Legal Current Affairs for CLAT (May 2024) | Legal Reasoning for CLAT PDF Download

Importance of Precedent in Law

Why in News?

Recently, a bench of Justices BR Gavai and Sandeep Mehta observed that disregarding a court's judgment would undermine its soundness. This observation came in the case of Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors.

Background of the Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors. Case:

• The State of Haryana amended Section 2(g) of the Haryana Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 by inserting sub-clause (6) through a gazette notification dated 11th February 1992, which received the President's assent on 14th January 1992.
• The review petitioner, along with other landowners, filed a batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the amendment.
• A Full Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petitions.
• The State of Haryana challenged the Full Bench’s decision before the Supreme Court through a Civil Appeal.
• The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for reconsideration in light of Article 31A of the Constitution.
• The Full Bench of the High Court, by its judgment dated 13th March 2003, partly allowed the petitions and issued directions regarding mutation entries made by the Revenue Authorities.
• Aggrieved by this, the State of Haryana filed a Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court, which was allowed by the Supreme Court's judgment on 7th April 2022.
• The review petitioner filed a review petition against the Supreme Court’s judgment dated 7th April 2022, contending that the judgment was contrary to the law established by Constitution Bench judgments.
• The petitioner argued that the judgment did not correctly consider the precedents regarding the vesting of land and modification of rights under the consolidation scheme.
• The review petitioner claimed that the judgment ignored settled precedents that had been in place for decades.

Court’s Observations:

• The Supreme Court held that "Ignoring the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court and taking a view totally contrary to the same itself would amount to a material error, manifest on the face of the order."
• The Court allowed the review petition.

Doctrine of Precedent under the Constitution of India, 1950:

About:

• The rule of precedent has been adopted from English jurisprudence into the Indian Constitution.
• Article 141 of the Constitution of India deals with the doctrine of precedent.
• Article 141 specifies that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
• The doctrine of precedent is the principle of following previous decisions of the Court within well-defined limits.
• The part of the judgment which constitutes the ratio decidendi (reason for the decision) of the judgment has a binding effect, whereas the part that constitutes obiter dictum (judicial opinion) has no binding effect.
• Ratio decidendi is the legal principle that is not only applicable to the particular case but to all similar future cases.
• Obiter dictum is merely a judicial opinion in a specific case and has no general applicability.
• In Bir Singh v. Union of India (2019), it was held that the judgment of a decided case is a precedent, and the same will operate as a binding precedent whenever a similar legal issue arises.

General Principles Related to the Doctrine of Precedent:

• The decisions of superior courts bind inferior courts, and the latter are obligated to follow them.
• The Supreme Court is not bound by its own decisions and may depart from them if necessary.
• A decision made by one High Court does not constitute a binding precedent over another High Court.
• High Courts or other subordinate courts do not have the power to override Supreme Court decisions.
• Procedural irregularity and immateriality do not invalidate the binding nature of a judgment.
• Ex-parte decisions by the Supreme Court are also binding and may be used as precedents.
• A bench with a smaller quorum cannot dissent from the decisions of a larger quorum.
• Procedural irregularity and immateriality do not invalidate the binding nature of a judgment.

Minutes of Order

Why in News?

Recently, the Supreme Court overturned an order passed by the Bombay High Court, stating that the High Court had failed to conduct a basic inquiry and that the order, made solely based on the Minutes of Order, was entirely illegal. Below is the background of the Ajay Ishwar Ghute & Ors. v. Meher K. Patel & Ors. case:

• Arbitration Petitions were filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A & C Act) before a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court.
• The dispute in the Arbitration Petitions was related to the lands of Parsi Dairy Farm.
• The High Court directed the police to provide protection to the parties to complete the process of handing over possession.
• According to the consent terms, a compound wall was to be constructed.
• However, some local people obstructed the construction of the compound wall. These locals were not parties to either the Arbitration Petition or the interim application.
• A writ petition was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI).
• The Division Bench of the High Court neither directed the impleadment of the affected parties nor dismissed the writ petition for the non-joinder of necessary parties. It passed the order in terms of the Minutes of Order.
• The reasons for passing an order in terms of the Minutes of Order were not recorded.
• The High Court also did not take into account the fact that third parties could be affected by the construction of the compound wall, which was allowed under police protection.
• An appeal was then filed before the Supreme Court.

What were the Court’s Observations?

• The Supreme Court set aside the order, ruling that an order passed in terms of the Minutes of Order is in invitum (against the will of the parties), and the Court must first examine whether it would be lawful to issue such an order in terms of the Minutes of Order.
• The Court stated that the High Court must ensure that all necessary parties are impleaded. It should consider that third parties might be affected by the order passed in terms of the Minutes of Order. If the petitioner fails to implead necessary parties, the Court must decline to pass the order.
• The Court emphasized that without hearing the necessary parties, an order passed by the Court is entirely illegal.
• An order based on the Minutes of Order is not a consent order.
• When passing an order in terms of the Minutes of Order, the Court must record brief reasons that reflect its application of mind.

What are Minutes of Order?

• Minutes of Order are documents drafted by the advocates representing the parties for the convenience of the Court.
• The Minutes of Order specify what could be incorporated in the Court's order.
• This practice was developed to save the Court's time.
• The advocates who sign the Minutes of Order have a greater responsibility as officers of the Court. They must ensure that the proposed order is lawful.
• The practice of passing orders based on Minutes of Order, submitted by the advocates, is common only in the Bombay High Court.

Compassionate Appointment of Divorced Daughters

Why in the News?

Recently, the bench of Justice J.J. Munir observed, “If, on the date of demise of the employee in harness, it can be shown that a married daughter is dependent upon him, or his widow and minor family members could be supported by the married daughter, if granted compassionate appointment, it may be a case for considering the claim and judging the validity of the prohibitive rule.” This observation was made by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Akhtari Khatoon v. State of U.P. and Ors.

Background of the Akhtari Khatoon v. State of U.P. and Ors. Case:

• The petitioner’s father, Nasir Ahmad, was an employee of the Purvanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (the Corporation), who passed away while in service.
• The petitioner claimed to be divorced from her husband, Nisar Ahmad, through a Talaqnama.
• She sought compassionate appointment and family pension from the Corporation as the legal heir of her deceased father.
• The Corporation requested a succession certificate from her, which she obtained from the District Court, establishing her entitlement to her father’s retiral dues.
• However, the petitioner filed the petition, alleging that while she was initially paid her father’s retiral dues and pension for some period in 2019-2020, it was stopped by the Corporation without any valid reason.
• She sought a direction for the grant of compassionate appointment from the Corporation as the legal heir of her deceased father.

Court’s Observations:

• The court ruled that a divorced daughter must demonstrate her dependence on the deceased employee at the time of his death to qualify for compassionate appointment.
• The court noted that the petitioner failed to establish:
  • Her dependence on the deceased employee at the time of his death.
  • The authenticity of the Talaqnama to prove her divorce.
  • The full particulars of the deceased’s other dependents, whom she claimed to support.
• Regarding the family pension, the court pointed out that the petitioner did not cite any statutory rule entitling her to receive the family pension for her father's services.
• Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Landmark Cases on Compassionate Appointment:

Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another (2016):

• The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court struck down the word ‘unmarried’ qualifying ‘daughter’ in Rule 2(c)(iii) of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servants Dying in Harness Rules, 1974, as violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

State of U.P. and another v. Madhavi Mishra and others (2021):

• The Allahabad High Court held that a married daughter cannot claim compassionate appointment as a matter of right.

Director of Treasuries in Karnataka and another v. Somyashree (2021):

• The Supreme Court summarized the principles governing the grant of appointment on compassionate grounds:
• Compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule.
• No aspirant has a right to compassionate appointment.
• Appointments to public posts in the service of the State must be made in accordance with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
• Appointment on compassionate grounds can only be made if the applicant fulfills the norms laid down by the State’s policy and/or satisfies the eligibility criteria.
• The norms prevailing at the time of consideration of the application should be the basis for deciding the claim for compassionate appointment.

The State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Ms. Madhuri Maruti Vidhate (2022):

• The Supreme Court observed that a married daughter of a deceased employee cannot be considered dependent on her deceased mother, especially after a significant period has passed since the employee's death.

Women Reservation

Why in News?

Recently, the bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and KV Viswanathan ruled that “Notwithstanding any resolution passed by the Supreme Court Bar Association, some posts in the Executive Committee must be reserved for women members of the bar.” This order was passed in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v. BD Kaushik.

Background of Supreme Court Bar Association v. BD Kaushik Case

• The Supreme Court had previously invited suggestions from the members of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) regarding reforms in the election process, through an order dated 14th August 2023.
• The SCBA held a Special General Body Meeting on 30th April 2024, where eight resolutions were presented. However, all resolutions failed to secure the required 2/3rd majority of members present and voting.
• These resolutions concerned:
  • Revising eligibility criteria for SCBA office bearers
  • Revising admission and deposit fees
  • Increasing the minimum number of members required to convene meetings
  • Extending the tenure of the Executive Committee
  • Introducing reservation for women

Court’s Orders

• The Court recognized that the SCBA plays an integral role in the country’s highest judicial forum and acknowledged the need for timely reforms to meet evolving challenges while ensuring proper consideration of suggestions from bar members.

The following directions were issued by the Court:

• The SCBA Executive Committee was directed to invite suggestions from all bar members via public notice on its website by 19th July 2024, including suggestions already received.
• Cross-suggestions on the compiled suggestions were to be invited until 9th August 2024.
• To ensure adequate representation of women in SCBA governance, the following reservations were implemented with immediate effect:
  • A minimum of 1/3rd of the seats (3 out of 9) in the Executive Committee reserved for women
  • A minimum of 1/3rd (2 out of 6) Senior Executive Members reserved for women
  • At least one post of Office Bearer reserved for women on a rotation basis
  • For the 2024-25 election, the post of Treasurer was specifically reserved for women
• The SCBA elections for 2024-25 were to be held on 16th May 2024 based on the 2023 voter list, which was updated to include eligible members from 1st March 2023 to 29th February 2024.
• The Supreme Court Registry was directed to provide the updated lists of eligible members by 3rd May 2024.

Journey of Women Reservation in India

National Perspective Plan

• The National Perspective Plan for Women, 1988, recommended the reservation of seats for women from the panchayat level up to Parliament.

73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments

• In 1992, the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments mandated all states to reserve one-third of seats for women in local bodies, under Article 243D (2) for Panchayats and Article 243T (2) for Municipalities.

Women’s Reservation Bills

• The Women’s Reservation Bill for Parliament and state assemblies was first introduced in 1996, but it failed to pass due to lack of majority.
• Further attempts were made in 1998, 1999, and 2008, but all the bills lapsed with the dissolution of the respective Lok Sabhas.
• The Rajya Sabha passed the bill in 2010, but it remained pending in the Lok Sabha.
• Various committees and reports, including the 2013 Committee on the Status of Women, have recommended at least 50% reservation for women in all decision-making bodies.

Women Reservation Act, 2023
About:

• The Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023, also known as the Women’s Reservation Act, 2023, is a landmark legislation that reserves one-third of all seats for women in the Lok Sabha, state legislative assemblies, and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
• This Act aims to increase the representation of women in the highest decision-making bodies of the country.

Articles Inserted and Amended:

• Article 330A for reservation in the Lok Sabha
• Article 332A for reservation in state assemblies
• Article 239AA amended for reservation in the Delhi Legislative Assembly

Major Committees on Women Reservation:

1971 Committee on the Status of Women in India (CSWI):

• Set up by the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, this committee examined constitutional, administrative, and legal provisions affecting the social status of women.
• Its report, Towards Equality, highlighted the state's failure to ensure gender equality and recommended the introduction of reservations for women in local bodies.

1987 Committee under Margaret Alva:

• This committee presented the National Perspective Plan for Women 1988-2000, which included a recommendation for reserving seats for women in elected bodies.
• This led to the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1992, which mandated the reservation of one-third of seats for women in local bodies.

1996 Select Committee headed by Geeta Mukherjee:

• The first Women’s Reservation Bill was sent to a Select Committee in 1996, which was headed by Geeta Mukherjee.
• The committee recommended considering the extension of reservations to OBC women at an appropriate time.

2013 Committee on the Status of Women:

• Constituted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development, this committee recommended ensuring at least 50% reservation for women in all decision-making bodies, including Parliament and state assemblies.

Removal of Elected Members of Municipality

Why in News?

Recently, the Supreme Court held that the removal of an elected representative from the office of Councilor/Vice-President, with a further ban on him from contesting elections for six years, is highly excessive and disproportionate to the nature of the alleged misconduct attributed to him.

Background of Makarand alias Nandu v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. Case:

• Makarand was elected as the Councilor of the Municipal Council in Osmanabad, and in 2006, he was elected as the Vice-President.
• One of the respondents filed a complaint before the Collector of Osmanabad, alleging that the appellant had violated the Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar Panchayats, and Industrial Townships Act, 1965 (1965 Act) by illegally constructing a house.
• An inquiry was conducted by the Collector, who found the allegation to be correct.
• A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant, and during the pendency of the show-cause proceedings, the State Government took suo moto action. The Minister-in-charge disqualified the appellant from the post of Vice-President.
• The appellant was also debarred from contesting any election for the next six years.
• Another appellant, Nitin, was elected as the President of the Municipal Council in Naldurga.
• In his case too, a complaint was filed before the Collector and referred to the Minister-in-charge. After serving a show-cause notice, Nitin was removed from the post of President for irregularities in allotting work.
• Nitin was also debarred from contesting Municipal elections for six years.
• Both appellants filed writ petitions challenging the orders of the Minister-in-charge before the High Court. The High Court of Bombay, Aurangabad Bench, dismissed the petitions.
• The appellants then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.
• Since both appeals involved a common issue, they were clubbed and heard together.
• The Supreme Court passed an interim order during the pendency of these proceedings, allowing the appellants to continue holding their offices.

Court’s Observations:

• The Court held that the manner in which the proceedings, while pending before the Collector at the show-cause notice stage, were suo moto transferred to the State Government, and how the Minister-in-charge hastily passed an order of removal, were grounds to infer that the action was unfair, unjust, and based on irrelevant considerations.
• The Court stated that the impugned action did not satisfy the doctrine of proportionality.
• The Court found that the action taken against the appellants was totally unwarranted and exceeded jurisdictional limits.
• The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the order passed by the Minister-in-charge.

Legal Provisions Involved in the Case:

• Section 44(1)(e) of the 1965 Act: This section deals with the disqualification of a Councilor during his term of office. It states that a Councilor shall be disqualified if, during his term of office, he constructs or allows the construction of illegal or unauthorized structures, either directly or indirectly, or obstructs the demolition of such structures by a competent authority. In such cases, the Councilor's office becomes vacant.
• Section 55A of the 1965 Act: This section deals with the removal of the President or Vice-President by the Government. It states that the President or Vice-President can be removed for misconduct, neglect, incapacity, or disgraceful conduct. They will not be eligible for re-election or re-appointment for the remainder of the term. However, a reasonable opportunity must be given for the person to furnish an explanation.
• Section 55B of the 1965 Act: This section deals with the disqualification of a Councilor or former President/Vice-President who has been removed for misconduct. It provides that the State Government may disqualify such a person from continuing as a Councilor for the remainder of the term and from being elected as a Councilor for up to six years from the date of disqualification.

Constitutional Provisions Related to Municipalities

• The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 introduced Part IX-A in the Constitution of India, 1950 (COI), which addresses the establishment, administration, powers, and functions of municipal bodies at different levels.
• Articles 243P to 243ZG under Part IX-A of the COI deal with municipalities, and the 12th Schedule was added through the 74th Amendment Act.
• The Amendment Act created three types of municipalities:
  • Nagar Panchayat
  • Municipal Council
  • Municipal Corporation
• The members of a municipality are to be elected directly by the people.
• There is a reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in proportion to their population.
• One-third of the total seats to be filled by direct election must be reserved for women, including women from the SC and ST categories.
• Article 243V of the COI addresses Disqualifications for Membership. It states that:
  • A person shall be disqualified from being chosen as, and from being, a member of a municipality if:
    • They are disqualified by or under any law currently in force for elections to the legislature of the concerned State.
    • A person shall not be disqualified on the grounds of being under the age of twenty-five years, provided they have attained the age of twenty-one years.
  • If any question arises as to whether a member of a municipality has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned above, it shall be referred to an authority designated by the State Legislature for a decision.
• Article 243W of the COI deals with the powers, authority, and responsibilities of municipalities.
• The term of every municipality is five years.

Sub Rights of Right to Property

Why in News?

A bench of Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Aravind Kumar upheld the constitutional principles governing the right to property, identified the essential sub-rights, and found the Kolkata Municipal Corporation’s (KMC) actions to be illegal and violative of statutory provisions and constitutional principles. This observation was made in the case Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors..

Background of the Case:

Facts:

• The Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) claimed to have acquired the property of Birinchi Bihari Shah under Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980.
• The property in question is located at Premises No. 106C, Narikeldanga North Road, Kolkata – 700011.
• Birinchi Shah inherited the property through a deed of settlement executed by his father.
• In 2009, when KMC attempted to forcibly occupy the property, Birinchi Shah filed a writ petition in the High Court seeking a restraining order against KMC.
• In 2010, KMC removed Birinchi Shah’s name as the property owner and replaced it with its own name in the official records, prompting another writ petition by Birinchi Shah.

Trial Court (Single Judge) Views:

• The Single Judge ruled that KMC had no power of compulsory acquisition under Section 352 of the Act and quashed the alleged acquisition.

High Court (Division Bench) Views:

• The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge's decision, stating there was no power of compulsory acquisition under Section 352.
• It directed KMC to either initiate acquisition proceedings under Sections 536 or 537 of the Act within five months or restore the name of the last recorded owner as the property owner.

Appeal to the Supreme Court:

• After the Division Bench's judgment, KMC filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Court’s Observations:

Constitutional Right to Property:

• As amended by the 44th Amendment, Article 300A of the Constitution of India, 1950 protects the right to property and mandates compliance with a fair procedure before depriving anyone of their immovable property.
• Providing just compensation is insufficient for the valid acquisition of property; due process must also be followed.
• The Right to Property was initially a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution.

Sub-rights Constituting the Right to Property:
The Court identified seven sub-rights that form part of the constitutional right to property under Article 300A:

• Right to Notice of Intention to Acquire the Property: The state must inform the person of its intent to acquire their property through a clear, cogent, and meaningful notice.
• Right to Be Heard and Raise Objections: After receiving notice, the property owner has the right to object and must be given a meaningful hearing, not a sham process.
• Right to a Reasoned Decision: The acquiring authority must provide a reasoned decision when addressing objections.
• Duty of the State to Acquire Property Only for Public Purpose: Property can only be acquired for a public purpose, aligning with the constitutional goals.
• Right to Restitution or Fair Compensation: Deprivation of property is permissible only with restitution, such as monetary compensation, rehabilitation, or similar measures.
• Right to an Efficient and Expeditious Acquisition Process: The process must be efficient and completed within a reasonable time to prevent unnecessary trauma to the property owner.
• Right of Conclusion: The acquisition process concludes with not just compensation but the physical transfer of property and its final vesting in the state.

Statutory Incorporation and Judicial Recognition:

• Union and State land acquisition laws incorporate these sub-rights in various forms.
• Courts have recognized these sub-rights, even independent of statutory provisions.

Observations in the Present Case:

• Section 352 of the Act does not provide a procedure for acquiring private property.
• The appellant-Corporation violated statutory provisions by invoking Section 352(a) to acquire property without due process, despite legal advisors' concerns.
• The acquisition under Section 352(a) was illegal, invalid, and contrary to the Act.

Dismissal of Appeal:

• The High Court rightly accepted the writ petition and rejected the Corporation’s claim of acquiring land under Section 352.
• The Supreme Court dismissed the Corporation's appeal against the High Court judgment.
• KMC was directed to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- as costs to the respondent within 60 days.

Sub-Rights of the Right to Property:

• Right to Notice of Acquisition: The state must inform the person of its intention to acquire property through a clear and meaningful notice.
• Right to Be Heard: The property owner must be given a meaningful opportunity to object and present their concerns.
• Right to a Reasoned Decision: The acquiring authority must provide an informed, reasoned decision in response to objections raised.
• Duty to Acquire Only for Public Purpose: The acquisition must be justified by a public purpose that aligns with the constitutional goals.
• Right of Restitution or Fair Compensation: Deprivation of property is permissible only upon providing restitution, such as fair compensation or rehabilitation.
• Right to an Efficient and Expeditious Process: The acquisition process must be conducted efficiently and completed within a reasonable timeframe to minimize harm to the property owner.
• Right of Conclusion: The acquisition process is concluded with the physical possession of the property and its final vesting in the state, after compensation is paid.