Notes: Paul Kennedy | Sociology Mains Optional for UPSC 2024 PDF Download

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Paul Kennedy 
• History is full of great powers whose military and geopolitical ambitions and commitments could not be 
sustained; at a certain point, they simply could no longer afford what the Romans called Imperium. 
• Kennedy in 1987 suggested that the US might be simply another example of an age-old pattern of “imperial 
overstretch ”  
? Its decline relative to other powers was clear, and the task of policy-makers was simply to manage it 
well. 
• There always seems to be a time lag between a nation becoming wealthy and the point at which its political 
and military influence increases. 
• Great powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on ‘ s e c u r i t y ’ and thereby divert 
potential resources from ‘i n v e s t m e n t ’ and compound their long-term dilemma. 
• Around 1500 there were several power centres around the world: Ming China, Ottoman Empire, Mogul 
Empire in India, Muscovy, Tokugawa Japan, and the cluster of states in central-western Europe.  
? The problem with all the non-European powers is that they were illiberal. Not only did they require 
uniformity in religious belief, commerce and weapons development only happened with the consent 
of the ruler. 
? In contrast, Europe had no overarching ruler, and the constant warring between kingdoms and city-
states only encouraged the development of military technology, which spilled over into other 
technological developments. 
? Competition also encouraged an entrepreneurial culture that helped to create wealth. 
• After N a p ol e o n ’ s bid to dominate Europe came to an end in 1815, the rest of the century was characterised 
by relative stability and peace. 
? America and Russia were focused on domestic instability and developing their huge landmasses 
? Britain was able to achieve naval domination and extend its commercial and colonial interests while 
achieving industrial power at home 
• Kennedy does not claim that economics alone drives world events.  
• Geography, national morale, alliances and other factors can all affect the relative power of nations within 
the state system. 
• The need to divert investment away from “ b u t t e r ” toward “ g u n s ” leads any great power to the “ d o w n w a r d 
spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities and weakening 
capacity to bear the burdens of d ef en se ”. 
• He sees America in the late 1980s as being similar to Britain in 1914: an apparently unassailable great 
power about to have an uncomfortable reckoning. 
Page 2


 
 www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
 www.SleepyClasses.com 
  
Paul Kennedy 
• History is full of great powers whose military and geopolitical ambitions and commitments could not be 
sustained; at a certain point, they simply could no longer afford what the Romans called Imperium. 
• Kennedy in 1987 suggested that the US might be simply another example of an age-old pattern of “imperial 
overstretch ”  
? Its decline relative to other powers was clear, and the task of policy-makers was simply to manage it 
well. 
• There always seems to be a time lag between a nation becoming wealthy and the point at which its political 
and military influence increases. 
• Great powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on ‘ s e c u r i t y ’ and thereby divert 
potential resources from ‘i n v e s t m e n t ’ and compound their long-term dilemma. 
• Around 1500 there were several power centres around the world: Ming China, Ottoman Empire, Mogul 
Empire in India, Muscovy, Tokugawa Japan, and the cluster of states in central-western Europe.  
? The problem with all the non-European powers is that they were illiberal. Not only did they require 
uniformity in religious belief, commerce and weapons development only happened with the consent 
of the ruler. 
? In contrast, Europe had no overarching ruler, and the constant warring between kingdoms and city-
states only encouraged the development of military technology, which spilled over into other 
technological developments. 
? Competition also encouraged an entrepreneurial culture that helped to create wealth. 
• After N a p ol e o n ’ s bid to dominate Europe came to an end in 1815, the rest of the century was characterised 
by relative stability and peace. 
? America and Russia were focused on domestic instability and developing their huge landmasses 
? Britain was able to achieve naval domination and extend its commercial and colonial interests while 
achieving industrial power at home 
• Kennedy does not claim that economics alone drives world events.  
• Geography, national morale, alliances and other factors can all affect the relative power of nations within 
the state system. 
• The need to divert investment away from “ b u t t e r ” toward “ g u n s ” leads any great power to the “ d o w n w a r d 
spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities and weakening 
capacity to bear the burdens of d ef en se ”. 
• He sees America in the late 1980s as being similar to Britain in 1914: an apparently unassailable great 
power about to have an uncomfortable reckoning. 
 
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? He warns of a “ m u l t i p o l a r ” world in which US and Soviet dominance is giving way to a rapidly 
developing Eastern sphere and an industrialising Third World. 
• The cost of maintaining superpower status is so substantial that, even if this power is retained, it is an 
obstacle to continued economic dominance compared to other rising powers. 
? Unconstrained by the need for huge military spending, China has been able to focus on commercial 
enrichment, which has now set it up to become a major military power if it wishes to. 
• Ability to defend a nation is usually a short-term need, whereas economic growth is a long-term 
requirement of national power and it can be hard to balance both. 
? The heart of Ken ne d y’s argument is that there is a tension between strategic security, which requires 
significant diversion of the na t ion ’s resources, and economic security, which depends on growth and 
high demand, both of which can be eroded by the higher taxation needed for substantial defense 
spending. 
• On US 
? US defense spending is quite affordable given that the country is still way ahead of China in terms of 
technology and education, and that America cannot be seen as a top-heavy military power with a 
weakening economic base —the classic profile of empire-fallers according to Kennedy. 
? Recent studies suggest that China will not match American in economic output for another 20 years. 
Chinese economic power is already held back by authoritarian rule and corruption, but even if the 
country were to become increasingly liberal, history suggests that democratic transitions are 
accompanied by falling growth rates. 
• The combination of American economic resilience and Chinese political fragility may well prove Ken ne d y’s 
thesis about American decline to have been wrong.