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One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice One might believe that there are facts which could not ever be represented or comprehended by human beings, even if the species lasted forever-simply because our structure does not permit us to operate with concepts of the requisite type. This impossibility might even be observed by other beings, but it is not clear that the existence of such beings, or the possibility of their existence, is a precondition of the significance of the hypothesis that there are humanly inaccessible facts. After all, the nature of beings with access to humanly inaccessible facts is presumably itself a humanly inaccessible fact.Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.I shall not pursue this subject, however. Its bearing on the mind-body problem is that it enables us to make a general observation about the subjective character of experience. Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view.I am not advertising here to the alleged privacy of experience to its possessor. The point of view in question is not one accessible only to a single individual. Rather it is a type. It is often possible to take up a point of view other than one's own, so the comprehension of such facts is not limited to one's own case. There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one person can know or say of another what the quality of the other's experience is. They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of ascription to be able to adopt his point of view-to understand the ascription in the first person as well as in the third, so to speak. The more different from oneself the other experience is, the less success one can expect with this enterprise.Q. All of the following options weaken the argument of the author EXCEPT:a)Point of views can only be subjective and no one else can be made to understand them.b)Whether phenomenological facts are subjective or objective depends on the observer.c)Phenomenological facts can either be subjective or objective at any given time.d)For an observer completely different from us, phenomenological facts are perfectly objective.Correct answer is option 'B'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.