State Exec. & legislature | Polity for UPSC 2024 (Pre & Mains) PDF Download

 Page 1


State Execu*ve and Legislature 
Governor- powers and posi*on: 
Ar#cles 153 to 167 in Part VI of the Cons#tu#on deal with the state execu#ve. The state execu#ve consists 
of the governor, the chief minister, the council of ministers and the advocate general of the state much like 
the Union execu#ve. However, there is no o?ce of vice-governor (in the state) like that of Vice-President at 
the Centre. Usually, there is a governor for each state, but the 7th Cons#tu#onal Amendment Act of 1956 
facilitated the appointment of the same person as a governor for two or more states.  
The governor is neither directly elected by the people nor indirectly elected by a specially cons#tuted 
electoral college as is the case with the president. He is appointed by the president by warrant under his 
hand and seal. In a way, he is a nominee of the Central government. But, as held by the Supreme Court in 
1979, the o?ce of governor of a state is not an employment under the Central government. It is an 
independent cons#tu#onal o?ce and is not under the control of or subordinate to the Central government. 
The DraQ Cons#tu#on provided for the direct elec#on of the governor on the basis of universal adult 
su?rage. But the Cons#tuent Assembly opted for the present system of appointment of governor by the 
president because of the following reasons : 
1. The direct elec#on of the governor is incompa#ble with the parliamentary system established in 
the states. 
2. The mode of direct elec#on is more likely to create con?icts between the governor and the chief 
minister. 
3. The governor being only a cons#tu#onal (nominal) head, there is no point in making elaborate 
arrangements for his elec#on and spending huge amount of money. 
4. The elec#on of a governor would be en#rely on personal issues. Hence, it is not in the na#onal 
interest to involve a large number of voters in such an elec#on. 
5. An elected governor would naturally belong to a party and would not be a neutral person and an 
impar#al head. 
6. The elec#on of governor would create separa#st tendencies and thus a?ect the poli#cal stability 
and unity of the country. 
7. The system of presiden#al nomina#on enables the Centre to maintain its control over the states. 
8. The direct elec#on of the governor creates a serious problem of leadership at the #me of a 
general elec#on in the state. 
9. The chief minister would like his nominee to contest for governorship.  
The Canadian model, where the governor of a province (state) is appointed by the Governor-General 
(Centre), was accepted in the Cons#tuent Assembly. It is an aYempt of amalgama#ng two diagonally 
opposite interests of securing the unity of the country and keeping the spirit of the parliamentary system 
intact in the state in the o?ce of the Governor, the framers appear to have conceptualized the o?ce in 
such a sense that it normally func#ons as the cons#tu#onal head of the state but in abnormal situa#ons, 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
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Page 2


State Execu*ve and Legislature 
Governor- powers and posi*on: 
Ar#cles 153 to 167 in Part VI of the Cons#tu#on deal with the state execu#ve. The state execu#ve consists 
of the governor, the chief minister, the council of ministers and the advocate general of the state much like 
the Union execu#ve. However, there is no o?ce of vice-governor (in the state) like that of Vice-President at 
the Centre. Usually, there is a governor for each state, but the 7th Cons#tu#onal Amendment Act of 1956 
facilitated the appointment of the same person as a governor for two or more states.  
The governor is neither directly elected by the people nor indirectly elected by a specially cons#tuted 
electoral college as is the case with the president. He is appointed by the president by warrant under his 
hand and seal. In a way, he is a nominee of the Central government. But, as held by the Supreme Court in 
1979, the o?ce of governor of a state is not an employment under the Central government. It is an 
independent cons#tu#onal o?ce and is not under the control of or subordinate to the Central government. 
The DraQ Cons#tu#on provided for the direct elec#on of the governor on the basis of universal adult 
su?rage. But the Cons#tuent Assembly opted for the present system of appointment of governor by the 
president because of the following reasons : 
1. The direct elec#on of the governor is incompa#ble with the parliamentary system established in 
the states. 
2. The mode of direct elec#on is more likely to create con?icts between the governor and the chief 
minister. 
3. The governor being only a cons#tu#onal (nominal) head, there is no point in making elaborate 
arrangements for his elec#on and spending huge amount of money. 
4. The elec#on of a governor would be en#rely on personal issues. Hence, it is not in the na#onal 
interest to involve a large number of voters in such an elec#on. 
5. An elected governor would naturally belong to a party and would not be a neutral person and an 
impar#al head. 
6. The elec#on of governor would create separa#st tendencies and thus a?ect the poli#cal stability 
and unity of the country. 
7. The system of presiden#al nomina#on enables the Centre to maintain its control over the states. 
8. The direct elec#on of the governor creates a serious problem of leadership at the #me of a 
general elec#on in the state. 
9. The chief minister would like his nominee to contest for governorship.  
The Canadian model, where the governor of a province (state) is appointed by the Governor-General 
(Centre), was accepted in the Cons#tuent Assembly. It is an aYempt of amalgama#ng two diagonally 
opposite interests of securing the unity of the country and keeping the spirit of the parliamentary system 
intact in the state in the o?ce of the Governor, the framers appear to have conceptualized the o?ce in 
such a sense that it normally func#ons as the cons#tu#onal head of the state but in abnormal situa#ons, 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
also supplements as the extended arm of the Central Government to help it #de over the situa#ons. The 
Cons#tu#on lays down only two quali?ca#ons for the appointment of a person as a governor. These are: 
1. He should be a ci#zen of India. 
2. He should have completed the age of 35 years. 
Addi#onally, two conven#ons have also developed in this regard over the years. First, he should be an 
outsider, that is, he should not belong to the state where he is appointed, so that he is free from the local 
poli#cs. Second, while appoin#ng the governor, the president is required to consult the chief minister of the 
state concerned, so that the smooth func#oning of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state is ensured. 
However, both the conven#ons have been violated in some of the cases.  
Before entering upon his o?ce, the governor has to make and subscribe to an oath or a?rma#on. In his 
oath, the governor swears: 
(a) to faithfully execute the o?ce; 
(b) to preserve, protect and defend the Cons#tu#on and the law; and 
(c) to devote himself to the service and well-being of the people of the state. The oath of o?ce to 
the governor is administered by the chief jus#ce of the concerned state high court and in his 
absence, the senior-most judge of that court available. 
A governor holds o?ce for a term of ?ve years from the date on which he enters upon his o?ce. However, 
this term of ?ve years is subject to the pleasure of the President. Further, he can resign at any #me by 
addressing a resigna#on leYer to the President. The Supreme Court held that the pleasure of the President 
is not jus#?able. The Cons#tu#on does not lay down any grounds upon which a governor may be removed 
by the President.  
Discre*onary Powers of the Governor: 
• The reach of the discre#onary powers of the Governor has become wide-ranging due to both the overt 
cons#tu#onal mandate on the one hand, and the circumstan#al assump#on of such powers by the 
governors, on the other.  
• Thus, Ar#cle 163 of the Cons#tu#on, while providing for the Council of Ministers to aid and advice the 
Governor in the exercise of his func#ons, also speci?cally envisages that in certain maYers he may act in 
his discre#on. 
• Addi#onally, the circumstan#al exigencies would also a?ord the Governor the situa#ons in which he 
might ?nd himself compelled to take a decision in his discre#on. Appointment of the Chief Minister 
happens to be one of the cases when despite the established norms of the parliamentary democracy and 
overt cons#tu#onal mandate, the Governor may ?nd himself in a posi#on to exercise his discre#on in 
response to the ?uidity of the situa#on. 
• Reserva#on of a bill for the considera#on by the President is another instance where the Governor is not 
obliged to abide by the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Ar#cle 200 of the Cons#tu#on 
provides for the Governor to reserve a bill duly passed by the Legisla#ve Assembly of the state for the 
assent of the President if the subject maYer of the bill pertains to such signi?cant issues like the larger 
interest of the country, endangers the posi#on of the High Court, and touches upon the issues of grave 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 3


State Execu*ve and Legislature 
Governor- powers and posi*on: 
Ar#cles 153 to 167 in Part VI of the Cons#tu#on deal with the state execu#ve. The state execu#ve consists 
of the governor, the chief minister, the council of ministers and the advocate general of the state much like 
the Union execu#ve. However, there is no o?ce of vice-governor (in the state) like that of Vice-President at 
the Centre. Usually, there is a governor for each state, but the 7th Cons#tu#onal Amendment Act of 1956 
facilitated the appointment of the same person as a governor for two or more states.  
The governor is neither directly elected by the people nor indirectly elected by a specially cons#tuted 
electoral college as is the case with the president. He is appointed by the president by warrant under his 
hand and seal. In a way, he is a nominee of the Central government. But, as held by the Supreme Court in 
1979, the o?ce of governor of a state is not an employment under the Central government. It is an 
independent cons#tu#onal o?ce and is not under the control of or subordinate to the Central government. 
The DraQ Cons#tu#on provided for the direct elec#on of the governor on the basis of universal adult 
su?rage. But the Cons#tuent Assembly opted for the present system of appointment of governor by the 
president because of the following reasons : 
1. The direct elec#on of the governor is incompa#ble with the parliamentary system established in 
the states. 
2. The mode of direct elec#on is more likely to create con?icts between the governor and the chief 
minister. 
3. The governor being only a cons#tu#onal (nominal) head, there is no point in making elaborate 
arrangements for his elec#on and spending huge amount of money. 
4. The elec#on of a governor would be en#rely on personal issues. Hence, it is not in the na#onal 
interest to involve a large number of voters in such an elec#on. 
5. An elected governor would naturally belong to a party and would not be a neutral person and an 
impar#al head. 
6. The elec#on of governor would create separa#st tendencies and thus a?ect the poli#cal stability 
and unity of the country. 
7. The system of presiden#al nomina#on enables the Centre to maintain its control over the states. 
8. The direct elec#on of the governor creates a serious problem of leadership at the #me of a 
general elec#on in the state. 
9. The chief minister would like his nominee to contest for governorship.  
The Canadian model, where the governor of a province (state) is appointed by the Governor-General 
(Centre), was accepted in the Cons#tuent Assembly. It is an aYempt of amalgama#ng two diagonally 
opposite interests of securing the unity of the country and keeping the spirit of the parliamentary system 
intact in the state in the o?ce of the Governor, the framers appear to have conceptualized the o?ce in 
such a sense that it normally func#ons as the cons#tu#onal head of the state but in abnormal situa#ons, 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
also supplements as the extended arm of the Central Government to help it #de over the situa#ons. The 
Cons#tu#on lays down only two quali?ca#ons for the appointment of a person as a governor. These are: 
1. He should be a ci#zen of India. 
2. He should have completed the age of 35 years. 
Addi#onally, two conven#ons have also developed in this regard over the years. First, he should be an 
outsider, that is, he should not belong to the state where he is appointed, so that he is free from the local 
poli#cs. Second, while appoin#ng the governor, the president is required to consult the chief minister of the 
state concerned, so that the smooth func#oning of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state is ensured. 
However, both the conven#ons have been violated in some of the cases.  
Before entering upon his o?ce, the governor has to make and subscribe to an oath or a?rma#on. In his 
oath, the governor swears: 
(a) to faithfully execute the o?ce; 
(b) to preserve, protect and defend the Cons#tu#on and the law; and 
(c) to devote himself to the service and well-being of the people of the state. The oath of o?ce to 
the governor is administered by the chief jus#ce of the concerned state high court and in his 
absence, the senior-most judge of that court available. 
A governor holds o?ce for a term of ?ve years from the date on which he enters upon his o?ce. However, 
this term of ?ve years is subject to the pleasure of the President. Further, he can resign at any #me by 
addressing a resigna#on leYer to the President. The Supreme Court held that the pleasure of the President 
is not jus#?able. The Cons#tu#on does not lay down any grounds upon which a governor may be removed 
by the President.  
Discre*onary Powers of the Governor: 
• The reach of the discre#onary powers of the Governor has become wide-ranging due to both the overt 
cons#tu#onal mandate on the one hand, and the circumstan#al assump#on of such powers by the 
governors, on the other.  
• Thus, Ar#cle 163 of the Cons#tu#on, while providing for the Council of Ministers to aid and advice the 
Governor in the exercise of his func#ons, also speci?cally envisages that in certain maYers he may act in 
his discre#on. 
• Addi#onally, the circumstan#al exigencies would also a?ord the Governor the situa#ons in which he 
might ?nd himself compelled to take a decision in his discre#on. Appointment of the Chief Minister 
happens to be one of the cases when despite the established norms of the parliamentary democracy and 
overt cons#tu#onal mandate, the Governor may ?nd himself in a posi#on to exercise his discre#on in 
response to the ?uidity of the situa#on. 
• Reserva#on of a bill for the considera#on by the President is another instance where the Governor is not 
obliged to abide by the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Ar#cle 200 of the Cons#tu#on 
provides for the Governor to reserve a bill duly passed by the Legisla#ve Assembly of the state for the 
assent of the President if the subject maYer of the bill pertains to such signi?cant issues like the larger 
interest of the country, endangers the posi#on of the High Court, and touches upon the issues of grave 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
na#onal signi?cance. This right is an absolute discre#on of the Governor as the Cons#tu#on professedly 
lays down the power of the Governor. 
• Finally, the discre#on of the Governor extends to the ?eld of sending his report to the Centre on his own 
judgement regarding the breakdown of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state, and recommending the 
imposi#on of the president’s rule in the state. Though the president’s rule in a state can be imposed even 
without the report of the Governor, ordinarily, the Governor’s report becomes the basis for the Union 
government to act on the maYer. 
• The Indian poli#cal scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years aQer independence. 
Problems which arose in the working of union – state rela#ons were mostly maYers for adjustments in 
the intra – party forum and the Governor had very liYle occasion for using his discre#onary powers. 
• The ins#tu#on of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President’s rule was 
imposed, brought in to some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereaQer it did not aYract much 
aYen#on for some years.  
• A major change occurred aQer the Fourth General Elec#ons in 1967. In a number of states the party in 
power was di?erent from that in the Union. The subsequent decades saw the fragmenta#on of poli#cal 
par#es and emergence of new regional par#es. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in 
several states. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discre#onary powers 
move frequently.  
• It has been alleged that the governors have not acted with necessary objec#vity either in the manner of 
exercise of their discre#on or in their role as a vital link between the Union and the states. The Indian 
poli#cal scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years aQer independence. Problems 
which arose in the working of union – state rela#ons were mostly maYers for adjustments in the intra – 
party forum and the Governor had very liYle occasion for using his discre#onary powers. 
• The ins#tu#on of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President’s rule was 
imposed, brought in to some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereaQer it did not aYract much 
aYen#on for some years.  
• A major change occurred aQer the Fourth General Elec#ons in 1967. In a number of states the party in 
power was di?erent from that in the Union. The subsequent decades saw the fragmenta#on of poli#cal 
par#es and emergence of new regional par#es. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in 
several states. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discre#onary powers 
move frequently.  
• It has been alleged that the governors have not acted with necessary objec#vity either in the manner of 
exercise of their discre#on or in their role as a vital link between the Union and the states. 
• The ques#on of judicial review under Ar#cle 356 has come up for considera#on before the Courts in 
several circumstances. In Rao Birender Singh v. State of Haryana, it was held that the President while 
exercising power under Ar#cle 356 did not act on behalf of the execu#ve of the Union but in a 
cons#tu#onal capacity and hence the exercise of power by the President was not amenable to the 
jurisdic#on of the Court. 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
Page 4


State Execu*ve and Legislature 
Governor- powers and posi*on: 
Ar#cles 153 to 167 in Part VI of the Cons#tu#on deal with the state execu#ve. The state execu#ve consists 
of the governor, the chief minister, the council of ministers and the advocate general of the state much like 
the Union execu#ve. However, there is no o?ce of vice-governor (in the state) like that of Vice-President at 
the Centre. Usually, there is a governor for each state, but the 7th Cons#tu#onal Amendment Act of 1956 
facilitated the appointment of the same person as a governor for two or more states.  
The governor is neither directly elected by the people nor indirectly elected by a specially cons#tuted 
electoral college as is the case with the president. He is appointed by the president by warrant under his 
hand and seal. In a way, he is a nominee of the Central government. But, as held by the Supreme Court in 
1979, the o?ce of governor of a state is not an employment under the Central government. It is an 
independent cons#tu#onal o?ce and is not under the control of or subordinate to the Central government. 
The DraQ Cons#tu#on provided for the direct elec#on of the governor on the basis of universal adult 
su?rage. But the Cons#tuent Assembly opted for the present system of appointment of governor by the 
president because of the following reasons : 
1. The direct elec#on of the governor is incompa#ble with the parliamentary system established in 
the states. 
2. The mode of direct elec#on is more likely to create con?icts between the governor and the chief 
minister. 
3. The governor being only a cons#tu#onal (nominal) head, there is no point in making elaborate 
arrangements for his elec#on and spending huge amount of money. 
4. The elec#on of a governor would be en#rely on personal issues. Hence, it is not in the na#onal 
interest to involve a large number of voters in such an elec#on. 
5. An elected governor would naturally belong to a party and would not be a neutral person and an 
impar#al head. 
6. The elec#on of governor would create separa#st tendencies and thus a?ect the poli#cal stability 
and unity of the country. 
7. The system of presiden#al nomina#on enables the Centre to maintain its control over the states. 
8. The direct elec#on of the governor creates a serious problem of leadership at the #me of a 
general elec#on in the state. 
9. The chief minister would like his nominee to contest for governorship.  
The Canadian model, where the governor of a province (state) is appointed by the Governor-General 
(Centre), was accepted in the Cons#tuent Assembly. It is an aYempt of amalgama#ng two diagonally 
opposite interests of securing the unity of the country and keeping the spirit of the parliamentary system 
intact in the state in the o?ce of the Governor, the framers appear to have conceptualized the o?ce in 
such a sense that it normally func#ons as the cons#tu#onal head of the state but in abnormal situa#ons, 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
also supplements as the extended arm of the Central Government to help it #de over the situa#ons. The 
Cons#tu#on lays down only two quali?ca#ons for the appointment of a person as a governor. These are: 
1. He should be a ci#zen of India. 
2. He should have completed the age of 35 years. 
Addi#onally, two conven#ons have also developed in this regard over the years. First, he should be an 
outsider, that is, he should not belong to the state where he is appointed, so that he is free from the local 
poli#cs. Second, while appoin#ng the governor, the president is required to consult the chief minister of the 
state concerned, so that the smooth func#oning of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state is ensured. 
However, both the conven#ons have been violated in some of the cases.  
Before entering upon his o?ce, the governor has to make and subscribe to an oath or a?rma#on. In his 
oath, the governor swears: 
(a) to faithfully execute the o?ce; 
(b) to preserve, protect and defend the Cons#tu#on and the law; and 
(c) to devote himself to the service and well-being of the people of the state. The oath of o?ce to 
the governor is administered by the chief jus#ce of the concerned state high court and in his 
absence, the senior-most judge of that court available. 
A governor holds o?ce for a term of ?ve years from the date on which he enters upon his o?ce. However, 
this term of ?ve years is subject to the pleasure of the President. Further, he can resign at any #me by 
addressing a resigna#on leYer to the President. The Supreme Court held that the pleasure of the President 
is not jus#?able. The Cons#tu#on does not lay down any grounds upon which a governor may be removed 
by the President.  
Discre*onary Powers of the Governor: 
• The reach of the discre#onary powers of the Governor has become wide-ranging due to both the overt 
cons#tu#onal mandate on the one hand, and the circumstan#al assump#on of such powers by the 
governors, on the other.  
• Thus, Ar#cle 163 of the Cons#tu#on, while providing for the Council of Ministers to aid and advice the 
Governor in the exercise of his func#ons, also speci?cally envisages that in certain maYers he may act in 
his discre#on. 
• Addi#onally, the circumstan#al exigencies would also a?ord the Governor the situa#ons in which he 
might ?nd himself compelled to take a decision in his discre#on. Appointment of the Chief Minister 
happens to be one of the cases when despite the established norms of the parliamentary democracy and 
overt cons#tu#onal mandate, the Governor may ?nd himself in a posi#on to exercise his discre#on in 
response to the ?uidity of the situa#on. 
• Reserva#on of a bill for the considera#on by the President is another instance where the Governor is not 
obliged to abide by the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Ar#cle 200 of the Cons#tu#on 
provides for the Governor to reserve a bill duly passed by the Legisla#ve Assembly of the state for the 
assent of the President if the subject maYer of the bill pertains to such signi?cant issues like the larger 
interest of the country, endangers the posi#on of the High Court, and touches upon the issues of grave 
www.YouTube.com/SleepyClasses 
www.SleepyClasses.com 
na#onal signi?cance. This right is an absolute discre#on of the Governor as the Cons#tu#on professedly 
lays down the power of the Governor. 
• Finally, the discre#on of the Governor extends to the ?eld of sending his report to the Centre on his own 
judgement regarding the breakdown of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state, and recommending the 
imposi#on of the president’s rule in the state. Though the president’s rule in a state can be imposed even 
without the report of the Governor, ordinarily, the Governor’s report becomes the basis for the Union 
government to act on the maYer. 
• The Indian poli#cal scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years aQer independence. 
Problems which arose in the working of union – state rela#ons were mostly maYers for adjustments in 
the intra – party forum and the Governor had very liYle occasion for using his discre#onary powers. 
• The ins#tu#on of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President’s rule was 
imposed, brought in to some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereaQer it did not aYract much 
aYen#on for some years.  
• A major change occurred aQer the Fourth General Elec#ons in 1967. In a number of states the party in 
power was di?erent from that in the Union. The subsequent decades saw the fragmenta#on of poli#cal 
par#es and emergence of new regional par#es. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in 
several states. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discre#onary powers 
move frequently.  
• It has been alleged that the governors have not acted with necessary objec#vity either in the manner of 
exercise of their discre#on or in their role as a vital link between the Union and the states. The Indian 
poli#cal scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years aQer independence. Problems 
which arose in the working of union – state rela#ons were mostly maYers for adjustments in the intra – 
party forum and the Governor had very liYle occasion for using his discre#onary powers. 
• The ins#tu#on of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President’s rule was 
imposed, brought in to some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereaQer it did not aYract much 
aYen#on for some years.  
• A major change occurred aQer the Fourth General Elec#ons in 1967. In a number of states the party in 
power was di?erent from that in the Union. The subsequent decades saw the fragmenta#on of poli#cal 
par#es and emergence of new regional par#es. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in 
several states. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discre#onary powers 
move frequently.  
• It has been alleged that the governors have not acted with necessary objec#vity either in the manner of 
exercise of their discre#on or in their role as a vital link between the Union and the states. 
• The ques#on of judicial review under Ar#cle 356 has come up for considera#on before the Courts in 
several circumstances. In Rao Birender Singh v. State of Haryana, it was held that the President while 
exercising power under Ar#cle 356 did not act on behalf of the execu#ve of the Union but in a 
cons#tu#onal capacity and hence the exercise of power by the President was not amenable to the 
jurisdic#on of the Court. 
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• The President, ac#ng under Ar#cle 356 of the Cons#tu#on of India had promulgated President’s rule in 
six States during 1989 to 1992 which were challenged at di?erent #mes and they were heard together by 
the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India and held: 
(1) That the proclama#on has been made upon a considera#on which is wholly extraneous or 
irrelevant to the purpose for which the power under Ar#cle 356 had been conferred by the 
Cons#tu#on, namely, a breakdown of the cons#tu#onal machinery in a State. 
(2) In other words, where there is no ‘reasonable nexus’ between the reasons disclosed and the 
sa#sfac#on of the President, because in such a case, it can be said that there has been no 
‘sa#sfac#on’ of the President which is a condi#on for exercise of the power under Ar#cle 356. 
(3) That the exercise of the power under Ar#cle 356 has been mala ?de, because a statutory order 
which lacks bona ?des has no existence in law.“ 
• In the recent years the lengthiest decision of the Supreme Court on Ar#cle 356 came in Rameshwar 
Prasad v. Union of India. The Supreme Court’s majority view in this case was that if a poli#cal party with 
the support of other poli#cal par#es or other MLAs staked claim to form a government and sa#s?ed the 
Governor about its majority to form a stable government, the Governor could not override the majority 
claim because of his subjec#ve assessment that the majority was cobbled up by illegal and unethical 
means. 
• In the cases concerning UYarakhand and Arunchal Pradesh governments in the past few years, Courts 
described as “a thrashing to the Cons#tu#on and a spanking to governance”, the cons#tu#onal courts 
have outlined that dislodging a democra#cally elected government through a Presiden#al proclama#on 
must happen in extremely rare circumstances, and that the Governor, in such instances, must “keep clear 
of any poli#cal horse-trading.” 
• Chief Minister and his CoM are the real execu#ve at the state level. The Cons#tu#on does not contain 
any speci?c procedure for the selec#on and appointment of the Chief Minister. Ar#cle 164 only says that 
the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the governor. 
• In accordance with the convec#ons of the parliamentary system of government, the governor has to 
appoint the leader of the majority party in the state legisla#ve assembly as the Chief Minister. 
• Ar#cle 163 provides for Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advise the 
Governor in the exercise of his func#ons, except in so far as he is required to exercise his func#ons in his 
discre#on. 
• The total number of ministers, including the chief minister, in the council of ministers in a state shall not 
exceed 15 per cent of the total strength of the legisla#ve assembly of that state. But, the number of 
ministers, including the chief minister, in a state shall not be less than 12. This provision was added by the 
91st Amendment Act of 2003. 
State Legislatures: 
Composi*on of State Legislature: 
The composi#on of State Legislature is uniform, however the Cons#tu#on a dis#nc#on between small and 
bigger states. While the Legislature of every State shall include the Governor and in some of the States it 
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Page 5


State Execu*ve and Legislature 
Governor- powers and posi*on: 
Ar#cles 153 to 167 in Part VI of the Cons#tu#on deal with the state execu#ve. The state execu#ve consists 
of the governor, the chief minister, the council of ministers and the advocate general of the state much like 
the Union execu#ve. However, there is no o?ce of vice-governor (in the state) like that of Vice-President at 
the Centre. Usually, there is a governor for each state, but the 7th Cons#tu#onal Amendment Act of 1956 
facilitated the appointment of the same person as a governor for two or more states.  
The governor is neither directly elected by the people nor indirectly elected by a specially cons#tuted 
electoral college as is the case with the president. He is appointed by the president by warrant under his 
hand and seal. In a way, he is a nominee of the Central government. But, as held by the Supreme Court in 
1979, the o?ce of governor of a state is not an employment under the Central government. It is an 
independent cons#tu#onal o?ce and is not under the control of or subordinate to the Central government. 
The DraQ Cons#tu#on provided for the direct elec#on of the governor on the basis of universal adult 
su?rage. But the Cons#tuent Assembly opted for the present system of appointment of governor by the 
president because of the following reasons : 
1. The direct elec#on of the governor is incompa#ble with the parliamentary system established in 
the states. 
2. The mode of direct elec#on is more likely to create con?icts between the governor and the chief 
minister. 
3. The governor being only a cons#tu#onal (nominal) head, there is no point in making elaborate 
arrangements for his elec#on and spending huge amount of money. 
4. The elec#on of a governor would be en#rely on personal issues. Hence, it is not in the na#onal 
interest to involve a large number of voters in such an elec#on. 
5. An elected governor would naturally belong to a party and would not be a neutral person and an 
impar#al head. 
6. The elec#on of governor would create separa#st tendencies and thus a?ect the poli#cal stability 
and unity of the country. 
7. The system of presiden#al nomina#on enables the Centre to maintain its control over the states. 
8. The direct elec#on of the governor creates a serious problem of leadership at the #me of a 
general elec#on in the state. 
9. The chief minister would like his nominee to contest for governorship.  
The Canadian model, where the governor of a province (state) is appointed by the Governor-General 
(Centre), was accepted in the Cons#tuent Assembly. It is an aYempt of amalgama#ng two diagonally 
opposite interests of securing the unity of the country and keeping the spirit of the parliamentary system 
intact in the state in the o?ce of the Governor, the framers appear to have conceptualized the o?ce in 
such a sense that it normally func#ons as the cons#tu#onal head of the state but in abnormal situa#ons, 
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also supplements as the extended arm of the Central Government to help it #de over the situa#ons. The 
Cons#tu#on lays down only two quali?ca#ons for the appointment of a person as a governor. These are: 
1. He should be a ci#zen of India. 
2. He should have completed the age of 35 years. 
Addi#onally, two conven#ons have also developed in this regard over the years. First, he should be an 
outsider, that is, he should not belong to the state where he is appointed, so that he is free from the local 
poli#cs. Second, while appoin#ng the governor, the president is required to consult the chief minister of the 
state concerned, so that the smooth func#oning of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state is ensured. 
However, both the conven#ons have been violated in some of the cases.  
Before entering upon his o?ce, the governor has to make and subscribe to an oath or a?rma#on. In his 
oath, the governor swears: 
(a) to faithfully execute the o?ce; 
(b) to preserve, protect and defend the Cons#tu#on and the law; and 
(c) to devote himself to the service and well-being of the people of the state. The oath of o?ce to 
the governor is administered by the chief jus#ce of the concerned state high court and in his 
absence, the senior-most judge of that court available. 
A governor holds o?ce for a term of ?ve years from the date on which he enters upon his o?ce. However, 
this term of ?ve years is subject to the pleasure of the President. Further, he can resign at any #me by 
addressing a resigna#on leYer to the President. The Supreme Court held that the pleasure of the President 
is not jus#?able. The Cons#tu#on does not lay down any grounds upon which a governor may be removed 
by the President.  
Discre*onary Powers of the Governor: 
• The reach of the discre#onary powers of the Governor has become wide-ranging due to both the overt 
cons#tu#onal mandate on the one hand, and the circumstan#al assump#on of such powers by the 
governors, on the other.  
• Thus, Ar#cle 163 of the Cons#tu#on, while providing for the Council of Ministers to aid and advice the 
Governor in the exercise of his func#ons, also speci?cally envisages that in certain maYers he may act in 
his discre#on. 
• Addi#onally, the circumstan#al exigencies would also a?ord the Governor the situa#ons in which he 
might ?nd himself compelled to take a decision in his discre#on. Appointment of the Chief Minister 
happens to be one of the cases when despite the established norms of the parliamentary democracy and 
overt cons#tu#onal mandate, the Governor may ?nd himself in a posi#on to exercise his discre#on in 
response to the ?uidity of the situa#on. 
• Reserva#on of a bill for the considera#on by the President is another instance where the Governor is not 
obliged to abide by the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Ar#cle 200 of the Cons#tu#on 
provides for the Governor to reserve a bill duly passed by the Legisla#ve Assembly of the state for the 
assent of the President if the subject maYer of the bill pertains to such signi?cant issues like the larger 
interest of the country, endangers the posi#on of the High Court, and touches upon the issues of grave 
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na#onal signi?cance. This right is an absolute discre#on of the Governor as the Cons#tu#on professedly 
lays down the power of the Governor. 
• Finally, the discre#on of the Governor extends to the ?eld of sending his report to the Centre on his own 
judgement regarding the breakdown of the cons#tu#onal machinery in the state, and recommending the 
imposi#on of the president’s rule in the state. Though the president’s rule in a state can be imposed even 
without the report of the Governor, ordinarily, the Governor’s report becomes the basis for the Union 
government to act on the maYer. 
• The Indian poli#cal scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years aQer independence. 
Problems which arose in the working of union – state rela#ons were mostly maYers for adjustments in 
the intra – party forum and the Governor had very liYle occasion for using his discre#onary powers. 
• The ins#tu#on of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President’s rule was 
imposed, brought in to some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereaQer it did not aYract much 
aYen#on for some years.  
• A major change occurred aQer the Fourth General Elec#ons in 1967. In a number of states the party in 
power was di?erent from that in the Union. The subsequent decades saw the fragmenta#on of poli#cal 
par#es and emergence of new regional par#es. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in 
several states. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discre#onary powers 
move frequently.  
• It has been alleged that the governors have not acted with necessary objec#vity either in the manner of 
exercise of their discre#on or in their role as a vital link between the Union and the states. The Indian 
poli#cal scene was dominated by a single party for a number of years aQer independence. Problems 
which arose in the working of union – state rela#ons were mostly maYers for adjustments in the intra – 
party forum and the Governor had very liYle occasion for using his discre#onary powers. 
• The ins#tu#on of Governor remained largely latent. Events in Kerala in 1959 when President’s rule was 
imposed, brought in to some prominence the role of the Governor, but thereaQer it did not aYract much 
aYen#on for some years.  
• A major change occurred aQer the Fourth General Elec#ons in 1967. In a number of states the party in 
power was di?erent from that in the Union. The subsequent decades saw the fragmenta#on of poli#cal 
par#es and emergence of new regional par#es. These developments gave rise to chronic instability in 
several states. As a consequence, the Governors were called upon to exercise their discre#onary powers 
move frequently.  
• It has been alleged that the governors have not acted with necessary objec#vity either in the manner of 
exercise of their discre#on or in their role as a vital link between the Union and the states. 
• The ques#on of judicial review under Ar#cle 356 has come up for considera#on before the Courts in 
several circumstances. In Rao Birender Singh v. State of Haryana, it was held that the President while 
exercising power under Ar#cle 356 did not act on behalf of the execu#ve of the Union but in a 
cons#tu#onal capacity and hence the exercise of power by the President was not amenable to the 
jurisdic#on of the Court. 
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• The President, ac#ng under Ar#cle 356 of the Cons#tu#on of India had promulgated President’s rule in 
six States during 1989 to 1992 which were challenged at di?erent #mes and they were heard together by 
the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India and held: 
(1) That the proclama#on has been made upon a considera#on which is wholly extraneous or 
irrelevant to the purpose for which the power under Ar#cle 356 had been conferred by the 
Cons#tu#on, namely, a breakdown of the cons#tu#onal machinery in a State. 
(2) In other words, where there is no ‘reasonable nexus’ between the reasons disclosed and the 
sa#sfac#on of the President, because in such a case, it can be said that there has been no 
‘sa#sfac#on’ of the President which is a condi#on for exercise of the power under Ar#cle 356. 
(3) That the exercise of the power under Ar#cle 356 has been mala ?de, because a statutory order 
which lacks bona ?des has no existence in law.“ 
• In the recent years the lengthiest decision of the Supreme Court on Ar#cle 356 came in Rameshwar 
Prasad v. Union of India. The Supreme Court’s majority view in this case was that if a poli#cal party with 
the support of other poli#cal par#es or other MLAs staked claim to form a government and sa#s?ed the 
Governor about its majority to form a stable government, the Governor could not override the majority 
claim because of his subjec#ve assessment that the majority was cobbled up by illegal and unethical 
means. 
• In the cases concerning UYarakhand and Arunchal Pradesh governments in the past few years, Courts 
described as “a thrashing to the Cons#tu#on and a spanking to governance”, the cons#tu#onal courts 
have outlined that dislodging a democra#cally elected government through a Presiden#al proclama#on 
must happen in extremely rare circumstances, and that the Governor, in such instances, must “keep clear 
of any poli#cal horse-trading.” 
• Chief Minister and his CoM are the real execu#ve at the state level. The Cons#tu#on does not contain 
any speci?c procedure for the selec#on and appointment of the Chief Minister. Ar#cle 164 only says that 
the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the governor. 
• In accordance with the convec#ons of the parliamentary system of government, the governor has to 
appoint the leader of the majority party in the state legisla#ve assembly as the Chief Minister. 
• Ar#cle 163 provides for Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister as the head to aid and advise the 
Governor in the exercise of his func#ons, except in so far as he is required to exercise his func#ons in his 
discre#on. 
• The total number of ministers, including the chief minister, in the council of ministers in a state shall not 
exceed 15 per cent of the total strength of the legisla#ve assembly of that state. But, the number of 
ministers, including the chief minister, in a state shall not be less than 12. This provision was added by the 
91st Amendment Act of 2003. 
State Legislatures: 
Composi*on of State Legislature: 
The composi#on of State Legislature is uniform, however the Cons#tu#on a dis#nc#on between small and 
bigger states. While the Legislature of every State shall include the Governor and in some of the States it 
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shall consist of two Houses namely the Legisla#ve Assembly and Legisla#ve Council and while in the 
remaining there shall be one House i.e. Legisla#ve Assembly. 
Legisla*ve Council: 
The size of the Legisla#ve Council varies with the size of the Legisla#ve Assembly. The membership of the 
Legisla#ve Council is not more than 1/3 of the membership of the Legisla#ve Assembly but not less than 
40. It will be a partly nominated and partly elected body, the elec#on being the indirect on and in 
accordance with the principle of the propor#onal by the single transferable vote. The members are drawn 
from various sources and hence the council consists of variety of composi#on.  
Each Member of the State Legisla#ve Council (MLC) serves for a six-year term, with terms staggered so that 
the terms of one third of a State Legisla#ve Council's membership expire every two years. This arrangement 
parallels that for the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Parliament of India. MLC must be a ci#zen of 
India, at least 30 years old, mentally sound, not an insolvent, and must be enrolled on the voters' list of the 
state for which he or she is contes#ng an elec#on. He or she may not be a Member of Parliament at the 
same #me. 
In the Council: 
•1/3 of the total number of members of the council shall be elected by electorate consis#ng of members 
of local bodies, such as Municipali#es. 
•1/12 shall be elected by electorates consis#ng of graduates of 3 years standing residing in that State. 
•
1/12 shall be elected by electorates consis#ng of persons engaged for at least three years in teaching in 
educa#on ins#tu#on within the State not lower in standard than Secondary schools. 
•1/3 shall be elected by member of Legisla#ve Assembly from amongst member who are member of 
Assembly. 
•The remainders shall be nominated by the Governor from persons having knowledge or prac#cal 
experience in respect of such maYers as Literature, Science, Art, Co-opera#ve movement and Social 
Service. 
States having legisla#ve councils include Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Telangana and 
UYar Pradesh.  
Legisla*ve Assembly: 
Legisla#ve Assembly of each State shall be composed of members chosen by direct elec#on on the basis of 
Adult su?rage from territorial cons#tuencies. The number of members of the Assembly shall not be more 
than 500 or less than 60. The Assembly in Mizoram and Goa shall have only 40 members each. 
A Legisla#ve Assembly shall have Speaker and Deputy Speaker and the Legisla#ve Council shall have its 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman and the provisions rela#ng to them are analogous to those rela#ng to the 
corresponding o?cers of the Union Parliament. The Legisla#ve procedure in the State having two chamber 
is broadly similar to that in the Parliament. Except for the following :- 
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