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In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2025 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?a)The state objectionably uses its prerogative powers to achieve its ends frequently.b)The interpretation of the articles needs a rather rigid approach.c)The executive order of the government was in consonance with Article 14 and 21.d)The Indian government has no grounds whatsoever to grant an LIN.Correct answer is option 'A'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.