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The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.
Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.
The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992). While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. In Shrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors (2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.
The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.
Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.
The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992). While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. In Shrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors (2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.
The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.
Q. What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?
- a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.
- b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.
- c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.
- d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.
Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?
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The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has bee...
It is well stated in the passage that 'The authorities ought to address the shortage of trained healthcare professionals in the field of transfusion medicine'. The author even states in the last paragraph that the onus of this problem related to blood storage and utilization lies with the medical institutions and the authorities responsible for it. Thus, option 1 is the correct answer.
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The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has bee...
Loophole in the Anti-Defection Law
The primary loophole in the current Anti-Defection Law, as identified by the author, is that disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat without any restrictions on the period of time. This creates a significant gap in the law that allows political maneuvering and undermines the intended purpose of the legislation.
Key Points Explaining the Loophole:
- Disqualification Duration: Currently, when MLAs are disqualified under the Anti-Defection Law, there is no set period during which they cannot recontest elections. This means they can quickly return to the political arena without facing substantial consequences for their actions.
- Recontesting Elections: Since disqualified MLAs can participate in elections immediately after their disqualification, they treat this as a mere temporary setback. This undermines the law's effectiveness in curbing opportunistic defections, as they can re-enter the House after a short hiatus.
- Impact on Political Integrity: Allowing immediate recontesting encourages a culture of defection for personal gain. It diminishes the seriousness of the disqualification process and sends a message that political loyalty can be easily bypassed.
- Need for Reform: To address this loophole, the author suggests extending the disqualification period to at least six years. This would ensure that defectors face a meaningful penalty, effectively preventing them from returning to power until a significant period has passed.
Conclusion
In summary, the lack of a specified timeframe during which disqualified MLAs cannot contest elections weakens the Anti-Defection Law's intended purpose. By implementing a longer disqualification period, the law could become a more effective deterrent against political defections.
The primary loophole in the current Anti-Defection Law, as identified by the author, is that disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat without any restrictions on the period of time. This creates a significant gap in the law that allows political maneuvering and undermines the intended purpose of the legislation.
Key Points Explaining the Loophole:
- Disqualification Duration: Currently, when MLAs are disqualified under the Anti-Defection Law, there is no set period during which they cannot recontest elections. This means they can quickly return to the political arena without facing substantial consequences for their actions.
- Recontesting Elections: Since disqualified MLAs can participate in elections immediately after their disqualification, they treat this as a mere temporary setback. This undermines the law's effectiveness in curbing opportunistic defections, as they can re-enter the House after a short hiatus.
- Impact on Political Integrity: Allowing immediate recontesting encourages a culture of defection for personal gain. It diminishes the seriousness of the disqualification process and sends a message that political loyalty can be easily bypassed.
- Need for Reform: To address this loophole, the author suggests extending the disqualification period to at least six years. This would ensure that defectors face a meaningful penalty, effectively preventing them from returning to power until a significant period has passed.
Conclusion
In summary, the lack of a specified timeframe during which disqualified MLAs cannot contest elections weakens the Anti-Defection Law's intended purpose. By implementing a longer disqualification period, the law could become a more effective deterrent against political defections.
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The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?
Question Description
The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2025 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?.
The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2025 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT.
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Here you can find the meaning of The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of
The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an
ample number of questions to practice The phenomenon of defections is not new to Indian politics. It has been plaguing the political landscape for over five decades. The recurrence of this evil phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law, which defined three grounds of disqualification of MLAs — giving up party membership; going against party whip; and abstaining from voting.Resignation as MLA was not one of the conditions. Exploiting this loophole, the 17 rebel MLAs in Karnataka resigned, their act aimed at ending the majority of the ruling coalition and, at the same time, avoiding disqualification. However, the Speaker refused to accept the resignations and declared them disqualified. This was possible as the legislation empowers the presiding officer of the House (i.e. the Speaker) to decide on complaints of defection under no time constraint.The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review. However, this safeguard was struck down inKihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others(1992).While the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the anti-defection law, thereby making her/his decisions subject to judicial review. InShrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Ors vs Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors(2019), where the three-judge SC bench upheld the then Karnataka Speaker’s decision of disqualification of the 17 rebel MLAs. However, it struck down his ban on the MLAs from contesting elections till 2023, negating the only possible permanent solution to the problem. The Supreme Court played the role of a neutral umpire in this political slugfest. The Anti-Defection Law provided a safeguard for defections made on genuine ideological differences. The 91st Constitutional Amendment introduced in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split. The 91st Amendment also barred the appointment of defectors as Ministers until their disqualification period is over or they are re-elected, whichever is earlier.The main issue is that the defectors treat disqualification as a mere detour, before they return to the House or government by re-contesting. This can only be stopped by extending the disqualification period from re-contesting and appointment to Chairmanships/Ministries to at least six years. The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for least one election cycle, which is five years.Q.What is the main loophole of the current Anti-Defection Law as per the author?a)The MLAs need not disclose the money they receive from party/leaders for defecting.b)The SC has judicial overview over the decision of the Speaker of the house.c)The Whip issued has killed democratic spirits of individual MLAs.d)Disqualified MLAs can recontest for the same assembly seat with no bar from contesting elections for any period of time.Correct answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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