Trial court and High Court concurrently held that though the prosecutrix had consented to sexual intercourse with the appellant the consent was obtained by fraud and deception inasmuch as the appellant induced her to consent on the promise that he shall marry her.
Consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact.
A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code.
She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to.
Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to it.
She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent.
There is no evidence to prove conclusively that the appellant never intended to marry her.
Perhaps he wanted to, but was not able to gather enough courage to disclose his intention to his family members for fear of strong opposition from them.