Notes: Sociology as Science- 1 | Sociology Mains Optional for UPSC 2024 PDF Download

 Page 1


 
Chapter 2 
Sociology as Science 
 
Science, Scientific method 
and Critique. 
 
  
Page 2


 
Chapter 2 
Sociology as Science 
 
Science, Scientific method 
and Critique. 
 
  
 
I will begin by telling you 2 stories. 
One of Thomas Kuhn. 
Another of Karl Popper. 
 
 
Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions talks of a generic idea 
of ‘paradigms’, which is a world view. 
 
He defines paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners”. 
 
It says that how with time one world view replaces another. 
 
And that it has been considered valuable across so many areas of knowledge. 
Kuhn also touches on the fact that paradigms exist not only in science, but are 
the natural human way of comprehending the world. 
 
When a paradigm is replaced by another one, the world itself seems to 
change. 
 
He says that paradigms can have integrity, providing most of the answers to 
most of the questions asked of them in their day, and yet also be 
fundamentally wrong. 
 
Real discovery begins with recognition of anomalies, or nature acting in a way 
that it is not meant to. Scientists don’t know what to do with these facts, and 
so they are not ‘scientific’ until they have found a home in an existing theory. 
 
Kuhn makes a distinction between Normal and revolutionary science. 
‘Normal’ science is based on the assumption that the scientific community 
knows what the world is like. 
Normal science tends to suppress anomalous facts because they are a road 
block in a pre-committed theoretical path. 
 
Scientific revolutions, on the other hand, Kuhn says are the “tradition shattering 
complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science. 
It is the type of scientific thinking or research which can cause revolutions in 
how we see the world. 
 
Since paradigm change is not a rational process, but rather a gulf between 
what different parties see, paradigms do not compete.  
 
They cannot agree on the methodology to tackle problems, or even on the 
language needed to describe them; the paradigms are ‘incommensurable’, 
Page 3


 
Chapter 2 
Sociology as Science 
 
Science, Scientific method 
and Critique. 
 
  
 
I will begin by telling you 2 stories. 
One of Thomas Kuhn. 
Another of Karl Popper. 
 
 
Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions talks of a generic idea 
of ‘paradigms’, which is a world view. 
 
He defines paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners”. 
 
It says that how with time one world view replaces another. 
 
And that it has been considered valuable across so many areas of knowledge. 
Kuhn also touches on the fact that paradigms exist not only in science, but are 
the natural human way of comprehending the world. 
 
When a paradigm is replaced by another one, the world itself seems to 
change. 
 
He says that paradigms can have integrity, providing most of the answers to 
most of the questions asked of them in their day, and yet also be 
fundamentally wrong. 
 
Real discovery begins with recognition of anomalies, or nature acting in a way 
that it is not meant to. Scientists don’t know what to do with these facts, and 
so they are not ‘scientific’ until they have found a home in an existing theory. 
 
Kuhn makes a distinction between Normal and revolutionary science. 
‘Normal’ science is based on the assumption that the scientific community 
knows what the world is like. 
Normal science tends to suppress anomalous facts because they are a road 
block in a pre-committed theoretical path. 
 
Scientific revolutions, on the other hand, Kuhn says are the “tradition shattering 
complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science. 
It is the type of scientific thinking or research which can cause revolutions in 
how we see the world. 
 
Since paradigm change is not a rational process, but rather a gulf between 
what different parties see, paradigms do not compete.  
 
They cannot agree on the methodology to tackle problems, or even on the 
language needed to describe them; the paradigms are ‘incommensurable’, 
 
Kuhn says, because they have no common standard by which to judge each 
other. 
  
Page 4


 
Chapter 2 
Sociology as Science 
 
Science, Scientific method 
and Critique. 
 
  
 
I will begin by telling you 2 stories. 
One of Thomas Kuhn. 
Another of Karl Popper. 
 
 
Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions talks of a generic idea 
of ‘paradigms’, which is a world view. 
 
He defines paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners”. 
 
It says that how with time one world view replaces another. 
 
And that it has been considered valuable across so many areas of knowledge. 
Kuhn also touches on the fact that paradigms exist not only in science, but are 
the natural human way of comprehending the world. 
 
When a paradigm is replaced by another one, the world itself seems to 
change. 
 
He says that paradigms can have integrity, providing most of the answers to 
most of the questions asked of them in their day, and yet also be 
fundamentally wrong. 
 
Real discovery begins with recognition of anomalies, or nature acting in a way 
that it is not meant to. Scientists don’t know what to do with these facts, and 
so they are not ‘scientific’ until they have found a home in an existing theory. 
 
Kuhn makes a distinction between Normal and revolutionary science. 
‘Normal’ science is based on the assumption that the scientific community 
knows what the world is like. 
Normal science tends to suppress anomalous facts because they are a road 
block in a pre-committed theoretical path. 
 
Scientific revolutions, on the other hand, Kuhn says are the “tradition shattering 
complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science. 
It is the type of scientific thinking or research which can cause revolutions in 
how we see the world. 
 
Since paradigm change is not a rational process, but rather a gulf between 
what different parties see, paradigms do not compete.  
 
They cannot agree on the methodology to tackle problems, or even on the 
language needed to describe them; the paradigms are ‘incommensurable’, 
 
Kuhn says, because they have no common standard by which to judge each 
other. 
  
 
Karl Popper in 1934 wrote Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
 
Popper believed that the purpose of philosophy or its application was to bring 
clarity to real world problems; it must seek to tell us something about our place 
in the universe. 
 
He said, “whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as 
hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it.”  
 
In other words, philosophy and science could no longer be about finding 
evidence to prove a theory – this wasn’t rigorous enough.  
 
A real philosopher or scientist would work to prove themselves wrong, 
attempting to find the holes in any existing theory.  
 
Only then might knowledge be worthy of its name. 
 
Popper was critical of inductive thinking being used in philosophy and science. 
 
Inductivism attempts to prove something by proving something based on the 
observations made in favour of the statement. 
 
For example, from the observation that all the swans we have seen are white, 
we assert that ‘swans are white’.  
But Popper says that we only need one case where this is not true. 
As for instance, when black swans were discovered in Australia to realise that 
inductive reasoning is faulty. 
 
Popper says that theories are never ultimately and conclusively verifiable, they 
are only “provisional conjectures” which can find apparent corroboration. 
 
On Positivism 
He believes that positivism considered itself an ultra-empirical movement and 
fell for the inductive illusion by claiming that something was only true if it could 
be show in a positive sense to be so.  
 
But this is not enough. Given the problems of inductive logic, to arrive at any 
semblance of knowledge you have to come at a problem from the negative 
angle, to relentlessly identify what clearly isn’t true.  
He notes that scientific laws tend to have credibility when it is clear where they 
do not apply. 
  
Page 5


 
Chapter 2 
Sociology as Science 
 
Science, Scientific method 
and Critique. 
 
  
 
I will begin by telling you 2 stories. 
One of Thomas Kuhn. 
Another of Karl Popper. 
 
 
Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions talks of a generic idea 
of ‘paradigms’, which is a world view. 
 
He defines paradigms as “universally recognized scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of 
practitioners”. 
 
It says that how with time one world view replaces another. 
 
And that it has been considered valuable across so many areas of knowledge. 
Kuhn also touches on the fact that paradigms exist not only in science, but are 
the natural human way of comprehending the world. 
 
When a paradigm is replaced by another one, the world itself seems to 
change. 
 
He says that paradigms can have integrity, providing most of the answers to 
most of the questions asked of them in their day, and yet also be 
fundamentally wrong. 
 
Real discovery begins with recognition of anomalies, or nature acting in a way 
that it is not meant to. Scientists don’t know what to do with these facts, and 
so they are not ‘scientific’ until they have found a home in an existing theory. 
 
Kuhn makes a distinction between Normal and revolutionary science. 
‘Normal’ science is based on the assumption that the scientific community 
knows what the world is like. 
Normal science tends to suppress anomalous facts because they are a road 
block in a pre-committed theoretical path. 
 
Scientific revolutions, on the other hand, Kuhn says are the “tradition shattering 
complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science. 
It is the type of scientific thinking or research which can cause revolutions in 
how we see the world. 
 
Since paradigm change is not a rational process, but rather a gulf between 
what different parties see, paradigms do not compete.  
 
They cannot agree on the methodology to tackle problems, or even on the 
language needed to describe them; the paradigms are ‘incommensurable’, 
 
Kuhn says, because they have no common standard by which to judge each 
other. 
  
 
Karl Popper in 1934 wrote Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
 
Popper believed that the purpose of philosophy or its application was to bring 
clarity to real world problems; it must seek to tell us something about our place 
in the universe. 
 
He said, “whenever we propose a solution to a problem, we ought to try as 
hard as we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it.”  
 
In other words, philosophy and science could no longer be about finding 
evidence to prove a theory – this wasn’t rigorous enough.  
 
A real philosopher or scientist would work to prove themselves wrong, 
attempting to find the holes in any existing theory.  
 
Only then might knowledge be worthy of its name. 
 
Popper was critical of inductive thinking being used in philosophy and science. 
 
Inductivism attempts to prove something by proving something based on the 
observations made in favour of the statement. 
 
For example, from the observation that all the swans we have seen are white, 
we assert that ‘swans are white’.  
But Popper says that we only need one case where this is not true. 
As for instance, when black swans were discovered in Australia to realise that 
inductive reasoning is faulty. 
 
Popper says that theories are never ultimately and conclusively verifiable, they 
are only “provisional conjectures” which can find apparent corroboration. 
 
On Positivism 
He believes that positivism considered itself an ultra-empirical movement and 
fell for the inductive illusion by claiming that something was only true if it could 
be show in a positive sense to be so.  
 
But this is not enough. Given the problems of inductive logic, to arrive at any 
semblance of knowledge you have to come at a problem from the negative 
angle, to relentlessly identify what clearly isn’t true.  
He notes that scientific laws tend to have credibility when it is clear where they 
do not apply. 
  
 
Now when we have listened to these stories, let us try to find out if  
Sociology is a science or not 
 
Sociology emerged due to challenges posed before modernity. 
 
Initial sociologists wanted to develop Sociology on bases of natural science-  
Saint Simon (social physics), August Comte (statistics and dynamics), Herbert 
Spencer (organismic analogy), Durkheim (moral density, moral volume). 
 
But it was found sociology could not stand all parameter of natural science so 
debate started whether ‘sociology is a science’. 
 
Conception of science has changed – enlightenment ideologies consider it as 
a body of knowledge (empirical (observed)/testable (verified)/uniform laws) 
based on natural science. 
 
Karl Popper argues that only positivism is not science because it overlooks 
aberration and kills the critical spirit of science. 
 
Gradually science came to be understood as method of enquiry or approach 
based on evidence and reason.  
 
Karl Popper says that science is not a body of knowledge but a method of 
approaching and studying phenomenon.  
 
 
Science has four preconditions - 
 
- Intersubjective reliability: (Intersubjectivity between people is there if 
they agree on a given set of meanings or a definition of the situation. It 
refers to shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions 
with each other and used as an everyday resource to interpret the 
meaning of elements of social and cultural life) 
 
- Objectivity in research 
 
- Quantifiability of the phenomenon 
 
- Theoretical orientation