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Passage: In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.
The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.
Q. Which of the following is an example of valid consideration
  • a)
    A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundays
  • b)
    A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farm
  • c)
    Both a and b
  • d)
    Neither a nor b
Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?
Most Upvoted Answer
Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was abou...
Option B forms a better answer in my opinion...
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Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of these is true?

Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.A enters into a contract with B that he will sell his land to B for 5 rupees since B has been a really good friend of his. A is later told by one of his employees that the actual worth of the land is 5 crore rupees. A decides not to perform the contract with B. B sues A for performance of contract. Decide.

Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.A goes to B and tells him that he knows a spell with which he can create barren lands wherever he wishes to. B agrees to pay 5 crore rupees to learn the spell. A teaches B the spell and produces a land of 10 square feet. A wants B to pay the money now but B refuses. He also says that the area of land so produce was inadequate. A sues B.Decide.

Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2( d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.What can be said rightly about the drafters of the Indian Contract Act?

Directions: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given beside.Section 25 of the Contract Act reads- “Agreements without consideration, void unless it is writing and registered or is a promise to compensate for something or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law”. This section after defining consideration in definition clause in Sec. 2( d) declares that “consideration is the vital part of a valid contract” and also states some exception to the rule that it establishes and in such exceptions, the contract cannot be rendered void even if it is without consideration. The exceptions are: When the contract is in writing and registered When it is for compensating someone for his voluntary services for the promisor in the past. When it is a promise, signed or made in writing by the person or his agent to pay whole or part of a debt which is barred by the law of limitation. Note- In case of transfer of any gift from one person to another, this section does not affect its validity. Mere inadequate consideration in a contract does not render it to be void under this section. However, inadequacy may be taken into account to check whether the consent was free or not.Q.ABC Ltd. and XYZ Ltd. entered into an agreement for the provision of raw materials, with the contract specifying that XYZ Ltd. would pay Rs. 10 lakhs to ABC Ltd. within 30 days of receiving the raw materials as the agreed consideration. However, even after receiving the raw materials, XYZ Ltd. failed to make the payment, prompting ABC Ltd. to initiate legal proceedings to recover the owed amount. During the legal proceedings, XYZ Ltd. contended that the contract lacked consideration and cited Section 25 of the Contract Act, which deems agreements without consideration void unless they qualify for specific exceptions. Which of the following options provides the best explanation regarding the validity of the contract between ABC Ltd. and XYZ Ltd.?

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Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?
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Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Passage:In the 1850s, around the time the Indian Contract Act was about to be drafted, consideration was on its way to becoming a ‘mere technicality’ and could very well have ‘withered away altogether’. It should not be surprising then that framers of a midnineteenth century contract code, beginning tabula rasa, might have wished to fundamentally shake up the rules relating to consideration. Indeed, as Ibbetson argues, ‘a codifying system might legitimately have discarded consideration as inconsistent with the newly imposed legal model’ – an option ‘not open to the Common law.’ But like the ingenious common law reformers in England, the drafters continued to pay ‘lip service’ to the idea of consideration and the ‘reciprocity’ underlying it. They did indeed retain the traditional doctrine’s outer crust of reciprocity: an act or abstinence or promise on the ‘other side’, as it were, but they tweaked this in important ways. The framers of the Act, like the English Courts of the day, made it very easy to find consideration by defining it in capacious terms, which included any act or abstinence or promise, regardless of benefit or detriment. Perhaps, they too, like the Law Revision Committee, were mindful of the fact that a root and branch abolition of the doctrine might arouse ‘suspicion and hostility’ and hence decided to ‘prune away from the doctrine those aspects of it that create hardship’. They also provided that no question of adequacy of consideration could ever be raised. However, the definition under the Indian Contract Act did more than that – Section 2(d) had other elements that lent it the makings of marking the vanishing point of consideration.The definition of consideration under the Indian Contract Act, with its copula ‘at the desire of’, appears to have been calculated to preempt potential hair splitting over whether the consideration in any given case was indeed valuable in the ‘eye of the law’. The idea at play here is that of the subjective theory of value: that the Courts would not second-guess whether any consideration was actually valuable – what the promisor desired is what he got and that settled conclusively the matter of the value of consideration. This was one of the effects of the influence of the will theory on the traditional exchange model of consideration.Q.Which of the following is an example of valid considerationa)A agrees to give B his horse if he stops going to the temple on Sundaysb)A agrees to deliver his television at B’s place if B reduces the monthly payment of rent for A’s farmc)Both a and bd)Neither a nor bCorrect answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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