International Nuclear Agreements: Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, CTBT, FMCT | Science & Technology for UPSC CSE PDF Download

Introduction

Nuclear agreements balance energy needs, security, and non-proliferation. The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal (2008) ended India’s nuclear isolation, enabling access to global nuclear technology and fuel. The CTBT aims to ban all nuclear explosions, while the FMCT seeks to halt production of fissile material for weapons. India’s positions reflect its pursuit of energy self-reliance (e.g., thorium-based reactors) and strategic autonomy. Recent developments, like the US easing restrictions on Indian nuclear entities in January 2025, highlight evolving dynamics. These agreements align with India’s goals of 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047 and a $1.8 trillion share in the global space-nuclear economy by 2035.

Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal

Initiated in July 2005 via a joint statement by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush, the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal, or 123 Agreement (under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, 1954), was signed on October 10, 2008. It followed India’s nuclear tests (1974, 1998), which led to sanctions and isolation from nuclear trade due to India’s non-signatory status to the NPT. The deal aimed to end this isolation, recognizing India as a responsible nuclear power.

Key Features

• Civil-Military Separation: India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, placing 35 civilian facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An India-specific safeguards agreement was signed in 2009, with phased inspections.

• Nuclear Trade: The deal allows India to access nuclear fuel, reactors, and technology from the US and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries, despite not signing the NPT. The NSG granted India a waiver on September 6, 2008, enabling trade with countries like France, Russia, and Australia.

• Non-Proliferation Commitments: India adopted a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing and strengthened arsenal security, without obligations to sign the CTBT or FMCT.

• Strategic Reserve: Provides for a nuclear fuel reserve to ensure supply continuity for India’s reactors.

• Technology Transfer: Covers nuclear reactors, fuel cycles, and cooperation, excluding sensitive enrichment/reprocessing tech.

Timeline

• 2005: Joint statement by Singh and Bush; Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) completed.

• 2006: US passes Hyde Act, amending Atomic Energy Act to allow cooperation.

• 2007: 123 Agreement finalized; faced opposition in India from Left parties, leading to a confidence vote (won 275–256).

• 2008: IAEA approves safeguards (August); NSG grants waiver (September); US Congress approves deal (October); signed by Pranab Mukherjee and Condoleezza Rice.

• 2016: Agreement with Westinghouse for six reactors; progress slowed by liability issues.

• 2025: US removes BARC, IGCAR, and IREL from Entity List, boosting cooperation.

Significance for India

• Ended Nuclear Isolation: Lifted a 30-year ban on nuclear trade, enabling uranium imports from Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, France, and Russia (7,800+ metric tons from 2008–2018).

• Energy Security: Improved reactor efficiency from 50–55% (2006) to 80% (post-deal), supporting India’s 22,480 MW target by 2032.

• Global Recognition: Granted de facto nuclear weapons state status, allowing India to maintain its arsenal while accessing civilian tech.

• Strategic Ties: Strengthened India-US relations, enabling cooperation in defense, renewables, and export control regimes (MTCR, Wassenaar, Australia Group).

• Economic Impact: Supports India’s nuclear expansion, contributing to a $1.8 trillion space-nuclear economy share by 2035.

Challenges

• Nuclear Liability: India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLND) 2010 holds suppliers liable (Section 17B), deterring US firms like Westinghouse, which faced bankruptcy in 2017.

• US Regulations: 10CFR810 restricts US vendors from manufacturing in India, limiting tech transfer.

• Cost and Alternatives: High nuclear costs vs. cheaper solar/wind; India prefers Russian reactors (e.g., Kudankulam).

• Implementation Delays: Projects like Westinghouse’s six AP1000 reactors in Kovvada, Andhra Pradesh, remain stalled.

Recent Developments

• US Entity List Removal (2025): The US removed BARC, IGCAR, and IREL from restrictions, facilitating tech collaboration and reviving the 123 Agreement.

• Budget 2025-26: ₹20,000 crore allocated for Nuclear Energy Mission; plans for five Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) by 2033; amendments to Atomic Energy Act and CLND proposed to ease liability concerns.

• iCET Initiative: India-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology fosters joint nuclear component manufacturing.

• French Collaboration: Talks for six EPRs in Jaitapur delayed over cost disputes with EDF; reflects broader implementation challenges.

Way Forward

• Amend CLND to align with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC), limiting liability to operators.

• Formalize intergovernmental liability agreements to reassure US firms.

• Fully fund the ₹1,500 crore India Nuclear Insurance Pool to reduce supplier risks.

• Streamline regulatory processes to expedite projects like Kovvada and Jaitapur.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Background

Adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 10, 1996, and opened for signature on September 24, 1996, the CTBT bans all nuclear explosions (military or peaceful) globally. Negotiated through the Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 1994, it aims to curb proliferation and disarmament. The CTBT has 187 signatories and 178 ratifications but is not in force, pending ratification by 44 Annex 2 states, including India.

Key Features

• Prohibition: Bans nuclear weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions in all environments (atmosphere, underwater, underground, outer space).

• Verification Regime: The CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS) detects nuclear tests via seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations.

• Organization: The CTBTO, based in Vienna, prepares for treaty enforcement with a plenary body and Technical Secretariat.

• Entry into Force: Requires ratification by 44 Annex 2 states (e.g., India, China, US, Pakistan). Nine, including India, have not ratified.

• Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs): Prohibited, but Article VIII allows Review Conferences to consider PNEs via consensus amendments.

India’s Position

• Non-Signatory: India did not sign the CTBT, citing:

  • Entry-into-Force Clause: India considers Article XIV (requiring 44 ratifications) coercive and against customary international law.

  • Lack of Disarmament: The treaty lacks a time-bound framework for nuclear weapons elimination, favoring nuclear haves.

  • Security Concerns: India’s 1998 tests (Pokhran-II) required further testing for a credible deterrent, especially against China and Pakistan.

• Voluntary Moratorium: Post-1998, India declared a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, reiterated in the Indo-US deal, but retains the right to test if strategic needs arise.

• Support for Non-Proliferation: India supports CTBT’s goals but demands equitable disarmament commitments.

Recent Developments

• CTBTO Activities: The CTBTO held a ministerial meeting in September 2024, urging ratification by holdout states like India, China, and the US.

• UN Resolutions: General Assembly Resolution A/RES/78/66 (2023) called for accelerated CTBT ratification, with no change in India’s stance.

• Global Context: North Korea’s nuclear test in 2016 was detected by CTBTO’s IMS, underscoring its monitoring capability. No new tests reported in 2024-2025.

• India’s Stance Unchanged: As of August 2025, India maintains its moratorium but has not signed, prioritizing strategic flexibility amid regional tensions.

Significance for India

• Strategic Autonomy: Non-signatory status preserves India’s right to test, critical for its nuclear deterrent against China and Pakistan.

• Global Pressure: India faces calls to sign, but its NSG waiver and nuclear trade access reduce urgency.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

Background

The FMCT, proposed in the 1990s at the Conference on Disarmament, aims to ban the production of fissile material (plutonium, highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons. It remains under negotiation, with no final text adopted. The UN General Assembly and CD prioritize it as a non-proliferation measure, but disagreements over scope and verification stall progress.

Key Features (Proposed)

• Prohibition: Halts production of fissile material for weapons, allowing peaceful use (e.g., power generation).

• Scope Debate: Some states (e.g., US) want only future production banned; others (e.g., Pakistan) demand existing stockpiles be addressed.

• Verification: Proposals for IAEA-led inspections, but consensus is lacking.

• Status: No treaty text finalized; negotiations stalled since 1995 due to disagreements on scope and enforcement.

India’s Position

• Support in Principle: India supports a non-discriminatory, verifiable FMCT but insists on equal treatment for all nuclear states.

• Concerns:

  • Existing Stockpiles: India opposes a treaty ignoring stockpiles, as it benefits states like China with large reserves.

  • Security Needs: India’s 130–140 warheads (2018 estimate) require fissile material for deterrence, especially against Pakistan and China.

  • Sovereignty: India resists intrusive verification that could expose its military programme.

• Strategic Flexibility: India’s 80,000–112,369 tons of uranium reserves allow self-sufficiency in fissile material, reducing FMCT urgency.

Recent Developments

• CD Stalemate: No progress in FMCT negotiations at the CD in 2024-2025; Pakistan’s opposition (citing India’s stockpile advantage) persists.

• India’s Stance: India reiterated support for a fair FMCT at UN disarmament talks in 2024 but emphasized non-discrimination and verification.

• Global Context: China’s thorium reactor (2025) and US SMR plans raise questions about fissile material use, but FMCT talks remain deadlocked.

Significance for India

• Strategic Balance: Non-participation allows India to maintain fissile material production for its arsenal, critical for regional security.

• Thorium Focus: India’s thorium-based reactors (e.g., AHWR) reduce reliance on traditional fissile materials, aligning with FMCT goals indirectly.

• UPSC Relevance: Questions may address India’s reservations, FMCT’s impact on nuclear strategy, or delays in negotiations.

Challenges, Future Prospects, and Significance

Challenges

• Indo-US Deal: Liability issues (CLND Act), high costs, and regulatory hurdles delay projects like Kovvada and Jaitapur.

• CTBT: India’s non-signatory status faces global pressure, but strategic needs prevent commitment.

• FMCT: Lack of consensus on stockpiles and verification stalls progress; India’s stockpile concerns persist.

• Geopolitical Tensions: Regional dynamics (China, Pakistan) and global competition (e.g., China’s thorium lead) complicate India’s nuclear diplomacy.

Future Prospects

• Indo-US Deal: Amending CLND and streamlining regulations could unlock US reactor projects and SMR collaborations by 2033.

• CTBT: India may maintain its moratorium but avoid signing unless nuclear powers commit to disarmament timelines.

• FMCT: Progress hinges on resolving stockpile disputes; India could leverage thorium expertise for diplomatic influence.

• Nuclear Expansion: India’s 100 GW target by 2047, supported by thorium and SMRs, aligns with global clean energy trends.

Significance for India

• Energy Security: The Indo-US deal and thorium focus reduce import dependence, supporting India’s 1.4 billion population and 22,480 MW goal by 2032.

• Strategic Autonomy: Non-signatory status to CTBT/FMCT preserves India’s nuclear deterrent and flexibility.

• Global Standing: The NSG waiver and nuclear trade enhance India’s role as a responsible nuclear power, boosting ties with the US, France,

The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal transformed India’s nuclear landscape, enabling access to global markets while recognizing its nuclear status. The CTBT and FMCT, though not adopted by India, shape its non-proliferation stance, balancing security and global expectations. Recent developments, like the US Entity List removal and India’s nuclear budget, signal progress toward energy goals. India’s strategic autonomy, thorium expertise, and diplomatic engagements position it as a key player in global nuclear governance, critical for UPSC aspirants to understand in the context of science, technology, and international relations.