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Passage: Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion‟, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice‟, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform‟ of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.
Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices‟ test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths. (Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).
Q. A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –
  • a)
    Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.
  • b)
    Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.
  • c)
    Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.
  • d)
    Both (b) and (c).
Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?
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Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice an...
As per settled law right to profess and practice religion does not include right to convert. So his argument as regards conversion will be against settled law and will entail failure to his challenge.
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Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.In 2019, the Government of India banned the pasting of religious pamphlets in public spaces. These pamphlets often carried the text of the key teachings of religions, and all religious sects engaged in this practice. One leader from a religion challenged this action of the government. His challenge will –

Passage: Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.Riots have just taken place in the small town of Mirzapur. Religious tempers were simmering. In this atmosphere, a small group of violent people from each religion decided to start announcing that the only path to salvation was the annihilation of the people of the other sect. The government decided to outlaw any public religious announcements in Mirzapur. Both the groups challenged this action. Their challenge will –

Passage: Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A particular temple in Maharashtra played religious songs all night on loudspeakers for thirteen days in a row, citing the beginning of Navratri. This was an auspicious period, during which it was necessary for the people of the religion to pray to the deity all night through music. An aggrieved resident of the nearby society filed a case against temples using speakers at odd hours. The followers of the religion argued that this practice is integral for them. The Court will decide –

It is quite understandable that a recentSupreme Court judgment, that there is no fundamental right to claim reservation in promotions, has caused some political alarm. The received wisdom in affirmative action jurisprudence is that a series of Constitution amendments and judgments have created a sound legal framework for reservation in public employment, subject to the fulfilment of certain constitutional requirements. And that it has solidified into an entitlement for the backward classes, including the SCs and STs. However, the latest judgment is a reminder that affirmative action programmes allowed in the Constitution flow from “enabling provisions” and are not rights as such. This legal position is not new. Major judgments — these include those by Constitution Benches — note that Article 16(4), on reservation in posts, is enabling in nature. In other words, the state is not bound to provide reservations, but if it does so, it must be in favour of sections that are backward and inadequately represented in the services based on quantifiable data. Thus, the Court is not wrong in setting aside an Uttarakhand High Court order directing data collection on the adequacy or inadequacy of representation of SC/ST candidates in the State’s services. Its reasoning is that once there is a decision not to extend reservation — in this case, in promotions — to the section, the question whether its representation in the services is inadequate is irrelevant.The root of the current issue lies in the then Congress government’s decision to give up SC/ST quotas in promotions in Uttarakhand. The present BJP regime also shares responsibility as it argued in the Court that there is neither a basic right to reservations nor a duty by the State government to provide it. The idea thatreservationis not a right may be in consonance with the Constitution allowing it as an option, but a larger question looms: Is there no government obligation to continue with affirmative action if the social situation that keeps some sections backward and at the receiving end of discrimination persists? Reservation is no more seen by the Supreme Court as an exception to the equality rule; rather, it is a facet of equality. The terms “proportionate equality” and “substantive equality” have been used to show that the equality norm acquires completion only when the marginalised are given a legal leg-up. Some may even read into this an inescapable state obligation to extend reservation to those who need it, lest its absence render the entire system unequal. For instance, if no quotas are implemented and no study on backwardness and extent of representation is done, it may result in a perceptible imbalance in social representation in public services. Will the courts still say a direction cannot be given to gather data and provide quotas to those with inadequate representation?Q.Suppose Article 16(5) of the Constitution reads- 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment (5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.Further suppose that The Government passes a law saying that the Chairmanship of the National Commission of Religious Minorities shall be limited to people from these communities.Is this law violative of Article 16?

The makers of our Constitution designed the institutions of our republic with great care and attention to detail. The deliberations of the Constituent Assembly bear witness to the extraordinary quality of thought which went into the making of these institutions. They were designed to endure and it was expected that as the republic grew, a body of good practices, conventions and intangible legacies would nourish and sustain them and make them stronger.Instead, we have seen every party in power since Indira Gandhi try to weaken and diminish these institutions. The Parliament, the Supreme Court, the Chief Election Commissioner, the Comptroller & Auditor General, the Union Public Service Commission are among the long list of institutions wherein constant attempts have been made to subdue them, erode their autonomy and authority (sometimes in the guise of reform) and have them subordinated to the will of the political executive, particularly the Prime Minister’s Office. Yet, their structural strength has enabled them to resist these attacks and substantially retain their character although each of them is probably weaker than before.The one institution that has received the maximum battering from every quarter is that of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). In the sixty four years of its existence (it came into existence in 1951 by an Act of Parliament under Article 312 of the Constitution), there have been more than fifty Commissions, Committees, Task Forces etc that have questioned and investigated different aspects of its architecture, tinkered with the recruitment system, and re-engineered it to change the socio-cultural and age profile of the entrants, introduced an OBC quota in addition to the original one for SC and ST, and suggested several other ‘reforms’ which have substantially changed its character.Some changes have been necessitated by major sociological and political developments, for instance, the acceptance of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. Some others have been motivated by the desire to make the IAS politically and culturally more acceptable. Yet despite these changes in the original architecture — or maybe because of them — the institution remains central to the working of the Government and, in the minds of the public, still exercises disproportionate power in the scheme of things.Q.Does Indian Administrative Services enjoy a constitutional status?

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Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?
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Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Passage:Article 25 guarantees the right to “profess, practice and propagate religion, but also permits the State to regulate „economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice, as well as provide for „social welfare and reform of Hindu religious institutions. Article 26 guarantees religious denominations, among other things, freedom to manage their religious affairs. However, the protection is extended only to the practices considered essential to the religion. The State can still restrict the right on the grounds of public order, health and morality.Litigation around these two Articles has broadly centred on two issues. The first is the distinction between the religious and secular, particularly in the case of Hinduism. The Court has dealt with this by bringing into play an „essential practices test to decide what is essential to Hinduism and used it to distinguish between the sacred and the secular. The Court’s intervention to decide what is religious and what is not in a secular, constitutional culture is hardly peculiar to India. As Pratap Bhanu Mehta points out, in most constitutional settings courts „have to determine whether or not a policy places a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. This might require the court to have not just a definition of religion but also to determine whether a particular practice counts as falling under that definition. What is unusual, however, is the Indian Supreme Court’s activism in fashioning religion in the way the State or the judges would likeit to be, rather than accept religion as practised by believers. The courts have upheld several practices as essential, but not along with the added elements and their outgrowths.(Ronojoy Sen, Secularism and Religious Freedom).Q.A leader of a religious sect, along with a group of volunteers decided to visit the rural parts of India to help those in need. In the process of helping them, he also taught them the basic tenet of his religion. Many residents of the rural area decided to begin following his religion. The leader was arrested under a law that made it illegal to “induce” anyone to convert to a particular religion. The term “induce” is left vague. The Supreme Court has already held, in Stanislaus v. State of MP, that the right to profess and practice religion does not include the right to convert. The leader challenged, in the High Court, the law as violating his right to propagate his religion. His challenge will –a)Fail if he argues that a right to propagate his religion will include the right to convert.b)Succeed if he argues that aright to propagate religion may cause voluntary conversions which are lawful.c)Succeed if he argues that the right to convert is the logical next step to propagating tenets of his religion and should be recognized, as conversions only happen after one is given full information about the other religion.d)Both (b) and (c).Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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