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In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice In recent decades, few ideas have received as much attention as that of human rights. But what, exactly, are human rights? A popular answer characterises them as entitlements that all human beings possessby virtue of their inherent dignityand that exist independently of legal or social recognition.This definition, which draws a conceptual link between human rights and dignity, is prominent in scholarly circles, human-rights documents and political discourse more generally.For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 refers to dignity multiple times, and so do the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).Despite its popularity, this way of connecting dignity and human rights is uninformative at best and counter-productive at worst. It is uninformative because the notion of inherent dignity is opaque. It is often just a placeholder for whichever human attribute grounds human rights, with different philosophical traditions disagreeing on the relevant attribute.Reference to inherent dignity is also counter-productive, since it pushes the debate on human rights into deep metaphysical waters and distracts from their political function: placing constraints on the conduct of powerful actors.In this article, I propose a new understanding of the relationship between dignity and human rights—one that reinforces, rather than undermines, their power-taming function. To do so, I distinguish between dignity as a status, involving distinctive normative demands (status dignity), and dignity as an inherent property of individuals, which purportedly justifies ascribing a certain status to them (inherent dignity). Status dignity and inherent dignity need not always accompany each other: one may hold status dignity by virtue of possessing properties other than inherent dignity. Definitions of human rights have focused on inherent dignity. I argue that the focus should shift to status dignity—particularly, the status dignity of individuals’vis-à-vispowerful sovereign entities—leaving open what inherent human property grounds or justifies that status.Q.What is thediscrepancyin the given argument?a)Involves denying the political function of human rights, and welcoming definitions of human rights that breed deeper metaphysical controversies about their grounds.b)The notion of (status) dignity may be appropriately applied not only to individual agents, but also to corporate ones, like states.c)Remains largely agnostic about the independently important issue of what grounds or justifies them.d)Building inherent dignity into the definition of human rights seems necessary to mark them out as a distinctive class of universal moral rights.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.