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In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.
Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.
J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.
Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?
  • a)
    It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.
  • b)
    The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.
  • c)
    The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.
  • d)
    The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.
Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?
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In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Cal...
In the last part of the last paragraph, the author stated that evidence of potential threat to the public order is a valid ground for issuing an LIN.
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In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)( c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?Q. Which of the following is the author of the given passage most likely to agree with?

In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)( c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. The government finds out from confidential sources that a foreigner, who is currently residing in India, praised GISIS, a terrorist organisation and made 3 statements on online platforms that disparaged India while residing in Czechoslovakia. On receiving the news, the government issued her an LIN notice on the grounds of a potential threat of letting her mingle with the Indian citizens and after receiving the notice, she moved to the concerned court challenging the order. Strictly from the legal principles laid down in the paragraph, which of the following would be the likely result of the petition?

In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)( c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. Louis de Raedtt, who came to India on a Belgian passport, engaged himself in some Christian missionary work and he had been residing continuously in India since 2003. The government, by an order dated 5-7-2003, rejected his application requesting his further stay in the country. If Raedtt challenged this position in the court, which of the following would strengthen the case of the state?

In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)( c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. In the situation provided in the previous question, which of the following would likely be the result of the judgment by applying the principles laid down in the paragraph?

In a bizarre order, the Supreme Court of India has decided to begin hearing the petitions seeking review of its previous judgement on the Sabarimala issue from January 13, 2020. A nine-judge constitution bench has been formed to hear the sensitive case. The court will also take up other contentious issues for hearing such as alleged discrimination against Muslim and Parsi women.However, the ambit of review power conferred under Article 137 of the Constitution is extremely limited: The review court must examine the correctness of the judgment under review to ascertain if it suffers from glaring omissions, a patent mistake or grave errors apparent on the face of record. Petitions seeking review of judgments are allowed in rare instances. In Chandra Kanta vs Sheikh Habib, the Court held that Article 137 would not permit ordering of a fresh hearing by a larger bench without scrutiny of judgment under review and without pointing out a grave error apparent on the face of record. None of this has been done by the majority in the Sabarimala review judgment. Simply put, the majority opinion is erroneous.Justices R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and opined against reviewing the original judgment. They held that what a future Constitution Bench (if ever forme d) may do was not relevant to the adjudication of the review petitions, which had to be decided in accordance with well established parameters. Since none of the grounds for review had been made out, they held that the petitions were liable to be dismissed.Incorrect as it appears to be, the majority view in the Sabarimala review petitions has served one purpose: it has revived the debate around judicial interference in matters of faith. The constitution doesn’t define religion. Article 25 guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion. However, the right is made subject to public order, morality and health.Article 26 allows every religious denomination or any of its sections to (

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In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?
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In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2025 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2025 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice In Kamil Sieczynski v Union of India, a single-judge bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a “Leave India Notice” [“LIN”] issued by the government to the Petitioner, who was a Polish student studying in India. The ostensible basis of the Notice – issued under Section 3(2)(c) of the Foreigners Act – was that the petitioner, not being a citizen of India, could not have participated in “political rallies'' while in the country. The petitioner impugned the LIN on both procedural and substantive grounds: namely, that he had not been heard, that the LIN was not supported by any reasons, and that it violated his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The State, on the other hand, raised a set of familiar arguments: it relied on its prerogative powers in matters of entry or expulsion into India since a foreigner can’t claim the right to reside in India, submitted materials in a sealed cover, denied any obligation to accord a hearing, and argued that foreigners could not agitate constitutional rights that flowed from Article 19.Justice J found for the Petitioner on all counts. He began by noting that the Petitioner was lawfully in India on a valid student visa. Consequently, the right of the Petitioner to reside in India – flowing from his visa – could not be revoked without a hearing. J then observed that the material in the “sealed cover” was essentially two sheets of paper that referred to the Petitioner’s attendance at an anti-CAA rally, and a decision taken by “higher formations” to expel him from the country. This led him to consider the substantive question at issue.J held that though Article 19 (right free speech and expression) was not available to the Petitioner (as a non-citizen), Article 21 – available to “all persons” – covered his right to participate in protests and rallies. Additionally, J pointed out that the powers under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act were not “unfettered”, but had to be exercised within the constitutional framework and only on acts committed in India. Interestingly, he also held that some of the earlier Supreme Court judgments – that seemed to indicate that no hearing was necessary as a Section 3 order was a “purely executive order” – were not only distinguishable, but had also been overtaken by the progress of Article 14 and 21 jurisprudence, which now required a more “liberal” approach. At all times, J. insisted, the State had to comply with its constitutional obligations: both in terms of respecting individual rights, and in terms of providing reasons for coercive action. Here – as often happens – the slightest scrutiny of the State’s putative “reasons” (even though they were submitted in a sealed cover) resulted in a clear realisation that they were, in essence, no reasons at all because the state failed to enclose evidence that proved potential threat to the public order.Q. After years of protests, the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, an Act of Indian Parliament that bifurcated the state of Andhra Pradesh into Telangana and the residuary Andhra Pradesh state was passed. A 68 year old Russian citizen who witnessed the fall of Soviet Union thought that this act might push both the states into a disastrous future and staged a protest against the Act. Taking cognisance of the protest, the government of India issued him the LIN notice and he moved to the concerned court challenging this order. Which of the following if true strengthen the case of the state in the above scenario?a)It is the prerogative power of the state to issue the LIN notice so the judicial intervention is unnecessary.b)The state government showed evidence of the Russian carrying a holster with a pistol in during the rally.c)The foreigners could not agitate against constitutional rights that flow from Article 19 because they are not granted to foreigners.d)The state government provided documents that included a few photos of the Russian participating in the rally.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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