Indo-Pakistan Relations - 1

India Pakistan Relations

Background

• The partition caused one of the largest human migrations ever seen and sparked riots and violence across the region.
• In October 1947 the first India-Pakistan war over Kashmir was fought following which Pakistan captured one-third major part of Kashmir (now referred to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK)). Hari Singh, the then Maharaja of Kashmir, signed the Instrument of Accession with Indian government in return for military help. The war ended in 1949 after UN intervened leading to a ceasefire.
• Indo-Pak talks, initiated in 1963, failed to produce any agreement and two years later, in 1965, the two countries fought their second war. This war also saw a UN mandated ceasefire and in 1966, Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement agreeing to withdraw to pre-war lines and restoring the economic and diplomatic relations. 
• In 1971, India and Pakistan went to war a third time, this time over East Pakistan when the West Pakistani central government refused to allow Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to assume the premiership. India launched a coordinated land, air and sea assault on East Pakistan following which the Pakistani army surrendered at Dhaka. India and Pakistan signed the Shimla Agreement in 1972.
• During the 1970s Pakistan started permitting foreign expeditions in the area of the Siachen glacier to reinforce its claim on it as this area was not clearly defined under the cease fire line between India and Pakistan. In response India launched Operation Meghdoot in 1984 and flew its troops to the Siachen glacier, thus securing an area of approximately 3,300 sq km.

Shimla Agreement, 1972

• The Simla Agreement designates the ceasefire line of December 17, 1971, as being the new "Line-of-Control (LoC)" between the two countries, which neither side is to seek to alter unilaterally. 
• Both countries agreed to put an end to the conflict and confrontation and work for the establishment of a durable peace in the subcontinent. They agreed to settle any disputes "by peaceful means". 

• Pakistan supported the insurgency in Kashmir Valley in 1980s and 1990s by providing weapons and training to fighters and fuelling a large influx of "mujahideen" in Kashmir who took part in the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s.
• During 1998 both India and Pakistan successfully tested their nuclear weapon capabilities.
• In 1999, Pakistani forces and Kashmiri fighters occupied strategic positions on the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil which culminated into the Kargil War in which India pushed the enemy to the other side of the LoC.
• In 2001 the attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi by Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad was the last event of this phase of active aggression between the two countries. 

Phase of reconciliation (2001-2008)

• Even before 2001 there were efforts to improve the bilateral relations. The Lahore Declaration saw the start of Delhi Lahore Bus Service in 1999 during Indian PM's visit. The Declaration proposed several measures for confidence building (informing each other ahead of missile tests) and it was the second agreement covering nuclear non-aggression. (first was 'Non Nuclear Attack Agreement' signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in 1988) 
• Vajpayee's principles of insaniyat (humanism), jamhooriyat (democracy) and kashmiriyat (Kashmir's legacy of amity) further attenuated Indo-Pakistan differences.

Why Siachen is important for India?

• The Siachen glacier demarcates central Asia from the Indian subcontinent, and separates Pakistan from China in the region.
• The Saltoro Ridge of the Siachin glacier serves as a divide that prevents direct linking of PoK with China, stopping them to develop geographical military linkages in the area.
• Siachen also serves as a watchtower for India to keep a deep watch on Gilgit and Baltistan regions of Pakistan.
• If Pakistan gets the location advantage in Siachen, it would become a big threat to India from the west in Ladakh in addition to Chinese threats from Aksai Chin of the east.

• Despite the failure of Agra summit in the aftermath of Parliament attacks PM Vajpayee travelled to Pakistan for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in 2004 where Pakistan agreed not to allow its soil to be used for anti-India activities.
• The year 2004 is marked as the beginning of the Composite Dialogue Process, in which bilateral meetings are held between officials at various levels of government (including foreign ministers, foreign secretaries, military officers, border officials etc.) 
• In 2008, India joined the TAPI gas pipeline framework with Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan; however, as of 2025 the project remains stalled because of security and financing issues after the Taliban takeover. Also, several trade routes were opened between the two countries in the same year.
• The end of this phase is marked by the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008 which were allegedly planned and abetted by the Pakistani intelligence agencies.

Phase of passive bilateralism (2008 - 2015)

• This phase is marked by low key interactions between the two countries. The dialogue process either remained suspended during this period or was limited to official level talks majorly.
• The phase is marked by post Mumbai attack discussions where both countries were engaged in proving and rebutting the source of attacks.
• At the end of this period in 2014, the new government unveiled its 'Neighborhood First' Policy which accorded priority to the South Asian countries in its foreign policy. Prime Minister level visits between the two countries started and good will gestures were shown by both sides (fishermen released by Pakistan, Pakistan PM invited to PM Modi's swearing-in ceremony etc.).
• Indian PM's visit to Pakistan in 2015 was first in a decade and was therefore a significant change in India's approach to Pakistan.

Phase of renewed aggression (2015 - 2019)

• The present phase in India-Pakistan relations is marked by renewed hostility between the two countries.
• China and Pakistan signed the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) infrastructural project in 2015 which was an affront to Indian sovereignty as the corridor passes through the PoK.
• Bilateral relations were dented by the series of attacks which started with Gurdaspur terror attacks in 2015 and included other major incidents like the Pathankot attack (2016), Nagrota attack (2016), Uri attack (2016), Amarnath yatra attack (2017) and finally the Pulwama attack in 2019. 
• India responded to the Uri attack by carrying out a 'surgical strike' inside PoK and to the Pulwama attack by carrying out the Balakot airstrike in Pakistan and revoking the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan. 
• Since India revoked Article 370 in August 2019 and reorganised Jammu & Kashmir as Union Territories, Pakistan has downgraded diplomatic ties, halted almost all bilateral trade, and tried to internationalise the Kashmir issue at multilateral forums. This downgraded posture remains in place in 2025.

What makes peace elusive between India-Pakistan?

• Kashmir conundrum: The tug of war over Kashmir represented the contest between identities of two nations. While Pakistan tries to alter status quo in Kashmir by force, India is content to retain its portion of Kashmir, without making serious efforts to change the situation on the ground.
• Fractured internal dynamics of Pakistan: In Pakistan both the army and the political parties failed to bring enduring stability, which provided a political space for Islamic extremism. Due to fractured polity, Pakistan could not develop an optimistic approach towards Kashmir and India. Also, army becoming increasingly entrenched in Pakistani politics, it developed a vested interest in sustaining hostility with India in order to justify its dominance.
• Cross-border terrorism: In order to achieve its ends, Pakistan fuels terrorist activities into India based on the military doctrine of 'bleeding India with a thousand cuts'. This often leads to violent escalations as witnessed during India's airstrike and Pakistan's retaliatory actions which severely limit initiatives to build a stable relationship.
• Boundary dispute: Apart from Kashmir, India and Pakistan have not been able to come to terms on the exact boundary between the two nations in the north (along the LoC) and in the West (Sir Creek issue).
• Water dispute: In May 2025, India formally suspended co-operation and data-sharing under the Indus Waters Treaty after Operation Sindoor, stating that 'blood and water cannot flow together'; Pakistan termed this an act of war.

Fallouts of the above issues

• Limited economic integration: Formal bilateral trade collapsed after 2019 and is near-zero in 2025, except for limited humanitarian and third-country routing. 
• Stalled regional integration: Intra-regional trade accounts for just over 5 percent of South Asia's total trade while it is 50 percent in East Asia and the Pacific and 22 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. SAARC and SAFTA remain ineffective due to India-Pakistan conflict. 
• Escalating arms race: By 2025 both countries have shifted from troop-heavy defence spending to technological competition-investing in precision missiles, drones, and air defence systems like the S-400 and HQ-9. Operation Sindoor highlighted this new dimension, making South Asia even more volatile. 
• Affects India's external interests: Pakistan remains key for Afghanistan's stability and for China's western access via CPEC, while India deepens engagement with the U.S., Gulf states, and Central Asia to bypass Pakistan in regional connectivity. 
• Internationalization of dispute: In 2025 Pakistan again internationalised the Kashmir and Indus-water issues after India's Operation Sindoor and Treaty suspension, warning of nuclear and water escalation. 
• Other issues like capture of fishermen, drug smuggling from the Golden Crescent, and fake Indian currency through the western borders also persist. 

Current events shaping India-Pakistan relations: 

• Pakistan continues to cite India's domestic issues like the CAA and NRC internationally, but the main drivers of tension in 2025 remain terrorism, Kashmir, and water politics.
• Afghanistan remains a zone of indirect competition: Pakistan leverages its ties with the Taliban, while India pursues development and connectivity projects without formal recognition of the Taliban regime.
• China-Pakistan axis vs India-U.S. axis: As India strengthens its Indo-Pacific partnerships, China has doubled down on Pakistan through CPEC, missile and drone cooperation, and diplomatic cover. India publicly accused Pakistan in May 2025 of using Chinese-origin missiles during retaliation strikes.
• Russia has opened limited defence and energy ties with Pakistan since 2019, yet remains crucial for India-systems like the S-400, used effectively during Operation Sindoor, are Russian-origin.

India-Pakistan Logjam: Cutting the Ice

Kartarpur Corridor continues to symbolise people-to-people hope, but after the 2025 Pahalgam attack and Operation Sindoor such initiatives are overshadowed by military and water tensions. India's current stance combines diplomatic isolation of Pakistan with calibrated military, economic, and water pressure. 

• Normalcy in Kashmir: India emphasises restoring normalcy and investment in Jammu & Kashmir. Despite the April 2025 attack, over 4 lakh pilgrims completed the Amarnath Yatra safely, reinforcing India's message that normalcy will continue in J&K. 
• People-to-people contacts: Public-level exchanges in entertainment, media and sports remain politically sensitive after 2025, though cultural links like Kartarpur keep limited engagement alive. 
• Trade facilitation: Pakistan's economic crisis and IMF dependence could give India leverage, but after Operation Sindoor, India hardened its stance-closing airspace, halting visas, and suspending water cooperation. 
• International mediation: Following May 2025 strikes, the U.S., China, Russia and Gulf partners quietly pressured both sides to agree to a DGMO-level ceasefire around 10 May 2025 to avoid nuclear escalation. 

Instead of looking for any short cuts to peace and tranquility with Pakistan, India should wait for Pakistan to reset itself. Though India has limited control over internal political dynamics of Pakistan, it should not allow Pakistan to define contours of the relationship. India should pursue a policy of containment with readiness for dialogue when conducive.

Recent Developments

1. 

Pahalgam / Baisaran Attack 

• A mass-casualty terror attack near Pahalgam in Jammu & Kashmir killed 26 civilians, including Hindu pilgrims and tourists. India blamed The Resistance Front (TRF), described as a Lashkar-e-Taiba proxy operating from Pakistan-backed networks. The U.S. later designated TRF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2025, marking a major diplomatic shift.

2. 

Operation Sindoor 

• India launched "Operation Sindoor," a series of precision missile and air strikes on nine targets inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. India stated the strikes targeted terror infrastructure linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, avoiding Pakistani military facilities. Pakistan alleged civilian casualties and called it an act of war.
• Pakistan retaliated with drone and missile strikes on Indian military sites; India said its Integrated Air Defence (including S-400 and Akash systems) intercepted them successfully. Analysts describe this as the first large-scale India-Pakistan conflict involving drones, long-range precision missiles, and electronic warfare.

3. 

Air Combat and Shootdown Claims

• India's Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh stated that India shot down five Pakistani fighter jets and one surveillance aircraft (AWACS) during the May clashes, including a 300 km-range kill with the S-400 system. Pakistan denied any losses and counter-claimed Indian jets destroyed. Verification remains disputed.

4. 

Ceasefire and Diplomatic Retaliation

• Under global pressure from the U.S., China, Russia, and Gulf partners, both sides agreed to halt firing around 10 May 2025 after DGMO-level talks. India simultaneously suspended cooperation under the Indus Waters Treaty, expelled Pakistani diplomats, and shut most visas, airspace, and trade links. Pakistan termed India's Indus move an "act of war."

5. 

Narrative and Nuclear Signalling

• Indian leadership described Operation Sindoor as a "calibrated deterrence strike." Pakistan responded with overt nuclear signalling and "water warfare" rhetoric, warning of retaliation. Both sides accused each other of disinformation and diplomatic harassment during the standoff.

6. 

Internal Security and Normalcy

• Post-attack operations in Jammu & Kashmir neutralised several TRF operatives linked to the Pahalgam attack. Security during the 2025 Amarnath Yatra was tightened, and over 4 lakh pilgrims completed the journey safely, which India presented as evidence of restored stability.