Transfer of Power & Independence | History Optional for UPSC (Notes) PDF Download

The British Withdrawal and the Acceptance of Partition by the Congress

The imperialist answer: 

• The independence was simply the fulfilment of Britain’s self-appointed mission to assist the Indian people to self- government. 
• Partition was the unfortunate consequence of the age old Hindu-Muslim rift, of the two communities’ failure to agree on how and to whom power was to be transferred. 

The radical view: 

• The independence was finally wrested by the mass actions of 1946-47 in which many Communists participated, often as leaders. 
• But the bourgeois leaders of the Congress, frightened by the revolutionary upsurge struck a deal with the imperialist power by which power was transferred to them and the nation paid the price of Partition. 

The Real view: 

• The Independence-Partition duality reflects the success-failure dichotomy of the anti-imperialist movement led by the Congress.
• The Congress had a two-fold task:
  • Structuring diverse classes, communities, groups and regions into a nation.
  • Securing independence from the British rulers for this emerging nation.
• While the Congress succeeded in building up nationalist consciousness sufficient to exert pressure on the British to quit India, it could not complete the task of welding the nation and particularly failed to integrate the Muslims into this nation.
• This contradiction — the success and failure of the national movement — reflects in the other contradiction — independence, but with it Partition.

Success of Nationalist Forces: 

• By the end of World War II, the success of nationalist forces in India was evident. 
• The British had won the war against Hitler but lost the war in India. 
• The national movement had expanded its influence, covering areas previously unpoliticized and agitating groups like those involved in the INA trials. 
• The reach and intensity of nationalist sentiment were increasing, as shown by swelling crowds and deepening nationalist fervor. 

Demoralization of British Officials: 

•  There was a noticeable demoralization among British officials in India. 
•  Indian officials and loyalists began changing their loyalties, reflecting a shift away from supporting British rule. 
•  This change in loyalty contributed to the narrative of nationalist success. 

Pillars of British Rule: 

• British rule was maintained with the consent or acquiescence of various Indian sections, particularly among zamindars, upper classes, and loyalists who received British favours and offices.
• The British secured consent by promoting beliefs in British justice, fair play, and the prevalence of Pax Brittanica.
• The Indian Civil Service (ICS), viewed as the ‘steel frame of the Raj,’ played a crucial role in maintaining British prestige and governance.
• When loyalists began to abandon the regime and the prestige of British officers was undermined, it signalled the decline of British rule in India.

Decline of British Rule: 

• The decline of British rule resulted from internal rot and external pressures. 
• The erosion of consent among loyalists and the diminishing prestige of British officials contributed to the weakening of the Raj. 
• The combination of internal decay and external agitation led to the rapid decline of British authority in India. 

 Weakening of the Pillars of British Rule:

• The British dominance of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) weakened due to a shortage of European recruits and a policy of Indianization, leading to a balance between British and Indian members by 1939.
• Recruitment was initially cut and later stopped, causing a decline in ICS officials during the 1940s.
• New recruits were no longer from elite backgrounds but from grammar schools and polytechnics, viewing service in the Raj as a career rather than a mission.
• By 1945, the bureaucracy was war-weary, facing economic worries and low morale, and was further weakened by the 1942 movement.
• The British strategy of conciliation and repression to counter nationalism became contradictory after the Cripps Offer of 1942, leaving little to offer except the transfer of power.
• The national movement’s strategy of a non-violent mass struggle combined with constitutional reforms proved more effective against British rule.
• Brutal repression of the 1942 movement alienated both liberals and loyalists, undermining British authority and prestige.
• The government’s actions, such as refusing to release Gandhi and proceeding with INA trials, offended both friends and loyalists.
• The mixed policy of repression and conciliation created problems for officials, first arising in the mid-1930s with the prospect of popular ministries.
• Constitutionalism damaged services morale, similar to the mass movement, as officials became aware of the likelihood of Congress returning to power.
• After the 1942 rebellion, there was a mix of repression and conciliation in dealing with Congress. Officials were demoralized when Congress demands were not met during elections.
• The previous Viceroy had promised no inquiries, but the current Viceroy found this issue challenging. By the war's end, officials recognized the changing dynamics of power.
• There were calls for leniency towards INA men and unrest in the RIN, indicating potential future instability.
• The British structure was still in place, but there were concerns about the reliability of services and armed forces in the face of a possible Congress mass movement.
• The Viceroy acknowledged the difficulty of suppressing such a revolt without an effective alternative, leading to a shift in British policy towards a graceful withdrawal from India.
• British policy-makers aimed for a settlement on the transfer of power and post-imperial relations with India, recognizing the need for substantial concessions to meet Congress demands.
• The Cabinet Mission in March 1946 was a serious attempt to negotiate a national government and initiate the transfer of power, unlike previous missions.

The Cabinet Mission

 Background:British Policy and the Cabinet Mission Plan (1946):

• British Policy Shift: In 1946, British policy shifted towards preferring a united India, contrasting earlier declarations that allowed for the possibility of Pakistan. Prime Minister Attlee emphasized that a minority should not veto the progress of the majority, showcasing this new stance. 
• Cabinet Mission's Conviction: The Cabinet Mission believed that Pakistan was not a viable option and aimed to safeguard minority autonomy within a united India framework. 
• Mission Plan Overview: The Mission Plan proposed three sections for India: A (Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, C.P., and Orissa), B (Punjab, NWFP, and Sind), and C (Bengal and Assam). These sections would meet separately to decide on group constitutions, with a common centre controlling defence, foreign affairs, and communications. 

Congress and League Responses:

• Congress Position: The Congress party wanted greater flexibility, arguing that a province should not have to wait for the first elections to leave a group. This was particularly aimed at Congress-ruled provinces of Assam and NWFP, which were in Sections C and B, respectively.
• League Position: The Muslim League sought the right for provinces to question the union constitution immediately, rather than waiting for ten years.

Mission Plan Ambiguity:

• Compulsory vs. Optional Grouping: The Mission Plan was unclear about whether grouping was compulsory or optional. It stated that grouping was optional but sections were compulsory, creating a contradiction.

Interpretations and Reactions:

• Congress Interpretation: The Congress party interpreted the Mission Plan as being against Pakistan, believing that the League's veto was eliminated and that one Constituent Assembly was envisioned. 
• League Interpretation: The Muslim League interpreted the Mission Plan as supporting Pakistan, based on the idea of compulsory grouping. 
• Nehru's Assertion: Jawaharlal Nehru reinforced the Congress Working Committee's interpretation of the Mission Plan, asserting that the Constituent Assembly was sovereign and would decide its own rules of procedure. 
• Jinnah's Withdrawal: Muhammad Ali Jinnah used Nehru's speech as an opportunity to withdraw the League's acceptance of the Mission Plan on July 29, 1946. 

Formation of the Interim Government

• Background: In July 1945, a Labour government in Britain led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee was elected, and it was keen on transferring power to Indian leaders. The Labour government was committed to decolonization and aimed to resolve the Indian issue promptly. 
• The Cabinet Mission: To facilitate the transfer of power, the British government sent a Cabinet Mission to India in March 1946, comprising three senior ministers. The mission aimed to negotiate the terms of independence and create a framework for governance. 
• The Cabinet Mission Plan: After discussions with various Indian leaders, the Cabinet Mission proposed a plan in May 1946. The plan suggested a federal structure with considerable autonomy for provinces and princely states. It also aimed to establish a Constituent Assembly to draft the Constitution. 
• Initial Response: The Congress accepted the Cabinet Mission’s proposal, while the Muslim League initially rejected it. However, the League later agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly, seeking to safeguard its interests. 
• The Interim Government: An Interim Government was formed in September 1946, with the Congress and the Muslim League sharing power. Jawaharlal Nehru became the de facto head of the government. However, the League’s participation was reluctant, and tensions persisted. 
• Failure of Cooperation: The cooperation between the Congress and the League in the Interim Government proved challenging. The League’s ministers disrupted proceedings, questioning Congress decisions and refusing to cooperate fully. This led to growing frustrations within the Congress. 
• League’s Demands: The Muslim League, under Jinnah’s leadership, demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and a direct bid for Pakistan. The League’s insistence on its interpretation of grouping and its refusal to join the Assembly further strained relations. 
• Collapse of the Interim Government: By early 1947, the situation had deteriorated. The Congress members of the Interim Government, frustrated with the League’s disruptive tactics, called for the resignation of League ministers. The final blow came when the League demanded the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which the Congress and the British authorities rejected. 
• Move Towards Pakistan: With the failure of the Interim Government and the breakdown of cooperation, Jinnah shifted his strategy towards a direct demand for Pakistan. This marked a significant turning point in the struggle for Indian independence. 
• Conclusion: The period between the Cabinet Mission and the eventual demand for Pakistan was marked by intense negotiations, political maneuvering, and increasing communal tensions. The failure of the Cabinet Mission to facilitate a smooth transition to independence highlighted the deep-rooted divisions within Indian society and the challenges of decolonization. 

Attlee statement

20 February 1947: Attlee's Statement and Its Impact

• Attlee's statement in Parliament on 20 February 1947 set 30 June 1948 as the date for British withdrawal from India and announced the appointment of a new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten .
• The hope was that this fixed date would prompt the Indian parties to reach an agreement and avoid a constitutional crisis.
• It aimed to convince Indians of British sincerity regarding independence.
• The Attlee Government accepted the need for a final date due to the undeniable decline of government authority in India, as assessed by Wavell , the previous Viceroy.
• Therefore, Attlee's statement was an acknowledgment of Wavell's understanding of the Indian situation.

Reception and Implications

• The prospect of freedom from imperial rule lifted the prevailing gloom caused by internal conflicts.
• The statement was warmly welcomed by the Congress as evidence of British commitment to leave.
• The implication of partition was embedded in the condition that if the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative (specifically if the Muslim-majority provinces did not participate), power would be transferred to multiple central governments.
• This condition was acceptable to the Congress as it allowed the existing Assembly to proceed with framing a constitution for the represented areas.
• It provided a way out of the deadlock where the Muslim League refused to join the Constituent Assembly and demanded its dissolution.
• There was a perceived possibility of fulfilling Attlee's hope that the fixed date would compel the two political parties in India to collaborate.

Mountbatten's Role and Misconceptions

•  When Mountbatten arrived in India as Viceroy, he was tasked with concluding the Raj by 30 June 1948 . 
•  Mountbatten claimed to have introduced the idea of a fixed time limit, but this was not accurate. 
•  The concept of a fixed date was initially proposed by Wavell, who anticipated a stage of responsibility without power by 31 March 1948 . 
•  Attlee preferred mid-1948 as the target date, while Mountbatten insisted on a specific calendar date, leading to 30 June 1948 . 
•  Mountbatten's assertion of having plenipotentiary powers was also misleading. 
•  Although he had more autonomy than previous Viceroys and his opinions were valued by the Labour Government, he still referred back to London during the development of his plan. 
•  Mountbatten communicated with London at various stages, including sending his aide, Ismay, and eventually traveling to London himself to secure agreement on the 3rd June Plan . 
•  Contrary to his claims, Mountbatten did not create his own agenda. 
•  He received directives from His Majesty's Government to explore options for unity and division until October 1947 , after which he was to advise on the form of the transfer of power. 
•  Mountbatten quickly realized that the Cabinet Mission Plan was no longer viable and that Jinnah was adamant about the demand for a sovereign state for Muslims. 
•  He found it challenging to persuade Jinnah to change his position, as Jinnah was resolute in his pursuit of Pakistan. 

Why the British Couldn’t Keep India United:

•  The British could only keep India united if they stopped acting as mediators trying to impose a solution that Indians had agreed upon. 
•  Unity required positive intervention in its favor, including a firm hand against communal elements, which the British chose not to do. 
•  Prime Minister Attlee later admitted that they preferred a united India but couldn’t achieve it despite their efforts. 
•  Instead of making a serious attempt to retain unity by identifying with the forces wanting a unified India, the British opted for an easier path. 
•  They preferred to woo both sides into friendly collaboration with Britain on strategic and defense issues, rather than taking a firm stand. 
•  The British revised their preference for a united Indian subcontinent to two dominions, both of which would be allies of Britain. 
•  The challenge was how to secure the friendship of both India and Pakistan. 
• Mountbatten proposed a formula to divide India while retaining maximum unity by partitioning Punjab and Bengal, creating a smaller Pakistan that would partially satisfy both the Congress and the League. 
•  The Congress was asked to concede its main point of a unified India, and in return, its other demands were met, such as ruling out independence for the princes and supporting Bengal’s unity. 
•  The Mountbatten Plan aimed for an early transfer of power based on Dominion Status to two successor states, India and Pakistan. 
•  The Congress was willing to accept Dominion Status temporarily because it allowed for a smoother transition and full power to address the volatile situation. 
•  For Britain, Dominion Status offered a chance to keep India in the Commonwealth, even if temporarily, which was seen as a valuable prize. 
•  Although Jinnah offered to bring Pakistan into the Commonwealth, India’s membership was prioritized due to its stronger economic and defense potential. 
•  The early date for the transfer of power, 15th August 1947, was aimed at securing Congress agreement to Dominion Status and absolving the British of responsibility for the worsening communal situation. 
•  Mountbatten defended the decision to advance the date, arguing that it prevented a worse situation from developing. 
•  The British believed a hasty retreat was the most suitable action, although it was not the only option. 
•  The seventy-two day timetable for the transfer of power and division was disastrous, with senior officials in India believing that peaceful division would take years. 
•  The Partition Council had to divide assets quickly, without transitional institutional structures to address the complex problems arising from division. 
•  Mountbatten hoped to be the joint Governor-General of India and Pakistan to provide a necessary link, but Jinnah wanted the position for himself, leading to the failure of the joint defense machinery by December 1947. 

The Punjab Massacres and Mountbatten's Role:

• The Punjab massacres during Partition were seen as a strong criticism of Lord Mountbatten's actions.
• Mountbatten's decision to announce the Boundary Commission Award after Independence Day contributed to the tragedy.
• Brigadier Bristow, an army official in Punjab, believed that the Punjab tragedy could have been avoided if partition had been delayed by one year.
• General Lockhart, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, supported this view, suggesting that better preparation and timing could have prevented widespread disorder.
• The Boundary Commission Award was ready before Independence Day, but Mountbatten postponed its announcement to avoid British responsibility.
• On Independence Day, strange scenes were witnessed in Punjab and Bengal, with people flying flags of both India and Pakistan.
• People were unaware that they would soon be on the wrong side of the border.

Why Congress Accepted Partition

• The acceptance of Partition by the Congress was seen as a betrayal of the people.
• Nehru and Patel were accused of seeking quick and easy power.
• Gandhi was believed to have been ignored and felt betrayed, fighting communal violence alone.
• However, the Congress leaders were acknowledging the reality of the situation due to the failure to integrate Muslim masses into the national movement and the rise of Muslim communalism.
• The 1946 elections, where the League won 90% of Muslim seats, highlighted this failure.
• The Congress's defeat in the struggle against Jinnah was evident, and immediate transfer of power was seen as a way to prevent further communal violence.
• The breakdown of the Interim Government made Pakistan seem inevitable, with Patel and Nehru recognizing its functional presence in various regions.
• The acceptance of immediate transfer of power to two dominions was also a strategic decision to maintain Indian unity, preventing the balkanization of the subcontinent.
• The Congress's acceptance of Partition in 1947 was the culmination of a gradual concession to the League's demand for a sovereign Muslim state.
• The autonomy of Muslim-majority provinces was acknowledged in 1942, and Gandhi even recognized the right of self-determination for these provinces in 1944.
• By June 1946, Congress had conceded the possibility of separate Constituent Assemblies for Muslim-majority provinces, though opposed compulsory grouping.
• In December 1946, the British Cabinet clarified that grouping was compulsory, and the Congress accepted this without objection.
• In early March 1947, the Congress officially referred to Partition when the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution stating that Punjab (and implicitly Bengal) must be partitioned if the country were to be divided.
• The Congress' final act of surrender to the League's demands came in June 1947 when it accepted Partition under the 3rd June Plan.

Congress leader of also having unreal hopes and wishful thinkings: 

• Hardly surprising at the time for nobody anticipated the quick pace of the unfolding tragedy.
• Millions of people on both sides of the new border refused to accept the finality of Partition.
• The right of secession was conceded by the Congress, believing that Muslims would not exercise it.
• In the mid-1940s, there was an assertive ‘Muslim nation’ led by a determined leader.
• Each concession of the Congress consolidated communalists’ positions rather than undermining them.
• There was a hope that once the British left, differences would be patched up between Hindus and Muslims.
• This belief underestimated the autonomy of communalism, which had become assertively independent.
• Another hope was that Partition was temporary and reversible once communal passions subsided.
• Gandhiji often stated that Pakistan could not exist long if people refused to accept Partition.
• Nehru believed in a united and strong India, despite the challenges faced.
• The most unreal belief was that Partition would be peaceful.
• No riots or transfers of population were anticipated, as it was assumed there was nothing to fight over.
• Nehru continued to believe in the goodness of his people, despite ongoing riots from August 1946.

What did Gandhiji feel about Partition?

• He was unhappy and felt helpless, but this was not just because of Jinnah or his Congress followers. 
• The real issue was the way people had become communal. 
• On June 4, 1947, at a prayer meeting, he said Congress agreed to Partition because that’s what the people wanted. 
• It was the Hindus and Sikhs who wanted Partition that made Gandhiji feel ineffective. The Muslims already saw him as an enemy. 
• Gandhiji’s strength was in sensing what the masses felt and giving it a shape. In 1947, there were no positive forces he could rely on to create a good program. 
• He bravely went to a Congress meeting on June 14, 1947, and urged Congress members to accept Partition as necessary but to fight against it in the long run. 
• Like Nehru, he did not accept Partition in his heart and kept faith in his vision for the people. 

Hisoriography of Partition

The Partition: A Divided Perspective

•  For many Indians, freedom came with a deep sense of loss due to the partition. In contrast, for many Muslims in Pakistan, especially their ideological leaders, the partition represented freedom. This stark difference in perception is why 'Partition' is such a contested topic in South Asian history. 

The Demand for Pakistan: An Elite Perspective

• Early historical accounts of the partition focus on the elite leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League.
• Some Pakistani historians view the partition as a liberating moment, initiated in the nineteenth century by figures like Sayyid Ahmed Khan.
• This process involved South Asian Muslims discovering their national identity, influencing the politics of the 1940s.
• Aitzaz Ahsan describes the partition as "A Primordial Divide," indicating both a recent and ancient divide in history.
• Akbar Ahmed argues the idea of Pakistan was compelling among Muslims, leading to a separation in 1947.
• This resulted in the claim of a separate history for themselves, with Jinnah and the Muslim League as key architects.
• However, significant works challenge the inevitability and legitimacy of the partition, offering a different perspective on this historical event.

Sucheta Mahajan (2000):

•  Mahajan argues that the Congress party, led by its leaders, consistently supported the idea of a secular and united India until the very end. 
•  She believes that it was Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League, starting from 1940 with the advocacy of the "two-nation theory," who were ultimately responsible for the division of the subcontinent. 
•  Jinnah's estrangement from the Congress began after 1937, and although he was initially flexible about the specifics of the Pakistan demand, it was always a likely outcome. 
•  This interpretation is based on two key assumptions known as the "two partition myths": 
  1. "The League for Partition"
  2. "The Congress for Unity"
•  A recent revisionist history has challenged these notions, highlighting that at the time of Pakistan's creation, there were 60 million Muslims in Pakistan and 35 million Muslims remaining in non-Muslim India. 

Ayesha Jalal (1985):

• Jalal questions why Pakistan, as created, did not align well with the interests of most Muslims.
• She interprets the Lahore Resolution, which did not explicitly mention "Partition" or "Pakistan," as Jinnah's strategic move to gain recognition of separate Muslim nationhood from Congress and the British.
• Initially, Jinnah preferred a weak federal structure for India with strong provincial autonomy and Hindu-Muslim parity at the center.
• He believed Congress, which favored a strong unitary center, would eventually concede to his demands to avoid a more aggressive separation plan, which he did not genuinely want.
• However, Jinnah's assumption that Congress and the British would never accept partition was flawed.
• Ultimately, Congress did accept partition, outmaneuvering Jinnah in their intellectual struggle.

Asim Roy:

• Asim Roy, in an article supporting Jalal, made a strong emotional statement, saying it was not the League but the Congress that decided to harm Mother India. 
• This interpretative model, as many have pointed out, gives even more importance to "High Politics" than the model it aims to replace. It relies too much on Jinnah's agency and delves too deeply into his speculative thoughts. 
• While it is agreed that Jinnah might have initially suggested the idea of Pakistan as a "bargaining counter," it is questionable whether he had the same bargaining power once the mass mobilization campaign started in 1944 around the emotive symbol of Muslim nationhood.

Mushirul Hasan

•  Mushirul Hasan argues that Jinnah did not merely follow a Muslim consensus; rather, he played a crucial role in shaping the two-nation idea . Hasan believes this idea was based on a mistaken belief in Muslim unanimity . 
•  He points out that the League was as faction-ridden and ideologically fragmented at the political level as the Congress. Moreover, even during times of communal tension, there were significant sections of the Muslim population who were not mentally prepared for partition and did not see the religious divide as a major obstacle. 
•  Many individuals who joined the partition movement were actually influenced by a well-organized campaign orchestrated from above. In his analysis, Hasan concludes that it was the colonial government that shaped a Muslim community in its own image and allowed the League, its wartime ally, to transform a segmented population into a cohesive "nation."
•  However, this does not imply that the Pakistan movement lacked popular support, at least in the final years of British rule. 

Pakistan Movement: A Shift from Elites to Mass Mobilization

 The Pakistan movement, which aimed to create a separate nation for Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, underwent a significant transformation from being an elite-driven campaign to one that involved mass participation across various regions. This shift is evident through different historical analyses of the movement in Punjab, Bengal, and the role of various social groups. 

Punjab: From Elite to Mass Mobilization:

•  Ian Talbot's research shows how the Muslim League's Pakistan campaign in Punjab moved from elite circles to mass participation. 
•  Thousands of Muslims celebrated special 'Days', took part in demonstrations, processions, and strikes, and engaged in communal riots, legitimizing the Muslim League's claims for Pakistan. 

Bengal: Mass Participation and Political Slogans:

•  Historians Shila Sen and Taj Hashmi argue that the Pakistan movement in Bengal was grassroots and democratic, resonating with the east Bengali Muslim peasantry by promising a better future. 
•  In the 1940s, Muslim rioters in Bengal used political slogans like "Pakistan ki jai" (victory to Pakistan), indicating a strong politicization of the crowd along communal lines. 

Hindu Mobilization and the Role of RSS:

•  The Hindu community also mobilized during this period, with the growing popularity of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in the Hindi belt. 
•  Scholar Christophe Jaffrelot suggests that the RSS's rise was linked to the circumstances surrounding Partition. 

Bengali Bhadralok and the Call for Partition:

•  Joya Chatterji's research highlights how the Bengali bhadralok (upper-middle-class) initiated a campaign for partition and sought to involve non-bhadralok classes, including dalit groups in northern and eastern districts. 
•  These dalit groups were eager to carve out a place for themselves in the emerging power structure of post-colonial India and actively responded to the call for partition.  

Leftist Historiography:

• Bipan Chandra and Colleagues: They believe that the Partition happened due to the rising waves of Muslim communalism after 1937 and the long-term failure of the Congress party to involve the Muslim masses in the national movement. The Congress leaders recognized their failure and accepted Partition as an "unavoidable necessity." 
• Sumit Sarkar: He argues that communalism was not yet normalized in Indian public life during that time. There was actually more communal harmony at the grassroots level, as seen in popular agitations, peasant struggles, and industrial actions in the 1940s, than at the negotiating table. Sarkar believes that the Congress leadership chose the easier option of an early transfer of power, accepting Partition as a necessary condition. He views the communal riots that erupted from August 1946 as separate from this popular politics. 

Subaltern Historians:

• Gyanendra Pandey: He critiques conventional elitist historiography on Partition for focusing on establishing the "causes" of Partition. Instead, he emphasizes the need to understand the meaning of Partition for those who lived through it, the trauma it caused, and the transformations it brought about. Pandey believes that the "truth" of Partition lies in the violence it produced.
• Partha Chatterjee: He argues that the partition campaign was decided by "all-India players" and that it is historically inaccurate to suggest significant mass participation in the process.

Shift in Focus: Aftermath of Partition:

• There has been a notable shift in partition historiography from focusing on the causes of Partition to examining the traumatic experiences and aftermath of Partition. Historians are now more interested in how Partition impacted post-colonial history and politics, how Partition memory shapes community identities, and affects inter-community relations. This approach emphasizes historical continuity and denies the year 1947 and the creation of two nation-states the status of "the end of all history."
• The focus is on the "afterlife" or "aftermath" of Partition in South Asia, exploring how the events of 1947 continue to influence contemporary society and politics.