of ethnic community identity. (This is not to misunderstand with the identity of a tribe as earmarked by the government of India’s scheduled list.) As compared to a tribe, an ethnic community is more politicised, ideologically structured with a matured form of communication network. 
• Emergence of Naga as an ethnic identity can be seen as the most recent development drawing attention of the social thinkers. Let me take ‘tribe’ as more or less a homogeneous group of people having a closely-knit way of life, with relatively simpler means of production, to be somewhat falling under a close/communicable speech community. On the other hand, it is politicisation of a tribe with certain ideological construct as goal that gives birth to an ethnic community. 
• Formation of ethnic community is primarily political. It may later provide ways for the emergence of a ‘more unifying’ cultural identity. The tying bond of cultural oneness in a community is so strong that we tend to see such an identity as pre-given, almost as the source for all other identity formations. Considering this formulation, it is too early to talk of Naga as a cultural identity though Naga as a political identity is already in operation, perhaps much more actively than any other community in the region.
• A little more clarity is perhaps called for on the functional distinctions between cultural identity and political identity. Both the terms ‘Naga’ and ‘Kuki’ as functional categories came into use with records of the British military officers and administrators [Mackenzie 1884, 2001]. Though the names may be in use earlier,self-appropriation of identities with these names came much later. Take for instance, the name ‘Naga’ which is more of a British creation in the 1880s. It is an identity projected for better administrative purposes – to club different tribes under one administrative umbrella. It was much later that the first self-appropriation came into being with the creation of Naga club. It initially started, in the same colonial fashion like that of Indian National Congress, with the participation of English educated Nagas serving under the British Indian army. 
• This name as a political identity became clearer in 1947 when British left its south-east Asian colonies. Phizo, as the champion of Naga self-determination, called for a separate Naga state outside the Indian dominion. Thus came the projection from the Naga national workers that Nagas achieved independence one day before India did. Creation of Naga political identity is still in process, latest being the inclusion of tribes like Anal, Moyon, Monsang, Maring, Paite into a common ‘Naga’ identity, etc, this being a major achievement of the NSCN (IM). These entries are the latest, in the 1990s. Notwithstanding these entries, tribes like Aaos, Angamese, Tangkhul, Zeliangrong, Mao, who are already clubbed as Nagas still have little in common among them so far as their dialects, customs and traditional world views are concerned. 
• Further, inter tribal rivalry [Singh and Singh 1989] was a dominant feature. Yet with the appropriation of Naga as a political identity efforts are being made to have a common political platform where equal participation of the constituting tribes are sought. This is a major political achievement among the Nagas. This is where I see ‘Naga’ more a political identity rather than cultural. It may of course be possible to have all the tribes under the Naga fold to develop one common language and custom to integrate into one cultural block. Celebration of ‘Lui-ngai-ni’ as the common festival of the Nagas, particularly in Manipur, is an effort towards this end.
• The problems with the Kukis are, however, different. Though the term ‘Kuki’ is also a creation of the British, the tribes constituting this category has close cultural affinity – linguistically as well as by custom. Of course, it would be an over exaggeration if one projects these tribes under one cultural head. Unlike the Nagas, Kuki as a political identity has not yet been fully appropriated. It remained more as a convenient name coined by the British administrators. 
• Though attempts were made for unification of all the tribes under ‘Kuki’ it was shortlived. By the half of 1940s three major divisions took place within the Kuki-Chin-Mizo group of Manipur, viz Mizo Union (predominantly constituted by Hmars), Kuki national assembly (initiated by Thadous and Haokips), and Khul union (initated by Paite, Vaiphei, Simte, Gangte, Kom, etc). This was followed by creation of political parties based on community lines by 1950. Kuki as a political concept got a major setback by these groupings marked by exclusivity along tribal lines. This break up was ignited by Willium Shaw’s note on the Thadou which was based on Jamkinthang Sitlou’s book Under the Wings of Thadou where supremacy of Thadous over other Kuki tribes was propounded. 
• This narrative of imposing hegemony under the ‘wings of Thadous’ faced stiff resistance from the other constituting partners. The inevitable followed – the disintegration of Kuki identity and emergence of three major groupings mentioned above. Failure to integrate the Kuki tribes, either through equal participation or dominance of one over others, also shows the thin fabric which fails to tie them as a cultural unit or block.
•  It further shows the difficulty of seeing Kuki as a cultural identity before being a political one. Recent attempt by some scholars to float the concept of ‘Zale’n-gam’ [Haokip 1998] by including all these tribes into Kuki once again is yet another attempt to create Kuki both as a political identity and cultural identity. Success or failure is yet to be seen. My contention here is that projection of political identities by groups of tribes is much recent, a post-independence (of India) phenomenon. Projecting cultural identity under the same name is still a distant possibility.
• It is a matter of fact that these new identities-in-formation have started using the discourse of western liberal democracy and its ideological constructs though it is hard to presume if those values have really been internalised. Political consciousness in its collective form becomes not o nly exclusive in approach, but also takes violent turns – ethnic conflicts being its outcome. ‘A factor which, perhaps, contributes towards a violent expression of aspirations for political independence is the absence of a language native to a community in terms of which to generate a complex, nuanced, authentic and imaginative articulation of the idea of freedom. 
• In the absence of such a language, the articulation takes place in the language of ideologies fashioned elsewhere and not internalised to any appreciable degrees’ [Miri 1999]. Let me not go into the issue of ‘not having a native language for discourse’ but on the issue of lack of internalisation, though perhaps the former is the cause for the latter. Rise of violence in its varied forms emerges mainly because of non-internalisation of the borrowed discourse. This doubt on internalisation remains even after conceding the arguments by many in the ‘south’ that borrowed categories of the west no more remains the same while in operation in the developing countries. 
• That concept like ‘secularism’ in the Indian context has to be understood differently for the discourse has totally changed from the place of its origin. This line of argument has already been conceded while studying  the idea of ‘nation’ as used in the political discourses in the region. However, the success or failure of these identity formations in terms of achieving the spirit of democratic values is yet to be accounted.
• The ideas of ‘nation’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘human rights’ that all the major tribes and communities in the state use in their respective discourses are in the midst of strong tribal kinship and bond. The idea of a Naga nation or a Kuki (and for that matter, pan-Manipuri) draws legitimacy from the same discourse, that of the western liberal democracy. Interestingly, each of these identities emerges with consciousness which are opposed to the idea of India as a nation state though both the Indian state as well as these ethnic ‘nations’ borrow their legitimacy, again, from the same discursive context [Akoijam 2002]. The very complexity of these identities lies where Naga ‘nation’ and Kuki ‘nation’ operating within the territory of Manipur are, in addition to their opposition to Indian nation state, mutually opposed to which is also targeted towards Manipuri as a ‘nation’. 
• This is indeed alarming that instead of being accommodative these identities have turned exclusive and hostile. At present, the wider ‘world view’ remains more in symbolism than in content. Yet I see this, particularly of the Nagas and the Kukis, as a struggle to come out of tribal moorings, failure being only a pathway.
• Emergence of political consciousness cannot be seen as the only factor determining the process of identity formation and subsequent conflict. Increasing awareness of land as the only long-term reliable capital for all development purposes in the state has slowly been realised by the tribes/ communities. It is this realisation, of course under certain conditions, that also triggers an atmosphere of conflict. The ‘quit notice’ served by the United Naga Council (UNC) to the Kukis in October 1992 is indirectly influenced by this factor. Though the issue of land as ‘capital’ does not surface in the political debate that clearly, it is but obvious from the mode of debate initiated in the whole discourse. 
• For instance, the anti-Tipaimukh dam agitation recently intensified by five Naga organisations tells the story.6 Another significant case has been the proposal for the creation of Sadar Hills district, the major point of contention being that of power over land. Though land as ‘capital’ is bracketed for the time being, it is the fear of others using the capital that each tribe is haunted with. The debate on migration and settlement is carried forward to justify the claim over the land-capital. The idea of ‘nativity’ carries legitimacy in the debate on the issue of ownership. 
• Dismissing the issue of land -ascapital will only involve rational arguments based on economy and compromise which none of the ethnic groups at present is ready for. Adopting a method of adjustment is considered suicidal at the moment, more so for the winning group.

Question of Land

• Instead of sloganeering land as ‘capital’, the ‘right of the peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 1803) has been projected as the starting point for political campaign. Projecting ‘possession of native land’ as an inalienable rights not only unifies tribes under panNaga identity because of common practical interest of inheritance of each tribe, but this strategy also serves as good ground for wiping out the enemy. Legitimacy is drawn from international declarations like UN covenants and charters. 
• Physically liquidating the Kukis may not be justified but pushing intruders out of the ‘occupied land’ certainly is. The stark irony however is that violence of any form under such circumstances rarely gets deserving international, and even national, attention. (Naga-Kuki clash could hardly reach headlines in national dailies). Violence often is seen as the unavoidable means of realising the community’s inalienable rights. Whether it is East Timor or northern Sri Lanka or Northern Ireland, the story has all been the same. Naga -Kuki story is nothing different in this regard. What is worth studying is the adoption of political moves which not only integrates the constituting groups within a party but also finds rational ground for justifying certain strategic means which otherwise are morally as well as legally unjustified. ‘Migration’ and ‘settlement’ have been projected as the best-suited themes to enhance Naga unification move.
• Though migration is a universal phenomenon, locating the migrant is an upheaval task. Where do we draw the historical line of demarcation? Who are to be termed the natives and who the migrants? Layers of migrations and subsequent settlement by the hordes or wondering tribes are proven facts. It is also a fact that a relatively settled life is shaped by the geographical contours (a river, sea, or plains).
• The same has happened in Manipur, too. Historiography of Manipur has the record of migration to the valley of Manipur as early as 33 AD narrated in the text Poireiton Khunthok, where a tribe from Khamnung Sawa headed by its chief, Poireiton, migrated and settled in the north-western part of the Imphal valley.8 There are several other instances of such tribes migrating and settling in the Imphal valley, which over a period of time merged into the Meitei confederation. 
• Though I have used the term ‘confederation’ for lack of appropriate word, it is difficult to assess the political locus standi of the Meitei community during the time it absorbed many other tribes into its fold. For there are records of some tribes of the valley whose population got divided, few were absorbed into the Meitei confederation while few others assimilated to other hill tribes. There are at present as many as 29 ‘scheduled’ tribes in Manipur most of them inhabiting the hills. Many of these tribes trace their origin to some earlier existing tribes in China and adjoining places [Lal Dena 1999]. Going by these sources, it is but natural to presume that most of them have migrated from different places.
• I would go to the extent of challenging the thesis of historical rootedness, the idea of ‘nativity’, of a community or a tribe over the land it proposes to hold/control beyond the areas where their mode of production operates. I see the nature of such assertions more political than historical. Considering the debate on migration, it is but obvious that conflict(s) is bound to take place. The conflict inevitably emerges between the so-called ‘earlier settled tribe’ with the ‘later migrants’.
• Though migration is followed by settlement, interlinkages between the two with collective conflict seek further attention. Sociology of politics and sociology of economics divide the two otherwise inseparable events. While the issue of migrationTis projected as the point of departure for distinguishing the native from the outsider, that of separating ‘we’ from ‘they’, it is the settlement which covertly generates the fear (of being made insignificant) in one or the other tribe, of being robbed of the land-capital. Political and ideological theories are then construed out of this fear.
• However, to my mind, process of identity formation does not give cognisance to the forces of landcapital in the whole issue. The reasons need to be further deliberated upon. Ignoring of land-capital in the entire deliberation will not only fail to address the issue of conflict in its entirety but also lead towards political solutions which are but partial. To clarify my position, let me here emphasise on the differentiation between land as capital and land as place of habitation.
• As long as land was in plenty, beyond the control of a tribe, beyond the matrix of its handled technology and worldview, neither migration nor settlement was considered worth considering an issue. Perhaps earlier, the idea of conflict lay on external invasion and the relationsh ip of dominance and subservience. To draw a case in point, one may study the idea of loipot kaba, which was an administrative/ military practice of the Meitei kings to their subjects, not directly under their day-today administrative fold, but to those they have conquered, defeated or controlled.
• The victims have been hill tribes like Maring, Anal, Tangkhul, Mao, etc. Thus the equation of power was more about one community/tribe defeating  the other militarily – but not necessarily  settling  down in the conquered territory or militarily guarding the controlled land.  The idea of territorial control is measured in terms of battles fought and subjecting others to accept defeat.
• The concept of conflict has drastically changed in the recent times. It is no more be tween the invader and the invaded, but between the native and the migrants. It is the settlement, which begins peacefully by stray migration of a handful of people in batches over untrodden land that later ignites the tension. The infamous Naga-Kuki conflict started with the issue of settlement, more accurately with UNC’s ‘quit notice’ as mentioned earlier. The argument of the Naga apex body supported by many others was that Kukis have been residing in the land ancestrally owned by the Nagas, that they are intruders, and hence have no rights over the ‘Naga territory’. Its further claim, as mentioned earlier, seeks justification from declarations like the UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962, ‘permanent sovereignty  over natural resources,’ etc. 
• The  justification further seeks legitimacy through the fact that, at present, barring some areas at Chandel and Kangpokpi there are no Kukis in the Naga inhabited areas. The claim can be ascertained after a decade long Naga -Kuki conflict where Kukis have been driven out of the districts of Tamenglong and Ukhrul, and partly from Chandel and Senapati. Starting from early 1990s till the end of the decade as many as 750 Kukis were massacred in the state, excluding those in Nagaland and Assam.10 Casualty, of course, had been in both ends. In total, nearly 1,14,300 Kukis and Nagas were displaced [Haokip 2001]. The expression ‘Naga dominated areas’ is now converted into ‘Naga inhabited areas’. The change in the expression not only pictures the present state of affairs but also takes a step towards verifying the claim of the Nagas over their ‘ancestral land’, that the demo-graphic composition is exclusively Nagas.
• What worries most is exaggerating inter-pretations of international covenants and declarations serving the interest of the concerned parties. There have been enormous amount of arguments and counterarguments propagated through the media justifying group actions to the extent of upholding acts of violence of the meanest form. It needs to be spelt out that context-free nature of international declarations does not entail interpreting texts beyond the paradigm of discourse. Justifying genocide11 is one such instance witnessed in the recent times. It is a serious matter to be looked into. Some forms of tribunal, internationally or within the country, needs to be enacted to look into the nature of group actions and validity of claims and counter claims.
• The events witnessed in the last few decades in the state have slowly changed the equation of power and process of participation in the political dialogue of ethnic communities. What had been so far termed a Meitei centric confederation is turning towards tribe-centric movement [Ranjit 1988]. Till withering away of the colonial rule, history has been written by and for the winning parties. Losers find no or little place in it. It is to be seen as time passes how the history of conflict is written and its consequences determine the process of history writing in the region – of the land and its people.
• Of present, the centre stage in the politics of Manipur is enjoyed by the Nagas and the Meiteis as two poles in the entire ‘balance of power’. The place of the lesser-known tribes is still to be ascertained. It is worth noting how the shift has taken place in the balance of power in recent times. Post Naga-Kuki clash in the 1990s has tilted the point of fulcrum.Naga political movement has taken a giant leap tilting the position Meiteis have enjoyed so long. The current process of dialogue between GOI and NSCN (IM) is the ultimate height Naga assertion in Manipur has reached in its history. It not only got its legitimacy over the land it has been claiming but more directly targeted the Meiteis. The real perception of threat by the Meiteis could be seen in the anti-ceasefire agitation that left the state assembly in ashes with 18 protesters losing lives. The aftermath of ‘ceasefire extension’ marks a point of shift in the equation of power.
• Several issues, in addition to the demand of greater (and southern) Nagaland, such as claims for Sixth Schedule, union territory, claiming additional power for the autonomous district councils under the existing Fifth Schedule, and formation of Sadar Hills district, are the current highlights in the process of political discourse. Thiscan be seen as the sign of a fast emerging pace of political consciousness among the various tribes in the state. Readjustment of political space is fast taking place.
• The end of Naga-Kuki clash has not stopped the process of ethnic conflict. Instead of collective participation of ethnic communities (under the proposed constituted praxis), earlier existing power structure seems to remain undisturbed, the only change being increase in the number of players in the power centre. Possibility of meaningful political dialogue is overshadowed by the game of dominance and subservience. Rather legitimacy to play the game has been won as the result of the earlier conflict. Subsequent conflict was witnessed between the Kukis and the Paites. A much more complex tension has also emerged between the Nagas and the Meiteis. A trend seems to be already set.
• The problem of migration and settlement continued even after the Naga-Kuki clash in the district of Churachandpur between the Kukis and the Paites. Following the same trend, fear became the focal point of conflict. The fear in the Paites was that of being demographically overshadowed, land being snatched, and politically dominated by the increasing Thadou Kuki migration in the so-called ‘Kuki home'. In the process unarmed civilians were the casualties. In such an ethnic strife, identity of an individual becomes immaterial. Each is seen as belonging to either of the warring tribes.
• The disturbing note is the continuation of the same trend set in the Naga-Kuki conflict. Fear in the Paites, whether founded or unfounded, was triggered by the issue of land and power. Abrupt increase of Thadou Kuki population was seen as a beginning of their share of land being captured by the Thadou Kukis and politically outnumbering other tribes. (In addition, there have been several other immediate factors.) Similar was the issue that triggered Naga -Kuki conflict. No lesson seems to have been learnt. What turned out to be a chain-look-alike separate phenomena is perhaps what signifies the Manipur conflict scenario from the rest of the region.
• Continuing the strife in a more covert and complex form is that between the Meiteis and the Nagas. Projecting a common enemy is an easier way to consolidate otherwise scattered groups through which new community  identity  is formed. Naga identity  formation  in  Manipur engages this particular method largely based on anti-Meitei sentiment. Initial means of unification was through anti-Kuki sentiment. The propagation of its political standpoint is marked by what is often stated as the past ‘ill doings of the (hinduised) Meiteis to the hill people’. Often quoted instances are of ‘untouchability’ exercised by the Meiteis to the tribes. While it is not the intention here to completely deny such historical episodes, such a practice as has been often quoted need proper scrutiny.
• Many of the instances of ‘untouchability’ turn out to be an exercise to control power exerting hegemony by the Meitei ruling class to its subjects, both the tribes as well as the Meitei peasants. In fact Meitei peasants faced harder atrocities in the hands of Rajkumars (feudal lords) and the Bamons (brahmins). Exploitation took place in terms of several taxes based on religious purity and impurity. There had been cases when suddenly the maharaja declared all his subjects ‘impure’ and that they had to pay purification fee to the king to be conducted by the priests. 
• There were taxes like ‘Chandon senkhai’ (tax on use of chandan by the Hindu subjects) and ‘Pothang’ system (exploitative administrative law associated with four types of free community labour) [Lokendra 1998: 83]. The so -called exploitation by the Meiteis of the hill people turns out to be acts of the Manipuri king and the ruling class. Unfortunately what has been projected in the discourse on Naga identity politics is purely on ethnic lines, Meiteis are seen as the oppressor and Nagas the oppressed. Naga political strategy seems to perceive social reality from the prism of ethnic contradiction. Equating Meitei ruling class with the Meitei people would be to commit a major conceptual fallacy.
• The fact is that Vaisnavism has put a halt in the process of Meiteisation of different tribes, so a new approach for unity has to be looked for. Christianisation has also put a check on the proce ss of Meitei centric worldview. Neither is the Naga centric worldview, which take recourse to Christian worldview, the answer. Hegemony of any kind, be it by the Meiteis or the Nagas, can no longer work. 
• The answer, lies in finding an alternative model of integration. What Jean Paul Sartre (1982) termed as ‘constitutive praxis’ forming the constituted praxis seems to be ideal and most workable answer. This has to be translated in terms of political participation and economic development aiming at removing regional imbalances. Unless such a method is adopted a chain of conflict is bound to take place. Conflict in the state has by and large arisen out of
  (i) non-governance [Oinam 2002] and
  (ii) tendency to subsume the other within one’s own fold. Dominance and subservience still work under cover which have to stop. 
• Unless sincere efforts are made towards ending the politics of dominance and hegemony, problem of conflict, and subsequently violence, is still a far away dream. This applies not only to the state of Manipur but also to the entire region.