Notes: Relationship between FRs & DPSPs (PCM) | Political Science & International Relations: Mains Optional - UPSC PDF Download

 Page 1


Relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs: 
• There has perennially been a controversy surrounding the constitutional 
relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 
• Early Supreme Court decisions attributed paramount importance to 
Fundamental Rights considering they were made enforceable and not 
DPSPs.  
• In the landmark judgment of  State of Madras v/s 
Champakam Dorairajan (1951) that subsequently led to the 
1st Constitutional Amendment, Justice Das stated that directive 
principles were expressly made unenforceable by Article 37 and 
therefore could not override the fundamental rights found in Part III, 
which were enforceable pursuant to Article 32. The 1
st
 amendment was 
the result of Shankari Prasad case which upheld Parliament’s power to 
amend Fundamental Rights.  
• These decisions of the apex court were subject to much criticism due to 
the excess importance endorsed to Fundamental Rights resulting in the 
complete neglect of principles that promoted socio-economic change 
and development. In this early phase of the Court’s history, 
therefore, the DPSPs were a classic example of what James Madison 
referred to as ‘parchment barriers’. 
• Pandit Nehru in his speeches in relation to the 1st and 4
th
  Constitutional 
Amendments expressly stated his disappointment. He stated, “There is 
difficulty when the Courts of the Land have to consider these matters and 
lay more stress on the Fundamental Rights than on the Directive 
Principles. The result is that the whole purpose behind the Constitution 
which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal 
step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element 
being emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.” 
• It was in the aftermath of the 17
th
 CA, that in the Sajjan Singh case 
(1967), the Court first evolved the doctrine of ‘harmonious 
construction’ which underlined the fact that DPSPs are also fundamental 
in the governance of the country and that Fundamental Rights need to be 
read harmoniously with the same.  
Page 2


Relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs: 
• There has perennially been a controversy surrounding the constitutional 
relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 
• Early Supreme Court decisions attributed paramount importance to 
Fundamental Rights considering they were made enforceable and not 
DPSPs.  
• In the landmark judgment of  State of Madras v/s 
Champakam Dorairajan (1951) that subsequently led to the 
1st Constitutional Amendment, Justice Das stated that directive 
principles were expressly made unenforceable by Article 37 and 
therefore could not override the fundamental rights found in Part III, 
which were enforceable pursuant to Article 32. The 1
st
 amendment was 
the result of Shankari Prasad case which upheld Parliament’s power to 
amend Fundamental Rights.  
• These decisions of the apex court were subject to much criticism due to 
the excess importance endorsed to Fundamental Rights resulting in the 
complete neglect of principles that promoted socio-economic change 
and development. In this early phase of the Court’s history, 
therefore, the DPSPs were a classic example of what James Madison 
referred to as ‘parchment barriers’. 
• Pandit Nehru in his speeches in relation to the 1st and 4
th
  Constitutional 
Amendments expressly stated his disappointment. He stated, “There is 
difficulty when the Courts of the Land have to consider these matters and 
lay more stress on the Fundamental Rights than on the Directive 
Principles. The result is that the whole purpose behind the Constitution 
which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal 
step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element 
being emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.” 
• It was in the aftermath of the 17
th
 CA, that in the Sajjan Singh case 
(1967), the Court first evolved the doctrine of ‘harmonious 
construction’ which underlined the fact that DPSPs are also fundamental 
in the governance of the country and that Fundamental Rights need to be 
read harmoniously with the same.  
• Gautam Bhatia writes that Indian Constitution provides inbuilt, textual 
limitations to its fundamental rights. For instance, Article 19(1)(g), 
which guarantees the freedom of trade, also permits the government to 
legislate ‘reasonable restrictions … in the interests of the general public’.  
In the aftermath of The Kerala Education Bill case (1958), the Court 
made the DPSPs an integral part of any inquiry into the validity of 
fundamental rights restrictions. This was the first—and most basic way—
in which fundamental rights came to be interpreted in light of the DPSPs, 
and the DPSPs began to be read into Part III: the question of what 
restrictions were in the public interest was to be adjudged by looking 
to the DPSPs. 
• The duty of the courts in relation to the directives came to be emphasised 
in later decisions, which trend reached its culmination in the 13-member 
Bench in Keshavananda’s case, which laid down certain broad 
propositions which are bound to be productive of far-reaching effects in 
future cases. These important propositions are: (i) there is no 
disharmony between the directives and the fundamental rights 
because they supplement each other for the same goal of bringing 
about a social revolution and establishment of a welfare State, which 
is envisaged in the Preamble. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles are two wheels of the chariot as an aid to make social and 
economic democracy a truism.  
• Together, they form core of the Constitution. They are not exclusionary, 
but are complementary to each other, (ii) even the conditions for the 
exercise by each individual of his fundamental rights cannot be 
ensured unless the directives are implemented, and (iii) Parliament is 
competent to amend the Constitution to override or abrogate any 
fundamental right to enable the State to implement the directives so 
long as the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution are not affected. 
• The imposition of Emergency witnessed Fundamental Rights being 
subordinated to DPSPs. By the 42
nd
 amendment, articles 14, 19 and 31 
were subordinated to all DPSPs as per 31 (c) and all sorts of 
limitations on Article 368 were removed. By the 44
th
 amendment, 
article 31 was converted into a legal right under 300 A. In the Minerva 
Mills case, Supreme Court found the subordination of FR to DPSPs as 
violating the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution.  Now articles 14 and 
Page 3


Relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs: 
• There has perennially been a controversy surrounding the constitutional 
relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 
• Early Supreme Court decisions attributed paramount importance to 
Fundamental Rights considering they were made enforceable and not 
DPSPs.  
• In the landmark judgment of  State of Madras v/s 
Champakam Dorairajan (1951) that subsequently led to the 
1st Constitutional Amendment, Justice Das stated that directive 
principles were expressly made unenforceable by Article 37 and 
therefore could not override the fundamental rights found in Part III, 
which were enforceable pursuant to Article 32. The 1
st
 amendment was 
the result of Shankari Prasad case which upheld Parliament’s power to 
amend Fundamental Rights.  
• These decisions of the apex court were subject to much criticism due to 
the excess importance endorsed to Fundamental Rights resulting in the 
complete neglect of principles that promoted socio-economic change 
and development. In this early phase of the Court’s history, 
therefore, the DPSPs were a classic example of what James Madison 
referred to as ‘parchment barriers’. 
• Pandit Nehru in his speeches in relation to the 1st and 4
th
  Constitutional 
Amendments expressly stated his disappointment. He stated, “There is 
difficulty when the Courts of the Land have to consider these matters and 
lay more stress on the Fundamental Rights than on the Directive 
Principles. The result is that the whole purpose behind the Constitution 
which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal 
step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element 
being emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.” 
• It was in the aftermath of the 17
th
 CA, that in the Sajjan Singh case 
(1967), the Court first evolved the doctrine of ‘harmonious 
construction’ which underlined the fact that DPSPs are also fundamental 
in the governance of the country and that Fundamental Rights need to be 
read harmoniously with the same.  
• Gautam Bhatia writes that Indian Constitution provides inbuilt, textual 
limitations to its fundamental rights. For instance, Article 19(1)(g), 
which guarantees the freedom of trade, also permits the government to 
legislate ‘reasonable restrictions … in the interests of the general public’.  
In the aftermath of The Kerala Education Bill case (1958), the Court 
made the DPSPs an integral part of any inquiry into the validity of 
fundamental rights restrictions. This was the first—and most basic way—
in which fundamental rights came to be interpreted in light of the DPSPs, 
and the DPSPs began to be read into Part III: the question of what 
restrictions were in the public interest was to be adjudged by looking 
to the DPSPs. 
• The duty of the courts in relation to the directives came to be emphasised 
in later decisions, which trend reached its culmination in the 13-member 
Bench in Keshavananda’s case, which laid down certain broad 
propositions which are bound to be productive of far-reaching effects in 
future cases. These important propositions are: (i) there is no 
disharmony between the directives and the fundamental rights 
because they supplement each other for the same goal of bringing 
about a social revolution and establishment of a welfare State, which 
is envisaged in the Preamble. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles are two wheels of the chariot as an aid to make social and 
economic democracy a truism.  
• Together, they form core of the Constitution. They are not exclusionary, 
but are complementary to each other, (ii) even the conditions for the 
exercise by each individual of his fundamental rights cannot be 
ensured unless the directives are implemented, and (iii) Parliament is 
competent to amend the Constitution to override or abrogate any 
fundamental right to enable the State to implement the directives so 
long as the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution are not affected. 
• The imposition of Emergency witnessed Fundamental Rights being 
subordinated to DPSPs. By the 42
nd
 amendment, articles 14, 19 and 31 
were subordinated to all DPSPs as per 31 (c) and all sorts of 
limitations on Article 368 were removed. By the 44
th
 amendment, 
article 31 was converted into a legal right under 300 A. In the Minerva 
Mills case, Supreme Court found the subordination of FR to DPSPs as 
violating the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution.  Now articles 14 and 
19 are only subordinate to clauses b and c of Article 39.  The Court 
rationalised this approach by defining the DPSPs as ‘social goals’, 
and the fundamental rights as ‘side constraints’ to be scrupulously 
adhered to by the government in its pursuit of those goals. 
• CJ. Chandrachud reasserted that Parts III and IV are complementary 
to each other and together they constitute the human rights of an 
individual. Reading these provisions independently would be impossible, 
as that would render them incomplete and thereby inaccessible. 
• In subsequent cases, the Court has stated that the purpose of the two 
distinct chapters was to grant the Government enough latitude and 
flexibility to implement the principles depending on the time and 
circumstances. The court therefore considered the Minerva Mills case as 
precedent and recommended a harmonious construction of the two parts 
in public interest and to promote social welfare. This view has been 
consistently adopted ever since and has been endorsed in Mohini Jain v 
State of Karnataka and Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh. In the 
Indira Sawhney case too, the Court asserted the need to understand 
Article 14 in light of Directive Principles. 
• The Judiciary over the years has taken a more proactive stance towards 
DPSPs and their role in aiding governance: 
1. Right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution free water, air and 
environment. The Court has derived this right by reading Article 21 
with Article 48A.  
2.  In Asad and Salal Hydro project cases, the Supreme Court applied 
Article 24 along with Article 21 to prohibit child labour being 
influenced by the above directive principles.  
3.  Right to Education: Under Article 21A, it is to be understood with 
reference to directive principles contained in Articles 41 and 45.  
4.  The directive principles of “equal pay for equal work” and 
“participation of workers in management” were linked with right to 
equality under Article 14 in Randhir Singh v/s UOI and National 
Textile Workers Union v/s P.R. Ramakrishna cases.  
5. The ban on alcohol by judiciary along national highway was seen in 
line with Art 47 of DPSP.  
Page 4


Relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs: 
• There has perennially been a controversy surrounding the constitutional 
relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 
• Early Supreme Court decisions attributed paramount importance to 
Fundamental Rights considering they were made enforceable and not 
DPSPs.  
• In the landmark judgment of  State of Madras v/s 
Champakam Dorairajan (1951) that subsequently led to the 
1st Constitutional Amendment, Justice Das stated that directive 
principles were expressly made unenforceable by Article 37 and 
therefore could not override the fundamental rights found in Part III, 
which were enforceable pursuant to Article 32. The 1
st
 amendment was 
the result of Shankari Prasad case which upheld Parliament’s power to 
amend Fundamental Rights.  
• These decisions of the apex court were subject to much criticism due to 
the excess importance endorsed to Fundamental Rights resulting in the 
complete neglect of principles that promoted socio-economic change 
and development. In this early phase of the Court’s history, 
therefore, the DPSPs were a classic example of what James Madison 
referred to as ‘parchment barriers’. 
• Pandit Nehru in his speeches in relation to the 1st and 4
th
  Constitutional 
Amendments expressly stated his disappointment. He stated, “There is 
difficulty when the Courts of the Land have to consider these matters and 
lay more stress on the Fundamental Rights than on the Directive 
Principles. The result is that the whole purpose behind the Constitution 
which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal 
step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element 
being emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.” 
• It was in the aftermath of the 17
th
 CA, that in the Sajjan Singh case 
(1967), the Court first evolved the doctrine of ‘harmonious 
construction’ which underlined the fact that DPSPs are also fundamental 
in the governance of the country and that Fundamental Rights need to be 
read harmoniously with the same.  
• Gautam Bhatia writes that Indian Constitution provides inbuilt, textual 
limitations to its fundamental rights. For instance, Article 19(1)(g), 
which guarantees the freedom of trade, also permits the government to 
legislate ‘reasonable restrictions … in the interests of the general public’.  
In the aftermath of The Kerala Education Bill case (1958), the Court 
made the DPSPs an integral part of any inquiry into the validity of 
fundamental rights restrictions. This was the first—and most basic way—
in which fundamental rights came to be interpreted in light of the DPSPs, 
and the DPSPs began to be read into Part III: the question of what 
restrictions were in the public interest was to be adjudged by looking 
to the DPSPs. 
• The duty of the courts in relation to the directives came to be emphasised 
in later decisions, which trend reached its culmination in the 13-member 
Bench in Keshavananda’s case, which laid down certain broad 
propositions which are bound to be productive of far-reaching effects in 
future cases. These important propositions are: (i) there is no 
disharmony between the directives and the fundamental rights 
because they supplement each other for the same goal of bringing 
about a social revolution and establishment of a welfare State, which 
is envisaged in the Preamble. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles are two wheels of the chariot as an aid to make social and 
economic democracy a truism.  
• Together, they form core of the Constitution. They are not exclusionary, 
but are complementary to each other, (ii) even the conditions for the 
exercise by each individual of his fundamental rights cannot be 
ensured unless the directives are implemented, and (iii) Parliament is 
competent to amend the Constitution to override or abrogate any 
fundamental right to enable the State to implement the directives so 
long as the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution are not affected. 
• The imposition of Emergency witnessed Fundamental Rights being 
subordinated to DPSPs. By the 42
nd
 amendment, articles 14, 19 and 31 
were subordinated to all DPSPs as per 31 (c) and all sorts of 
limitations on Article 368 were removed. By the 44
th
 amendment, 
article 31 was converted into a legal right under 300 A. In the Minerva 
Mills case, Supreme Court found the subordination of FR to DPSPs as 
violating the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution.  Now articles 14 and 
19 are only subordinate to clauses b and c of Article 39.  The Court 
rationalised this approach by defining the DPSPs as ‘social goals’, 
and the fundamental rights as ‘side constraints’ to be scrupulously 
adhered to by the government in its pursuit of those goals. 
• CJ. Chandrachud reasserted that Parts III and IV are complementary 
to each other and together they constitute the human rights of an 
individual. Reading these provisions independently would be impossible, 
as that would render them incomplete and thereby inaccessible. 
• In subsequent cases, the Court has stated that the purpose of the two 
distinct chapters was to grant the Government enough latitude and 
flexibility to implement the principles depending on the time and 
circumstances. The court therefore considered the Minerva Mills case as 
precedent and recommended a harmonious construction of the two parts 
in public interest and to promote social welfare. This view has been 
consistently adopted ever since and has been endorsed in Mohini Jain v 
State of Karnataka and Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh. In the 
Indira Sawhney case too, the Court asserted the need to understand 
Article 14 in light of Directive Principles. 
• The Judiciary over the years has taken a more proactive stance towards 
DPSPs and their role in aiding governance: 
1. Right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution free water, air and 
environment. The Court has derived this right by reading Article 21 
with Article 48A.  
2.  In Asad and Salal Hydro project cases, the Supreme Court applied 
Article 24 along with Article 21 to prohibit child labour being 
influenced by the above directive principles.  
3.  Right to Education: Under Article 21A, it is to be understood with 
reference to directive principles contained in Articles 41 and 45.  
4.  The directive principles of “equal pay for equal work” and 
“participation of workers in management” were linked with right to 
equality under Article 14 in Randhir Singh v/s UOI and National 
Textile Workers Union v/s P.R. Ramakrishna cases.  
5. The ban on alcohol by judiciary along national highway was seen in 
line with Art 47 of DPSP.  
6. Many of the articles enshrined in Part IV are also linked to Art 21. 
With subsequent interpretation by judiciary, the DPSP are getting 
legal backing. By reading Article 21 with the directive principles, the 
Supreme Court has expanded the horizon of Article 21 and derived 
there from different rights of the citizen.  
 
• Gautam Bhatia argues that DPSPs serve three distinct roles in judicial 
interpretation; in other words, there are three different ways in which 
fundamental rights (and other laws, for that matter) are interpreted ‘in 
light of’ the DPSPs: 
1. First, legislation enacted in service of the DPSPs meets the 
‘public interest’ threshold in a fundamental rights challenge 
(importantly, its reasonableness must then be examined, and not 
on the touchstone of the Directive Principles). 
2. Secondly, if legislation is intelligibly susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, then the meaning that corresponds more 
closely to the DPSPs is to be preferred over others.  
3. And thirdly, the DPSPs play a structuring role in selecting the 
specific conceptions that are the concrete manifestations of the 
abstract concepts embodied in the Fundamental Rights 
chapter. This is the best way to understand the Court’s dictum 
that fundamental rights ‘ought to be interpreted in light of the 
DPSPs’. 
 
• Judicial Activism: SC has many a time suo-moto adjudicated under Art 
142 to implement DPSP to provide time bound relief to citizens. 
Introduction of Public Interest Litigation has democratized the access of 
justice to common man. It has paved way to a new regime of human 
rights by giving a wider interpretation to the right to equality, life and 
personal liberty and DPSP.  
• More awareness in citizen regarding their rights.  
• So, initially, the courts adopted a strict and literal legal position in 
interpreting Part-III with Part IV of the Constitution. In the course of 
time, attitude of the judiciary changed and it held that there is a harmony 
between the two parts of the Constitution. As a result, nowadays we find 
Page 5


Relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs: 
• There has perennially been a controversy surrounding the constitutional 
relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. 
• Early Supreme Court decisions attributed paramount importance to 
Fundamental Rights considering they were made enforceable and not 
DPSPs.  
• In the landmark judgment of  State of Madras v/s 
Champakam Dorairajan (1951) that subsequently led to the 
1st Constitutional Amendment, Justice Das stated that directive 
principles were expressly made unenforceable by Article 37 and 
therefore could not override the fundamental rights found in Part III, 
which were enforceable pursuant to Article 32. The 1
st
 amendment was 
the result of Shankari Prasad case which upheld Parliament’s power to 
amend Fundamental Rights.  
• These decisions of the apex court were subject to much criticism due to 
the excess importance endorsed to Fundamental Rights resulting in the 
complete neglect of principles that promoted socio-economic change 
and development. In this early phase of the Court’s history, 
therefore, the DPSPs were a classic example of what James Madison 
referred to as ‘parchment barriers’. 
• Pandit Nehru in his speeches in relation to the 1st and 4
th
  Constitutional 
Amendments expressly stated his disappointment. He stated, “There is 
difficulty when the Courts of the Land have to consider these matters and 
lay more stress on the Fundamental Rights than on the Directive 
Principles. The result is that the whole purpose behind the Constitution 
which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal 
step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element 
being emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.” 
• It was in the aftermath of the 17
th
 CA, that in the Sajjan Singh case 
(1967), the Court first evolved the doctrine of ‘harmonious 
construction’ which underlined the fact that DPSPs are also fundamental 
in the governance of the country and that Fundamental Rights need to be 
read harmoniously with the same.  
• Gautam Bhatia writes that Indian Constitution provides inbuilt, textual 
limitations to its fundamental rights. For instance, Article 19(1)(g), 
which guarantees the freedom of trade, also permits the government to 
legislate ‘reasonable restrictions … in the interests of the general public’.  
In the aftermath of The Kerala Education Bill case (1958), the Court 
made the DPSPs an integral part of any inquiry into the validity of 
fundamental rights restrictions. This was the first—and most basic way—
in which fundamental rights came to be interpreted in light of the DPSPs, 
and the DPSPs began to be read into Part III: the question of what 
restrictions were in the public interest was to be adjudged by looking 
to the DPSPs. 
• The duty of the courts in relation to the directives came to be emphasised 
in later decisions, which trend reached its culmination in the 13-member 
Bench in Keshavananda’s case, which laid down certain broad 
propositions which are bound to be productive of far-reaching effects in 
future cases. These important propositions are: (i) there is no 
disharmony between the directives and the fundamental rights 
because they supplement each other for the same goal of bringing 
about a social revolution and establishment of a welfare State, which 
is envisaged in the Preamble. The Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles are two wheels of the chariot as an aid to make social and 
economic democracy a truism.  
• Together, they form core of the Constitution. They are not exclusionary, 
but are complementary to each other, (ii) even the conditions for the 
exercise by each individual of his fundamental rights cannot be 
ensured unless the directives are implemented, and (iii) Parliament is 
competent to amend the Constitution to override or abrogate any 
fundamental right to enable the State to implement the directives so 
long as the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution are not affected. 
• The imposition of Emergency witnessed Fundamental Rights being 
subordinated to DPSPs. By the 42
nd
 amendment, articles 14, 19 and 31 
were subordinated to all DPSPs as per 31 (c) and all sorts of 
limitations on Article 368 were removed. By the 44
th
 amendment, 
article 31 was converted into a legal right under 300 A. In the Minerva 
Mills case, Supreme Court found the subordination of FR to DPSPs as 
violating the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution.  Now articles 14 and 
19 are only subordinate to clauses b and c of Article 39.  The Court 
rationalised this approach by defining the DPSPs as ‘social goals’, 
and the fundamental rights as ‘side constraints’ to be scrupulously 
adhered to by the government in its pursuit of those goals. 
• CJ. Chandrachud reasserted that Parts III and IV are complementary 
to each other and together they constitute the human rights of an 
individual. Reading these provisions independently would be impossible, 
as that would render them incomplete and thereby inaccessible. 
• In subsequent cases, the Court has stated that the purpose of the two 
distinct chapters was to grant the Government enough latitude and 
flexibility to implement the principles depending on the time and 
circumstances. The court therefore considered the Minerva Mills case as 
precedent and recommended a harmonious construction of the two parts 
in public interest and to promote social welfare. This view has been 
consistently adopted ever since and has been endorsed in Mohini Jain v 
State of Karnataka and Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh. In the 
Indira Sawhney case too, the Court asserted the need to understand 
Article 14 in light of Directive Principles. 
• The Judiciary over the years has taken a more proactive stance towards 
DPSPs and their role in aiding governance: 
1. Right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution free water, air and 
environment. The Court has derived this right by reading Article 21 
with Article 48A.  
2.  In Asad and Salal Hydro project cases, the Supreme Court applied 
Article 24 along with Article 21 to prohibit child labour being 
influenced by the above directive principles.  
3.  Right to Education: Under Article 21A, it is to be understood with 
reference to directive principles contained in Articles 41 and 45.  
4.  The directive principles of “equal pay for equal work” and 
“participation of workers in management” were linked with right to 
equality under Article 14 in Randhir Singh v/s UOI and National 
Textile Workers Union v/s P.R. Ramakrishna cases.  
5. The ban on alcohol by judiciary along national highway was seen in 
line with Art 47 of DPSP.  
6. Many of the articles enshrined in Part IV are also linked to Art 21. 
With subsequent interpretation by judiciary, the DPSP are getting 
legal backing. By reading Article 21 with the directive principles, the 
Supreme Court has expanded the horizon of Article 21 and derived 
there from different rights of the citizen.  
 
• Gautam Bhatia argues that DPSPs serve three distinct roles in judicial 
interpretation; in other words, there are three different ways in which 
fundamental rights (and other laws, for that matter) are interpreted ‘in 
light of’ the DPSPs: 
1. First, legislation enacted in service of the DPSPs meets the 
‘public interest’ threshold in a fundamental rights challenge 
(importantly, its reasonableness must then be examined, and not 
on the touchstone of the Directive Principles). 
2. Secondly, if legislation is intelligibly susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, then the meaning that corresponds more 
closely to the DPSPs is to be preferred over others.  
3. And thirdly, the DPSPs play a structuring role in selecting the 
specific conceptions that are the concrete manifestations of the 
abstract concepts embodied in the Fundamental Rights 
chapter. This is the best way to understand the Court’s dictum 
that fundamental rights ‘ought to be interpreted in light of the 
DPSPs’. 
 
• Judicial Activism: SC has many a time suo-moto adjudicated under Art 
142 to implement DPSP to provide time bound relief to citizens. 
Introduction of Public Interest Litigation has democratized the access of 
justice to common man. It has paved way to a new regime of human 
rights by giving a wider interpretation to the right to equality, life and 
personal liberty and DPSP.  
• More awareness in citizen regarding their rights.  
• So, initially, the courts adopted a strict and literal legal position in 
interpreting Part-III with Part IV of the Constitution. In the course of 
time, attitude of the judiciary changed and it held that there is a harmony 
between the two parts of the Constitution. As a result, nowadays we find 
that almost every socially oriented judgment of the courts contains an 
obligatory reference to DPSP.