Indus Water Treaty | Political Science & International Relations: Mains Optional - UPSC PDF Download

 Page 1


 
 
 
 
 Indus Water Treaty- Issues and 
opportunities between India-Pakistan over sharing of 
Indus waters and its impact on states in India 
 
 
 Indus water treaty is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful 
coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship. Well-wishers of the treaty 
often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”. The World Bank, which, as the 
third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride 
that the treaty functions. 
 
 Partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 
1947.  
 The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system 
into two halves.  
 The three ‘western rivers’ (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) went to Pakistan and 
the three ‘eastern rivers’ (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) were portioned to India.  
 India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus 
system to Pakistan. 
 India also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build 
replacement canals from the western rivers. 
 A notable feature of IWT was the establishment of Permanent Indus 
Commission (PIC), with one commissioner from each country to implement 
the treaty as well as settle differences and disputes by agreement, neutral 
expert, court of arbitration or any other manner as agreed. 
 
 
 
Page 2


 
 
 
 
 Indus Water Treaty- Issues and 
opportunities between India-Pakistan over sharing of 
Indus waters and its impact on states in India 
 
 
 Indus water treaty is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful 
coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship. Well-wishers of the treaty 
often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”. The World Bank, which, as the 
third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride 
that the treaty functions. 
 
 Partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 
1947.  
 The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system 
into two halves.  
 The three ‘western rivers’ (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) went to Pakistan and 
the three ‘eastern rivers’ (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) were portioned to India.  
 India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus 
system to Pakistan. 
 India also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build 
replacement canals from the western rivers. 
 A notable feature of IWT was the establishment of Permanent Indus 
Commission (PIC), with one commissioner from each country to implement 
the treaty as well as settle differences and disputes by agreement, neutral 
expert, court of arbitration or any other manner as agreed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues in Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, IWT is a lopsided agreement which keeps for 
India just 19.48% of the total Indus-system waters and the world’s only inter-
country water agreement embodying the doctrine of restricted sovereignty, which 
compels the upstream nation to forego major river uses for the benefit of the 
downstream state. 
 
 According to Sayanangshu Modak, The IWT allows India to build a dam to 
generate hydroelectricity on western rivers. It also allows for irrigation on a 
small scale – up to 700,000 acres in total, spread among the Indus, Jhelun, and 
Chenab Rivers.  
 However, Annex D of the IWT bars India from constructing movable 
gates, as it would allow for the manipulation of water storage.  
 Although Indian projects are in line with conditions, Pakistan has 
repeatedly objected projects and approached PIC on Kishan Gangam 
Tulbul navigation and rattle dam, 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, India is not utilising the 3.6 million acre 
feet (MAF) of “permissible storage capacity” granted by the IWT on the 
western rivers. Poor water development projects have allowed 2-3 MAF of 
water to easily flow into Pakistan. 
 Out of the total estimated capacity of 11406 MW electricity that can be 
harnessed from the three western rivers in Kashmir, only 3034 MW has 
been tapped so far. 
 India’s leadership and water development planners in the 1970s lost much 
ground to Pakistan on the interpretation of IWT when it came to various 
projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab).  
 India conceded to Pakistan’s objections, for example on the Salal 
hydroelectricity project and then later the Tulbul navigation.  
 The adjustment on the height of the Salal resulted in huge siltation of the 
dam and the Tulbul waterway even till today remains shelved. 
 Being a lower riparian state, Pakistan’s scepticism of India allows it to 
increasingly politicise the issue. 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, India’s total installed generating capacity in 
J&K currently does not match the electric output of a single major dam in 
Pakistan, such as Tarbela, or Diamer-Bhasha.  
 In the lower basin, where India has full rights, the substantial waters of 
the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej untapped by it go to Pakistan as bonus outflows. 
 
 According to Bhrata Bhushan, The hydroelectric power potential of the three 
eastern rivers is estimated to be 18,600 Megawatt. Of this, only 11,406 Megawatt 
is either being used or is part of plans for usage. 
 India as the upper riparian has positional advantage in controlling the flow of 
the Indus Basin Rivers. But it lacks the hydrological infrastructure. 
 
 The state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan, has created pressures on Indian 
government to review the treaty. For instance, the Uri and Pulwama attacks 
Page 3


 
 
 
 
 Indus Water Treaty- Issues and 
opportunities between India-Pakistan over sharing of 
Indus waters and its impact on states in India 
 
 
 Indus water treaty is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful 
coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship. Well-wishers of the treaty 
often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”. The World Bank, which, as the 
third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride 
that the treaty functions. 
 
 Partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 
1947.  
 The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system 
into two halves.  
 The three ‘western rivers’ (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) went to Pakistan and 
the three ‘eastern rivers’ (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) were portioned to India.  
 India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus 
system to Pakistan. 
 India also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build 
replacement canals from the western rivers. 
 A notable feature of IWT was the establishment of Permanent Indus 
Commission (PIC), with one commissioner from each country to implement 
the treaty as well as settle differences and disputes by agreement, neutral 
expert, court of arbitration or any other manner as agreed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues in Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, IWT is a lopsided agreement which keeps for 
India just 19.48% of the total Indus-system waters and the world’s only inter-
country water agreement embodying the doctrine of restricted sovereignty, which 
compels the upstream nation to forego major river uses for the benefit of the 
downstream state. 
 
 According to Sayanangshu Modak, The IWT allows India to build a dam to 
generate hydroelectricity on western rivers. It also allows for irrigation on a 
small scale – up to 700,000 acres in total, spread among the Indus, Jhelun, and 
Chenab Rivers.  
 However, Annex D of the IWT bars India from constructing movable 
gates, as it would allow for the manipulation of water storage.  
 Although Indian projects are in line with conditions, Pakistan has 
repeatedly objected projects and approached PIC on Kishan Gangam 
Tulbul navigation and rattle dam, 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, India is not utilising the 3.6 million acre 
feet (MAF) of “permissible storage capacity” granted by the IWT on the 
western rivers. Poor water development projects have allowed 2-3 MAF of 
water to easily flow into Pakistan. 
 Out of the total estimated capacity of 11406 MW electricity that can be 
harnessed from the three western rivers in Kashmir, only 3034 MW has 
been tapped so far. 
 India’s leadership and water development planners in the 1970s lost much 
ground to Pakistan on the interpretation of IWT when it came to various 
projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab).  
 India conceded to Pakistan’s objections, for example on the Salal 
hydroelectricity project and then later the Tulbul navigation.  
 The adjustment on the height of the Salal resulted in huge siltation of the 
dam and the Tulbul waterway even till today remains shelved. 
 Being a lower riparian state, Pakistan’s scepticism of India allows it to 
increasingly politicise the issue. 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, India’s total installed generating capacity in 
J&K currently does not match the electric output of a single major dam in 
Pakistan, such as Tarbela, or Diamer-Bhasha.  
 In the lower basin, where India has full rights, the substantial waters of 
the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej untapped by it go to Pakistan as bonus outflows. 
 
 According to Bhrata Bhushan, The hydroelectric power potential of the three 
eastern rivers is estimated to be 18,600 Megawatt. Of this, only 11,406 Megawatt 
is either being used or is part of plans for usage. 
 India as the upper riparian has positional advantage in controlling the flow of 
the Indus Basin Rivers. But it lacks the hydrological infrastructure. 
 
 The state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan, has created pressures on Indian 
government to review the treaty. For instance, the Uri and Pulwama attacks 
 
 
 
 
aftermath, PM Modi has commented that  “blood and water and cannot flow 
together.” He threatened to “review” the IWT and “exploit to the maximum” the 
waters of the western rivers allocated to Pakistan. 
 
 Anticipating differences between the two countries, the IWT also provides for a 
three-level escalation for dispute resolution. 
 
Abrogation is a right choice? 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, ‘every now and then, there is a clamour in 
India for abrogating the IWT as a response to Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism.’ 
Any attempt towards this would require a number of politico-diplomatic and 
hydrological factors to be determined as also a political consensus. 
 
 Iftakhar Drabhu argues that in terms of water availability for Pakistan, it 
would continue to receive the flows till India plans and completes its storage 
and/or water diversion projects. 
 With the Indus basin supporting 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture, and 
employing more than 40 % of the population, the common man in 
Pakistan will see it as India’s attempt to strangulate and starve his people 
and his country.  
 A god sent opportunity to exacerbate the tensions between the two 
countries. 
 According to Sayagangshu Modak, By keeping to the IWT, India could 
leverage its position as a responsible upstream riparian when it engages with 
China over water issue.  
 China is an upstream riparian to some of the major rivers like Sutlej and 
Indus flowing into India from Tibet.  
 China is a self-proclaimed “all-weather friend” to Pakistan.  
 Moreover, meltwater from the Tibetan plateau contributes around 35 to 40 
percent of the total flow into the Indus basin.  
 Currently, India only has a data sharing agreement with China and it will 
definitely be at a loss if China proposes to obstruct or divert the flow of 
water in the Indus basin – a very possible scenario, should India similarly 
obstruct Pakistan’s access to water. 
 
 According to Amit Ranjan, the abrogation of the IWT will send alarm bells 
ringing in India’s other lower riparian country, Bangladesh which receives 
about 91% of its waters from the rivers flowing from India. 
 Walking away from the IWT might result in India facing flak from the global 
community during a time when states are coming together and cooperating to 
improve the status of water security. Therefore, it is definitely in India’s best 
interest to continue the IWT and avoid its termination. 
 
Reasons for success of the Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 IWT has been rather effective is managing the sharing of river water between 
India and Pakistan. Many scholars have sought to understand the reasons for 
the same. One of the important things pointed out is the clear demarcation in 
Page 4


 
 
 
 
 Indus Water Treaty- Issues and 
opportunities between India-Pakistan over sharing of 
Indus waters and its impact on states in India 
 
 
 Indus water treaty is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful 
coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship. Well-wishers of the treaty 
often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”. The World Bank, which, as the 
third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride 
that the treaty functions. 
 
 Partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 
1947.  
 The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system 
into two halves.  
 The three ‘western rivers’ (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) went to Pakistan and 
the three ‘eastern rivers’ (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) were portioned to India.  
 India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus 
system to Pakistan. 
 India also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build 
replacement canals from the western rivers. 
 A notable feature of IWT was the establishment of Permanent Indus 
Commission (PIC), with one commissioner from each country to implement 
the treaty as well as settle differences and disputes by agreement, neutral 
expert, court of arbitration or any other manner as agreed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues in Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, IWT is a lopsided agreement which keeps for 
India just 19.48% of the total Indus-system waters and the world’s only inter-
country water agreement embodying the doctrine of restricted sovereignty, which 
compels the upstream nation to forego major river uses for the benefit of the 
downstream state. 
 
 According to Sayanangshu Modak, The IWT allows India to build a dam to 
generate hydroelectricity on western rivers. It also allows for irrigation on a 
small scale – up to 700,000 acres in total, spread among the Indus, Jhelun, and 
Chenab Rivers.  
 However, Annex D of the IWT bars India from constructing movable 
gates, as it would allow for the manipulation of water storage.  
 Although Indian projects are in line with conditions, Pakistan has 
repeatedly objected projects and approached PIC on Kishan Gangam 
Tulbul navigation and rattle dam, 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, India is not utilising the 3.6 million acre 
feet (MAF) of “permissible storage capacity” granted by the IWT on the 
western rivers. Poor water development projects have allowed 2-3 MAF of 
water to easily flow into Pakistan. 
 Out of the total estimated capacity of 11406 MW electricity that can be 
harnessed from the three western rivers in Kashmir, only 3034 MW has 
been tapped so far. 
 India’s leadership and water development planners in the 1970s lost much 
ground to Pakistan on the interpretation of IWT when it came to various 
projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab).  
 India conceded to Pakistan’s objections, for example on the Salal 
hydroelectricity project and then later the Tulbul navigation.  
 The adjustment on the height of the Salal resulted in huge siltation of the 
dam and the Tulbul waterway even till today remains shelved. 
 Being a lower riparian state, Pakistan’s scepticism of India allows it to 
increasingly politicise the issue. 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, India’s total installed generating capacity in 
J&K currently does not match the electric output of a single major dam in 
Pakistan, such as Tarbela, or Diamer-Bhasha.  
 In the lower basin, where India has full rights, the substantial waters of 
the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej untapped by it go to Pakistan as bonus outflows. 
 
 According to Bhrata Bhushan, The hydroelectric power potential of the three 
eastern rivers is estimated to be 18,600 Megawatt. Of this, only 11,406 Megawatt 
is either being used or is part of plans for usage. 
 India as the upper riparian has positional advantage in controlling the flow of 
the Indus Basin Rivers. But it lacks the hydrological infrastructure. 
 
 The state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan, has created pressures on Indian 
government to review the treaty. For instance, the Uri and Pulwama attacks 
 
 
 
 
aftermath, PM Modi has commented that  “blood and water and cannot flow 
together.” He threatened to “review” the IWT and “exploit to the maximum” the 
waters of the western rivers allocated to Pakistan. 
 
 Anticipating differences between the two countries, the IWT also provides for a 
three-level escalation for dispute resolution. 
 
Abrogation is a right choice? 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, ‘every now and then, there is a clamour in 
India for abrogating the IWT as a response to Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism.’ 
Any attempt towards this would require a number of politico-diplomatic and 
hydrological factors to be determined as also a political consensus. 
 
 Iftakhar Drabhu argues that in terms of water availability for Pakistan, it 
would continue to receive the flows till India plans and completes its storage 
and/or water diversion projects. 
 With the Indus basin supporting 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture, and 
employing more than 40 % of the population, the common man in 
Pakistan will see it as India’s attempt to strangulate and starve his people 
and his country.  
 A god sent opportunity to exacerbate the tensions between the two 
countries. 
 According to Sayagangshu Modak, By keeping to the IWT, India could 
leverage its position as a responsible upstream riparian when it engages with 
China over water issue.  
 China is an upstream riparian to some of the major rivers like Sutlej and 
Indus flowing into India from Tibet.  
 China is a self-proclaimed “all-weather friend” to Pakistan.  
 Moreover, meltwater from the Tibetan plateau contributes around 35 to 40 
percent of the total flow into the Indus basin.  
 Currently, India only has a data sharing agreement with China and it will 
definitely be at a loss if China proposes to obstruct or divert the flow of 
water in the Indus basin – a very possible scenario, should India similarly 
obstruct Pakistan’s access to water. 
 
 According to Amit Ranjan, the abrogation of the IWT will send alarm bells 
ringing in India’s other lower riparian country, Bangladesh which receives 
about 91% of its waters from the rivers flowing from India. 
 Walking away from the IWT might result in India facing flak from the global 
community during a time when states are coming together and cooperating to 
improve the status of water security. Therefore, it is definitely in India’s best 
interest to continue the IWT and avoid its termination. 
 
Reasons for success of the Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 IWT has been rather effective is managing the sharing of river water between 
India and Pakistan. Many scholars have sought to understand the reasons for 
the same. One of the important things pointed out is the clear demarcation in 
 
 
 
 
the flow of the river which facilitated the negotiation and acceptance of the 
Indus Water Treaty.  
 
 As M. Bhatnagar points out, ‘the Indus dispute was resolved by the separation 
of the rivers rather than by a joint development of the river system’ which was 
possible in the case of Indus but not with respect to river sharing of Ganges-
Brahmaputra with Bangladesh and China.  
 
 Another major reason for success of IWT finds origin in Le Marquand's (1977) 
influential study that states, ‘riparians are better able to resolve problems if 
win-win situations are created’. The first criteria for successful river water 
negotiation is the condition of a ‘non zero sum game’, where benefits that 
accrue to one riparian do not necessarily imply losses to the other, which has 
been partly achieved by the IWT.  
 
 IWT creates ‘win-win’ situations, as Pakistan, which is entitled to a majority 
of the river water, isn’t adversely affected by India’s limited use of the eastern 
rivers thereby resulting in a ‘non-zero sum game’. The two major instances 
where Pakistan has objected to Indian activity in alleged violation of the IWT 
are the Tulbul navigation project (Pakistan refers to it as the Wullar barrage), 
and the Baglihar hydropower project – Pakistan objected to both projects on 
grounds of affecting the flow of river water into its territory. 
 
 Game theory accounts for trade-offs between two political entities that extend 
beyond economic outcomes. The primacy accorded to the India-Pakistan 
dispute and the need for relative stabilization in fear of exacerbating already 
precarious relations can partially explain the need for a conclusive treaty on 
the Indus. Therefore, the economic concessions made to Pakistan are balanced 
in terms of non-economic gains including peace, stability, and geo-political 
security. 
 
 Another major reason for success emerges in Le Marquand’s assertion that 
third party intervention is particularly useful in resolving disputes between 
upper and lower riparians. IWT was negotiated under the aegis of World Bank 
and even now in cases of disputes which can’t be resolved via talks, a Neutral 
Expert is called upon under the arbitration clause of the IWT to review the 
issue. 
 
 In addition, the mediation of the World Bank was instrumental because both 
the countries, having already fought one war in 1947-48, lacked trust between 
each other. By applying the ‘water rationality’ principle, U.Z. Alam argues 
that both India and Pakistan cooperated because they wanted to secure the 
water supply in the long-term. Since water is scarce and vital to both India and 
Pakistan, their cooperation, in contrast to waging war over it, was a much 
better option to build the infrastructure for future water use. 
 
H.K. Sahni remarks, ‘the Indus Water Treaty set a precedent of cooperation between 
India and Pakistan that has survived three wars and other hostilities between the two 
nations. 
Page 5


 
 
 
 
 Indus Water Treaty- Issues and 
opportunities between India-Pakistan over sharing of 
Indus waters and its impact on states in India 
 
 
 Indus water treaty is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful 
coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship. Well-wishers of the treaty 
often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”. The World Bank, which, as the 
third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride 
that the treaty functions. 
 
 Partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 
1947.  
 The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system 
into two halves.  
 The three ‘western rivers’ (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) went to Pakistan and 
the three ‘eastern rivers’ (Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) were portioned to India.  
 India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus 
system to Pakistan. 
 India also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build 
replacement canals from the western rivers. 
 A notable feature of IWT was the establishment of Permanent Indus 
Commission (PIC), with one commissioner from each country to implement 
the treaty as well as settle differences and disputes by agreement, neutral 
expert, court of arbitration or any other manner as agreed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issues in Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, IWT is a lopsided agreement which keeps for 
India just 19.48% of the total Indus-system waters and the world’s only inter-
country water agreement embodying the doctrine of restricted sovereignty, which 
compels the upstream nation to forego major river uses for the benefit of the 
downstream state. 
 
 According to Sayanangshu Modak, The IWT allows India to build a dam to 
generate hydroelectricity on western rivers. It also allows for irrigation on a 
small scale – up to 700,000 acres in total, spread among the Indus, Jhelun, and 
Chenab Rivers.  
 However, Annex D of the IWT bars India from constructing movable 
gates, as it would allow for the manipulation of water storage.  
 Although Indian projects are in line with conditions, Pakistan has 
repeatedly objected projects and approached PIC on Kishan Gangam 
Tulbul navigation and rattle dam, 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, India is not utilising the 3.6 million acre 
feet (MAF) of “permissible storage capacity” granted by the IWT on the 
western rivers. Poor water development projects have allowed 2-3 MAF of 
water to easily flow into Pakistan. 
 Out of the total estimated capacity of 11406 MW electricity that can be 
harnessed from the three western rivers in Kashmir, only 3034 MW has 
been tapped so far. 
 India’s leadership and water development planners in the 1970s lost much 
ground to Pakistan on the interpretation of IWT when it came to various 
projects on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab).  
 India conceded to Pakistan’s objections, for example on the Salal 
hydroelectricity project and then later the Tulbul navigation.  
 The adjustment on the height of the Salal resulted in huge siltation of the 
dam and the Tulbul waterway even till today remains shelved. 
 Being a lower riparian state, Pakistan’s scepticism of India allows it to 
increasingly politicise the issue. 
 
 According to Brahma Chellany, India’s total installed generating capacity in 
J&K currently does not match the electric output of a single major dam in 
Pakistan, such as Tarbela, or Diamer-Bhasha.  
 In the lower basin, where India has full rights, the substantial waters of 
the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej untapped by it go to Pakistan as bonus outflows. 
 
 According to Bhrata Bhushan, The hydroelectric power potential of the three 
eastern rivers is estimated to be 18,600 Megawatt. Of this, only 11,406 Megawatt 
is either being used or is part of plans for usage. 
 India as the upper riparian has positional advantage in controlling the flow of 
the Indus Basin Rivers. But it lacks the hydrological infrastructure. 
 
 The state sponsored terrorism by Pakistan, has created pressures on Indian 
government to review the treaty. For instance, the Uri and Pulwama attacks 
 
 
 
 
aftermath, PM Modi has commented that  “blood and water and cannot flow 
together.” He threatened to “review” the IWT and “exploit to the maximum” the 
waters of the western rivers allocated to Pakistan. 
 
 Anticipating differences between the two countries, the IWT also provides for a 
three-level escalation for dispute resolution. 
 
Abrogation is a right choice? 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, ‘every now and then, there is a clamour in 
India for abrogating the IWT as a response to Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism.’ 
Any attempt towards this would require a number of politico-diplomatic and 
hydrological factors to be determined as also a political consensus. 
 
 Iftakhar Drabhu argues that in terms of water availability for Pakistan, it 
would continue to receive the flows till India plans and completes its storage 
and/or water diversion projects. 
 With the Indus basin supporting 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture, and 
employing more than 40 % of the population, the common man in 
Pakistan will see it as India’s attempt to strangulate and starve his people 
and his country.  
 A god sent opportunity to exacerbate the tensions between the two 
countries. 
 According to Sayagangshu Modak, By keeping to the IWT, India could 
leverage its position as a responsible upstream riparian when it engages with 
China over water issue.  
 China is an upstream riparian to some of the major rivers like Sutlej and 
Indus flowing into India from Tibet.  
 China is a self-proclaimed “all-weather friend” to Pakistan.  
 Moreover, meltwater from the Tibetan plateau contributes around 35 to 40 
percent of the total flow into the Indus basin.  
 Currently, India only has a data sharing agreement with China and it will 
definitely be at a loss if China proposes to obstruct or divert the flow of 
water in the Indus basin – a very possible scenario, should India similarly 
obstruct Pakistan’s access to water. 
 
 According to Amit Ranjan, the abrogation of the IWT will send alarm bells 
ringing in India’s other lower riparian country, Bangladesh which receives 
about 91% of its waters from the rivers flowing from India. 
 Walking away from the IWT might result in India facing flak from the global 
community during a time when states are coming together and cooperating to 
improve the status of water security. Therefore, it is definitely in India’s best 
interest to continue the IWT and avoid its termination. 
 
Reasons for success of the Indus Water Treaty: 
 
 IWT has been rather effective is managing the sharing of river water between 
India and Pakistan. Many scholars have sought to understand the reasons for 
the same. One of the important things pointed out is the clear demarcation in 
 
 
 
 
the flow of the river which facilitated the negotiation and acceptance of the 
Indus Water Treaty.  
 
 As M. Bhatnagar points out, ‘the Indus dispute was resolved by the separation 
of the rivers rather than by a joint development of the river system’ which was 
possible in the case of Indus but not with respect to river sharing of Ganges-
Brahmaputra with Bangladesh and China.  
 
 Another major reason for success of IWT finds origin in Le Marquand's (1977) 
influential study that states, ‘riparians are better able to resolve problems if 
win-win situations are created’. The first criteria for successful river water 
negotiation is the condition of a ‘non zero sum game’, where benefits that 
accrue to one riparian do not necessarily imply losses to the other, which has 
been partly achieved by the IWT.  
 
 IWT creates ‘win-win’ situations, as Pakistan, which is entitled to a majority 
of the river water, isn’t adversely affected by India’s limited use of the eastern 
rivers thereby resulting in a ‘non-zero sum game’. The two major instances 
where Pakistan has objected to Indian activity in alleged violation of the IWT 
are the Tulbul navigation project (Pakistan refers to it as the Wullar barrage), 
and the Baglihar hydropower project – Pakistan objected to both projects on 
grounds of affecting the flow of river water into its territory. 
 
 Game theory accounts for trade-offs between two political entities that extend 
beyond economic outcomes. The primacy accorded to the India-Pakistan 
dispute and the need for relative stabilization in fear of exacerbating already 
precarious relations can partially explain the need for a conclusive treaty on 
the Indus. Therefore, the economic concessions made to Pakistan are balanced 
in terms of non-economic gains including peace, stability, and geo-political 
security. 
 
 Another major reason for success emerges in Le Marquand’s assertion that 
third party intervention is particularly useful in resolving disputes between 
upper and lower riparians. IWT was negotiated under the aegis of World Bank 
and even now in cases of disputes which can’t be resolved via talks, a Neutral 
Expert is called upon under the arbitration clause of the IWT to review the 
issue. 
 
 In addition, the mediation of the World Bank was instrumental because both 
the countries, having already fought one war in 1947-48, lacked trust between 
each other. By applying the ‘water rationality’ principle, U.Z. Alam argues 
that both India and Pakistan cooperated because they wanted to secure the 
water supply in the long-term. Since water is scarce and vital to both India and 
Pakistan, their cooperation, in contrast to waging war over it, was a much 
better option to build the infrastructure for future water use. 
 
H.K. Sahni remarks, ‘the Indus Water Treaty set a precedent of cooperation between 
India and Pakistan that has survived three wars and other hostilities between the two 
nations. 
 
 
 
 
Indus water treaty and impact on States: 
 
 In 1960, Water was critical for India’s development plans. It was vital to get the 
waters of the ‘eastern rivers’ for the proposed Rajasthan canal and the Bhakra 
Dam without which both Punjab and Rajasthan would be left dry, severely 
hampering India’s food production. According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, this is the 
reason why Nehru wanted complete control over eastern rivers. 
 
 The State of Jammu & Kashmir, though not a signatory but an important 
stakeholder, is also unhappy with IWT, and blames the Treaty for its 
economic woes. In fact, in 2002 a resolution was passed in the J&K State 
Legislative Assembly, seeking review of the Treaty.  
 
 According to Maya Marchandini, diplomatic sources who have worked closely 
on India-Pakistan ties, and experts who deal with water-sharing disputes, 
indicate that a possible reason for not stopping India’s share from going to 
Pakistan all these years. 
 It was to avoid an explosion of new water wars within the country. 
 Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Haryana have already locked horns over 
access to and use of water from these three rivers, internally.  
 It took nearly 40 years and the intervention of the Centre for the 
governments of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab to finally sign an 
agreement on the implementation of the Shahpur Kandi dam.  
 The Ujh dam on the Ravi river is also a source of contention for Punjab as 
are the Beas-Sutlej and Sutlej-Yamuna link canals. 
 
 According Ifthikhar Drabu, it is worth mentioning here that till date, no 
storage of any type has been constructed by India on western rivers.  
 If the storage volume permitted by the Treaty for Jhelum basin had been 
available, it could easily have moderated the level of flooding Kashmir 
experienced in September 2014. 
 
Opportunities and Way forward: 
 
 According to Uttam Kumar Sinha, Article XII of the IWT says that it “may from 
time to time be modified”.  
 Pakistan will see no merit in any modification having already got a good deal 
in 1960.  
 India’s best option would be to optimise the provisions of the treaty.  
 More over, now with a new set of hydrological realities, advanced 
engineering methods in dam construction and de-siltation, there is an urgent 
need to look at it afresh. 
 
 Brahma Chellany takes a hawkinsh view and argues that to bring Pakistan to 
heel, India needs to fashion water as an instrument of leverage. 
 Building leverage in the Indus Basin is a cheaper option for India to reform 
Pakistan’s behaviour than fighting a war.