Embarking on the exploration of constitutional interpretation reveals a journey into the essence of governance and legal intricacies. For civil services aspirants, delving into key doctrines like the 'Golden Rule,' 'Literal Rule,' 'Mischief Rule,' 'Purposive Interpretation,' and 'Harmonious Construction' is a gateway to unlocking the mysteries of legal discourse. This expedition goes beyond exam preparation, offering a transformative understanding for meaningful contributions to public service.
The legislative powers of the Parliament and the State Legislatures are explicitly mentioned in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Each legislative power mentioned carries with it incidental or ancillary powers necessary for its execution. In the USA, these powers are known as "necessary and proper powers," while in Australia, they are described as "powers incidental to the execution of that power."
According to this doctrine, the entries in the legislative lists should not be narrowly interpreted, and each general word in an entry should extend to all incidental or ancillary matters that can reasonably be comprehended in it. For example, the power to levy tax includes provisions to check tax evasion. Similarly, the power to legislate on rent collection includes the power to legislate on remission of rent.
However, this broad interpretation does not mean that the scope of incidental or ancillary powers can be extended unreasonably. For instance, the power to levy tax does not include the power to confiscate goods.
This doctrine cannot be used to expand legislative powers to cover subjects explicitly mentioned in a list. For instance, the legislative power on "betting and gambling" in Entry 34 of the State List does not include the power to impose taxes on betting and gambling, explicitly mentioned in Entry 62 of the State List.
Moreover, the doctrine cannot be abused to fraudulently extend legislative power.
The doctrine of incidental and ancillary powers is invoked by the Supreme Court to uphold a statute from invalidity or unconstitutionality. It is applied when a law is within legislative competence but incidentally encroaches upon another subject. The doctrine ensures that the legislature has not exceeded its allotted field of legislative powers and has not substantially encroached into another field.
The doctrine of precedent, also known as stare decisis, is an English legal principle. It dictates that lower courts must abide by the decisions of higher courts. In the UK, every court is bound by the decisions of the House of Lords.
Expressed in the maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere," the doctrine means "to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled." The underlying logic is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty, emphasizing that a longstanding view should not be disturbed merely because an alternative view is possible.
Former Chief Justice Chandrachud highlights that for the rule of stare decisis, it's sufficient that a decision was made on a question, regardless of the rationale behind it.
The doctrine of precedent is embedded in Article 141 of the Constitution, making the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts in India. The significance of this provision is underscored by the Supreme Court, emphasizing that the refusal of a lower court to follow the Supreme Court's decision renders the judgment null and void.
Additionally, the policy of courts is to adhere to precedent and not disturb settled points. Once a court establishes a legal principle, it is applied to future cases with similar facts, contributing to the development of legal principles and providing authoritative guidance.
In the hierarchical court system of India, lower courts, including High Courts, must respect and follow decisions of higher courts. The rationale is rooted in maintaining consistency, achieving certainty, and upholding the rule of finality in judicial pronouncements.
The doctrine's importance in promoting consistency, harmony, and certainty in judicial decisions is underscored by the Supreme Court. The court emphasizes that consistent opinions among courts of coordinate jurisdiction are essential to prevent judicial anarchy and achieve harmony in the judicial system.
When a legal position is well-settled by Supreme Court pronouncements, it is considered judicial impropriety for subordinate courts, including High Courts, to ignore settled decisions and pass orders contrary to established legal positions.
The Supreme Court cautions against judicial adventurism, emphasizing the declaratory nature of its judgments for the nation. It encourages litigants to accept the finality of the court's pronouncements, except in cases of fundamental national importance or glaring errors that necessitate correction.
The doctrine of occupied field asserts that when Parliament passes a law on a specific subject, thereby occupying the field, State Legislatures lack the authority to enact laws on that subject. In simpler terms, if a legislative field is already covered by a central law, a state law in that field is prohibited. This doctrine is also known as the doctrine of covered field. If a matter falls under the exclusive competence of Parliament (Union List), State Legislatures are prohibited from legislating on it. Similarly, if a matter falls under the exclusive competence of State Legislature (State List), it becomes a prohibited field for Parliament. However, matters in the Concurrent List allow both Parliament and State Legislatures to legislate.
The doctrine of occupied field is particularly relevant to laws related to entries in the Concurrent List. It originates from Article 254, addressing inconsistency (repugnancy) between laws passed by Parliament and State Legislatures.
Article 254 states that in case of inconsistency between a parliamentary law and a state law concerning matters in the Concurrent List, the parliamentary law prevails, rendering the state law void to the extent of repugnancy.
The Supreme Court provides three principles for ascertaining repugnancy: direct conflict, intended occupation, and occupied field. To determine repugnancy, the court laid down tests:
Article 254 includes an exception that allows a state law, after receiving the President's assent, to prevail over a parliamentary law in that state. However, Parliament can later supersede the state law by enacting a law on the same matter.
The question of repugnancy arises in two scenarios: when legislations overlap and conflict in their allocated spheres and when legislations concern matters in the Concurrent List. In both situations, parliamentary legislation predominates. In the first scenario, it is due to the non-obstante clause in Article 246(1), and in the second, it is governed by Article 254(1).
The Supreme Court clarifies that Article 254(1) applies only when both legislations occupy the same field in the Concurrent List, resulting in a direct conflict. It does not apply to cases of repugnancy due to overlapping between List II and List I or List II. In such cases, the State law is ultra vires due to the non-obstante clause in Article 246(1).
The doctrine of prospective overruling, originating from American jurisprudence, was first applied in India by the Supreme Court in the Golak Nath case (1967). This doctrine allows a court, when overruling its previous decision and introducing a new ruling, to limit the application of the new ruling to future transactions. In other words, prospective overruling enables a court to overrule a precedent from a future date, avoiding retrospective impact.
In the Golak Nath case (1967), the Supreme Court overruled its earlier decisions in the Shankari Prasad case (1951) and the Sajjan Singh case (1964). It held that Parliament's amending power under Article 368 does not include the power to amend fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. Despite this, the court applied prospective overruling, stating that the decision would only have future application. This meant that Parliament had no power to amend Part III of the Constitution from the date of the Golak Nath decision onward, preserving the validity of prior amendments.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that prospective overruling amounts to judicial legislation. It explained that the doctrine aligns with the court's role in declaring and interpreting the law. The court emphasized the pragmatic nature of prospective overruling, allowing corrections to errors without disrupting the impact on past transactions. The legal and constitutional basis of the doctrine was also discussed, noting that India's Constitution does not expressly prohibit it.
The Supreme Court laid down three propositions regarding prospective overruling:
The court explained that prospective overruling serves to avoid reopening settled issues, prevent litigation, and bring about a smooth transition. It emphasized that the doctrine is a pragmatic solution reconciling the conflicting doctrines of finding and making law. The court also clarified that there is no statutory prohibition against refusing retroactivity, and the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice.
Criticism of the Doctrine
Addressing objections to the doctrine, the Supreme Court countered arguments that it involves judicial legislation, discourages appeals, and results in obiter declarations. The court argued that these objections are not insurmountable, highlighting that the doctrine prevents injustice and instability in law.
Even though the Golak Nath case judgment was overruled in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), the doctrine of prospective overruling was upheld and applied in subsequent judgments. The Supreme Court extended the doctrine to matters arising under ordinary statutes and continued to follow it in later cases, demonstrating its ongoing relevance.
The Mandal case (1992) and Karunakar case (1993) are instances where the doctrine was applied, delaying its operation or limiting its benefit to specific parties and cases pending before authorities.
The doctrine of harmonious construction dictates that when different provisions of the constitution conflict, courts should interpret them in a way that avoids conflict, ensuring that both provisions can be given effect. This doctrine is also known as the rule of avoidance of conflict. Justices Venkatraama Aiyar and Mukherjea emphasized the need to interpret irreconcilable provisions to give effect to both and prevent rendering any provision nugatory.
The doctrine involves:
The Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of harmonious construction in various scenarios:
For instance, in cases involving conflicts between fundamental rights and directive principles, the Supreme Court highlighted the complementary nature of these principles, aiming at the same goal of social revolution and the establishment of a welfare state. The court emphasized its responsibility to interpret the constitution to ensure the implementation of directive principles while harmonizing them with individual rights.
Similarly, when interpreting legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule, the court emphasized reconciling entries and bringing about harmony between them. The court noted that, in case of apparent conflict, an attempt should be made to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction, ensuring the effect of all entries before considering the overriding power of the Union legislature.
Important Cases Relating to the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction
No. | Case (Year) | Supreme Court Judgement |
---|---|---|
1. | Sri Venkalaramana Oevaru vs. State of Mysore (1957) | Ruled that the right of a religious denomination under Article 26(b) is subject to Article 25(2)(b). |
2. | M.S.M. Sharma vs. Krishan Sinha (1958) | Held that freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to privileges of the Legislature under Article 194(3). |
3. | O.N. Mohindroo vs. Bar Council of Delhi (1968) | Held that Parliament is exclusively empowered to legislate with respect to practitioners before the Supreme Court, and other practitioners' legislation falls under the Concurrent list. |
4. | D.A.V. College vs. State of Punjab (1971) | Held that no state has legislative competence to prescribe a medium of instruction for higher education that interferes with Parliament's power under the Union list. |
5. | Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973) | Held that the term "law" in Article 13(2) includes only ordinary laws and not amendment acts made under Article 368. |
The doctrine of liberal interpretation emphasizes that the constitution should be interpreted broadly and liberally rather than in a narrow or pedantic sense. It views the constitution not just as a law but as a living and organic mechanism guiding the making of laws. Justice Higgins highlights the need to consider the nature and scope of the Constitution as a mechanism for lawmaking.
The Supreme Court underscores that constitutional provisions are ever-evolving and dynamic, requiring a broad interpretation. The intention is to prevent a narrow or restricted approach to interpreting constitutional provisions, particularly Fundamental Rights, ensuring their broad scope and not restricting them excessively.
When applying the doctrine to legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule, the court advocates the widest possible construction to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters reasonably comprehended by the general words in the entries.
The doctrine of literal interpretation, also known as strict or positivist construction, asserts that constitutional provisions should be expounded in their plain, ordinary, and grammatical meaning. Justice Mukherjea emphasizes interpreting the provisions based on the plain words used by the constitution-makers. The courts are cautioned against reading into the Constitution based on supposed spirit, policy, or correcting errors.
The Supreme Court states that the courts cannot declare an Act void based on a perceived spirit of the Constitution not explicitly mentioned in the statute. It emphasizes the difficulty in limiting legislative power through judicial interpretation unless explicitly restricted by the written Constitution.
The doctrine of purposive interpretation suggests that courts, while interpreting the Constitution, should consider the purpose for which a provision was incorporated. This approach involves ascertaining the intention of the Constitution's makers. The Preamble and Constituent Assembly Debates are viewed as key indicators of constitutional intent.
The Supreme Court stresses the need for an object-oriented approach to understand and interpret constitutional provisions. The full import and true meaning should be appreciated in the context of the provision's usage and the purpose it seeks to achieve.
The doctrine of creative interpretation advocates an innovative judicial approach, encouraging the courts to evolve new concepts and procedures to meet changing situations. An example is the Golak Nath case, where the Supreme Court introduced the American doctrine of prospective overruling. This allows overruling old precedents only from a future date.
Another manifestation is the Kesavananda Bharati case, where the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of the basic structure of the constitution, showcasing significant judicial creativity.
144 videos|611 docs|204 tests
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1. What is the Doctrine of Incidental and Ancillary Powers? |
2. What is the Doctrine of Precedent? |
3. Explain the Doctrine of Occupied Field. |
4. What is the Doctrine of Prospective Overruling? |
5. How does the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction work in constitutional interpretation? |
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