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Passage: Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order
The Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.
The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.
As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.
Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.
Q. What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?
  • a)
    Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.
  • b)
    Judiciary is less corrupt than executive
  • c)
    Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excesses
  • d)
    Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violations
Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
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Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government ...
Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.
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Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What could be a potential outcome of not having anonymized data protected from re- identification?

Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.Which among the following options highlight the central problem with Section 35 of the bill?

In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, as unconstitutional. That decision, Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, was heaped with praise by domestic and foreign media alike. But none of this stopped the police in Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, from arresting and detaining 18-year-old Tyagi in October 2017, for allegedly committing a crime under Section 66A - for posting some comments on Facebook. Mr. Tyagi's case is not alone.Media outlets have reported other instances where Section 66A has been invoked by the police, all of which points to an obvious, and serious, concern: what is the point of that landmark decision if the police still jail persons under unconstitutional laws?From police stations, to trial courts, and all the way up to the High Courts, we found Section 66A was still in vogue throughout the legal system. Equally disturbing was the discovery that this issue of applying unconstitutional penal laws long preceded Shreya Singhal and Section 66A. Before the recent decisions that held provisions in the Indian Penal Code as unconstitutional (in whole or in part), the Supreme Court had famously done this, in 1983, by striking down Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code in Mithu v. State of Punjab.In 2012, years after Section 303 had been struck down, the Rajasthan High Court intervened to save a person from being hanged for being convicted under that offence.We argue that a primary reason for poor enforcement of judicial declarations of unconstitutionality is signal failures between different branches of government. Commonly, in this context one thinks of active non-compliance that can undermine the work of courts - for instance, the aftermath of the Sabarimala verdict. But these publicised acts of defiance have hidden what is a systemic problem within the Indian legal system: there exists no official method for sharing information about such decisions, even those of constitutional import such as Shreya Singhal. We found that there is no formal system on information sharing in the hierarchical set-up of the Indian judiciary.Thus, enforcing unconstitutional laws is sheer wastage of public money. But more importantly, until this basic flaw within is addressed, certain persons will remain exposed to denial of their right to life and personal liberty in the worst possible way imaginable. They will suffer the indignity of lawless arrest and detention, for no reason other than their poverty and ignorance, and inability to demand their rights.Q. Ignorance of law is no excuse is a well-entrenched principle in the legal system. Considering the essence of the passage, is the arrest of Tyagi consistent with the law?

In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, as unconstitutional. That decision, Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, was heaped with praise by domestic and foreign media alike. But none of this stopped the police in Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh, from arresting and detaining 18-year-old Tyagi in October 2017, for allegedly committing a crime under Section 66A - for posting some comments on Facebook. Mr. Tyagi's case is not alone.Media outlets have reported other instances where Section 66A has been invoked by the police, all of which points to an obvious, and serious, concern: what is the point of that landmark decision if the police still jail persons under unconstitutional laws?From police stations, to trial courts, and all the way up to the High Courts, we found Section 66A was still in vogue throughout the legal system. Equally disturbing was the discovery that this issue of applying unconstitutional penal laws long preceded Shreya Singhal and Section 66A. Before the recent decisions that held provisions in the Indian Penal Code as unconstitutional (in whole or in part), the Supreme Court had famously done this, in 1983, by striking down Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code in Mithu v. State of Punjab.In 2012, years after Section 303 had been struck down, the Rajasthan High Court intervened to save a person from being hanged for being convicted under that offence.We argue that a primary reason for poor enforcement of judicial declarations of unconstitutionality is signal failures between different branches of government. Commonly, in this context one thinks of active non-compliance that can undermine the work of courts - for instance, the aftermath of the Sabarimala verdict. But these publicised acts of defiance have hidden what is a systemic problem within the Indian legal system: there exists no official method for sharing information about such decisions, even those of constitutional import such as Shreya Singhal. We found that there is no formal system on information sharing in the hierarchical set-up of the Indian judiciary.Thus, enforcing unconstitutional laws is sheer wastage of public money. But more importantly, until this basic flaw within is addressed, certain persons will remain exposed to denial of their right to life and personal liberty in the worst possible way imaginable. They will suffer the indignity of lawless arrest and detention, for no reason other than their poverty and ignorance, and inability to demand their rights.Q. Which of the following views can be correctly attributed to the author of the above passage?

It was submitted to the Supreme Court that there is a need to link the social media profiles of users with their Aadhar numbers, and if required, have platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp share this number (which acts like a unique identity) with law enforcement agencies to help detect crimes. This is needed to check fake news, defamatory articles, anti-national content, etc.To briefly characterize social media, it refers to any interactive technology mediated by a computer, which enables the creation and dissemination of ideas, information, opinions, career interests, and other kinds of expression through virtual communities and networks. The Supreme Court, declared the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution in the Puttaswamy judgment. The court noted that the right to bodily integrity, autonomy over personal decisions, and protection of personal information – all fall within the right to privacy. At the same time, the court also noted that this right was not absolute – it permitted exceptions, should there be a legitimate aim of the state, and the invasion of privacy was proportional to the object sought to be achieved.When the constitutional validity of the Aadhar had to be ascertained the majority opinion held that the Act was legal and intra vires the Constitution in all but some respects. It was clarified that only those benefits and services that were in the nature of a ‘subsidy’ or a ‘government welfare scheme’ could require linking of Aadhar.The curbing of fake news, defamatory content, etc. does come across as a legitimate goal of the State. However, the proportionality of this measure cannot easily be understood or justified, as the linking of social media accounts to Aadhar would necessarily involve a highly intrusive presence of the state in our daily lives, and make it difficult for people to express their opinions without concerns of incarceration. A notable point is the precarious situation that such a linking would create for the right to freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed under Article 19(1)Option A of the Constitution, making it illusory and cosmetic.This move would bolster the already-rampant use of the unconstitutional section 66A of the Information Technology Act. Linking of social media accounts to Aadhar would increase the incidence of such use of section 66A as tracing content and information back to individuals would become easier and more persons could be charged with this section. It is essential that social media be a ‘free’ platform, where individuals can speak their minds without the fear.Q. On the basis of the passage identify whether the author is supporting the linkage of social media account with Aadhar or not?

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Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
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Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2025 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Passage:Section 35 of the Bill, for instance, empowers the Government to grant a carte blanche authorization to any of its agencies to gather personal data, thereby overriding privacy protections and categorically undermining the two main components required to limit an aspiring surveillance state: accountability and transparency. Privacy protections, the Bill states, can be overridden in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order; or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public orderThe Srikrishna Committee’s Draft Bill, on the other hand, permitted surveillance only if “authorised pursuant to a law” and “in accordance with the procedure established by such law” if “necessary for, and proportionate to, such interests being achieved.” This was in line with the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, which emphasised that infringements upon privacy must meet the global constitutional standards of proportionality. The 2019 Bill eliminates these procedural restraints and does away with parliamentary or judicial oversight. Moreover, while the draft Bill provided such an exemption to the Government only in the interests of the security of the State, the current Bill further enhances the scope and boundaries of the broad scheme of power the Government enjoys.The Government’s sweeping power invokes grave privacy concerns, disregards the procedural and content based mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution, and strikes at the very root of the interpretive advance made in the Privacy judgement.As if this were not unconstitutional enough, the Bill allows the Central Government to collect anonymized “personal” or “non-personal data” from data fiduciaries. Neither term is distinguished nor defined in the bill. This provision is especially alarming in the wake of recent studies, which suggest that no anonymized personal data is protected from reidentification, thus raising a grave concern about confidentiality, privacy, and the ethical use of data. It is hardly a stretch to assume that this Bill, for all practical purposes, might seriously jeopardise the privacy of those set of individuals who espouse political sentiments that the Government may find unfavourable and thereby giving rise to a retributive form of policy making.Another change which is a cause of worry is the substitution of the judicial members in the selection committee, which is responsible for the appointment of the chairperson and the members of the DPAI, as was envisioned in the draft Bill, with the Cabinet Secretary, Law Secretary, and Electronics and Information and Technology Secretary, thereby making it impervious to judicial and expert influence. While the US Supreme Court maintains that judicial authorization is required before the operation of certain kinds of domestic surveillance, the current Bill mentions no such prerequisite. The Bill further fails to grapple effectively against executive overreach and does not stand the scrutiny of the proportionalityjurisprudence, i.e., the principle which seeks to safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.Q.What is the major problem with not having judicial oversight over the surveillance and not having judicial members in the selection committee?a)Judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and it has a duty to protect it.b)Judiciary is less corrupt than executivec)Judiciary would provide checks and balances against governmental excessesd)Judiciary would not be an accomplice in privacy violationsCorrect answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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