Relevance of Nam In The 'Unipolar' World | UPSC Mains Essay Preparation PDF Download

Relevance of Nam In The 'Unipolar' World

structure

(1) Opening    —    Recent development in the international scene.

    —    From bi-polar to Uni-polar.

(2) Body    —    Historical perspective. 

    —    No Churchils or Nehrus

    —    The policy remain relevant and valid

    —    Relevance of non-alignment.

    —    The US–European dispute.

    —    Democratisation of international relations.

    —    Multilateralism and multilateral institutions.

(3) Closing    —    The revival of the hegemony of one or more suprpowers over the rest of the states is unthinkable.

In view of recent developments in the international scene, students of international relations are faced with the most unexpected and puzzling situation of a so-called "unipolar" world. This situations has manysided implications to international relations, especially for the foreign policies of all nations. One of these is for the continued relevance of the policy of nonalignment for a hundred member states of the non-aligned movement (NAM).

Just because the policy of non-alignment happened to be born in the context of a bipolar world in the late 1940s when the Cold War also originated, many person (academics, journalists and politicians) have tried to relate the policy only to the bipolar context. And when the cold war appeared to be tapering off in the 1970s, with the first wave of detente, some writers started questioning the continuing relevance of the policy. That this was a mistake was realised in the early 1980s. But from 1988 onwards again, the same mistake was committed by some writers with the New Detente between the superpowers. We were told that (especially because the New Detente has had far-reaching implications to the resolution of many situations, conflicts and disputes) in the changed context, non-alignment had no continuing relevance.

This debate was still on going when, somewhat suddenly, the superpower status of the Soviet Union started eroding largely because of certain domestic developments within that country. With the fast deterioration of the superpower status of the Soviet Union since the middle of 

1989, it became demonstrably clear from the way the community of nations and the United Nations dealt with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (and  the Gulf war too), that the world has ceased to be bipolar, but become "unipolar", namely, the unique dominance of the world scene by the United States. Once again, the question is being asked whether or not there is any longer the continuing relevance of nonalignment as a foreign policy choice for as many as over a hundred nations.

The fact of the matter is that the policy of non-alignment was not wholly related to (or originated in, except by coincidence) a bipolar world, and the Cold War between the two superpowers and the blocs they led. It just happened that non-alignment flowered in the immediate post-war world, after a 350 years struggle by the small/weak state against the hegemony of the great power since the birth of the sovereign nation state system in the middle of seventeenth century Europe. Therefore, whatever the world is — bipolar, multipolar or unipolar — non alignment, as a foreign policy option of the small/weak states will remain continuingly relevant or valid. In other words, the policy will last as long as the sovereign nation state system.

In this historical perspective, there would be intermittently a revival periodically, of Cold War detente, entente, almost alternatingly. This is precisely what has happened during the last 350 years of the system of states, although no one though of labelling these periodical developments until the end of the Second World War (1945). Just because there were no Churchills and Nehrus, to label these phenomena of international relations until then, one ought not to ignore or forget that such developments did take place in diplomatic history until the end of the second World War.

In the light of this long historical background, it seems to me pointless for some persons to question today the continuing relevance of the policy of non alignment, which has become integral to the nature and functioning of the sovereign nation-state system. To the time-worn question "non-aligned with whom"?, the answar is simple, "non-alignment" with the hegemony of great powers, whether they are one of the dominant power; one of them has any merit or virtue. May be it becomes more difficult to practise nonalignment in a unipolar world, as in a bipolar or multipolar world, but the policy or stance as such does not cease to be relevant or valid. Only the practising of nonalignment becomes more challenging as it has, in fact, become in the present context, when practically the whole seems to be paralysed in practising independence of policy/action from the unprecedented dominance of world affairs by the United States.

Just because the NAM proved to be important in resolving Gulf crisis, one ought not to have second thoughts on the continuing relevance of non-alignment or the NAM, just as we do not have about the United Nations. The policy and movement remain relevant and valid, despite periodical vagaries in the system of sovereign nation-states for more than three centuries. The traditional foreign policy choices open to the small/weak states (isolationism, neutrality) are no longer available in view of the increasing interdependence of states. And the traditional foreign policy choices of the great powers (imperialism, balance of power, nationalistic universalism) will be resisted today by the overwhelming majority of the states (whether aligned, non-aligned, neutral or no bloc as, for example, Sweden, Ireland) for as long as one can foresee.

All that is likely to happen  is that the 350 years old struggle of the small/weak against the hegemony of the great powers will enter a new phase, in which the presently overwhelming majority of small/weak states (over two-thirds of the 150 plus states) would challenge the lone superpower dominating the community of states. The manoeurability that the former had in a bipolar (or unavailable now, but one can, on the other hand, see that the United States either would not (or would not any longer) have the sort as some persons intermittently suggest, the United States choose to without underplaying US military/economic power, one can emphasise the United States' great interdependence on other nations— particularly the other developed nations, who are most unlikely for long to oblige, or go along with, unilateral, self centred American policies (as for example, the present US-European dispute in the case of the latter's subsidising agricultural products).

As long as the functioning of the sovereign nation-state system is corrupted by power politics— that is, so long as the system operates contrary to the theory of the system, namely, that states are sovereign, independent and equal— the policy of non alignment will remain valid and effective in international relations, irrespective of periodical, marginal changes in the system (as, indeed, it has happend so far). If the policy is rather anaemic today, so is its counterpart, alignment (and the military alliances  that accompany it). The hegemony of one or a few states over the others (that is, the corruption of the system of states) is a periodical aberration that the community of states has to endure for the time being, as indeed it has for over three centuries. As long as some states— and today over two- thirds of them— are trying to function according to the theory of the system and are urging the "democratisation of international relations," so long one can live in hope.

True, presently multilateralism and multilateral institutions are pretty weak, but the community of states has not and will not abandon them. Even with present indications, they will survive and become more effective. They have survived bipolarism, and so will they the present, seeming unipolarism.

After the tremendous progress made in the present century in the development of international law and international organisation, it seems unthinkable that they would permit the revival of the hegemony of one or more superpowers over the rest of the states. "Democratisation of international relations" is the need of the hour, and nothing (even the transient unipolarism) cannot prevent it. 

1989, it became demonstrably clear from the way the community of nations and the United Nations dealt with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait (and  the Gulf war too), that the world has ceased to be bipolar, but become "unipolar", namely, the unique dominance of the world scene by the United States. Once again, the question is being asked whether or not there is any longer the continuing relevance of nonalignment as a foreign policy choice for as many as over a hundred nations.

The fact of the matter is that the policy of non-alignment was not wholly related to (or originated in, except by coincidence) a bipolar world, and the Cold War between the two superpowers and the blocs they led. It just happened that non-alignment flowered in the immediate post-war world, after a 350 years struggle by the small/weak state against the hegemony of the great power since the birth of the sovereign nation state system in the middle of seventeenth century Europe. Therefore, whatever the world is — bipolar, multipolar or unipolar — non alignment, as a foreign policy option of the small/weak states will remain continuingly relevant or valid. In other words, the policy will last as long as the sovereign nation state system.

In this historical perspective, there would be intermittently a revival periodically, of Cold War detente, entente, almost alternatingly. This is precisely what has happened during the last 350 years of the system of states, although no one though of labelling these periodical developments until the end of the Second World War (1945). Just because there were no Churchills and Nehrus, to label these phenomena of international relations until then, one ought not to ignore or forget that such developments did take place in diplomatic history until the end of the second World War.

In the light of this long historical background, it seems to me pointless for some persons to question today the continuing relevance of the policy of non alignment, which has become integral to the nature and functioning of the sovereign nation-state system. To the time-worn question "non-aligned with whom"?, the answar is simple, "non-alignment" with the hegemony of great powers, whether they are one of the dominant power; one of them has any merit or virtue. May be it becomes more difficult to practise nonalignment in a unipolar world, as in a bipolar or multipolar world, but the policy or stance as such does not cease to be relevant or valid. Only the practising of nonalignment becomes more challenging as it has, in fact, become in the present context, when practically the whole seems to be paralysed in practising independence of policy/action from the unprecedented dominance of world affairs by the United States.

Just because the NAM proved to be important in resolving Gulf crisis, one ought not to have second thoughts on the continuing relevance of non-alignment or the NAM, just as we do not have about the United Nations. The policy and movement remain relevant and valid, despite periodical vagaries in the system of sovereign nation-states for more than three centuries. The traditional foreign policy choices open to the small/weak states (isolationism, neutrality) are no longer available in view of the increasing interdependence of states. And the traditional foreign policy choices of the great powers (imperialism, balance of power, nationalistic universalism) will be resisted today by the overwhelming majority of the states (whether aligned, non-aligned, neutral or no bloc as, for example, Sweden, Ireland) for as long as one can foresee.

All that is likely to happen  is that the 350 years old struggle of the small/weak against the hegemony of the great powers will enter a new phase, in which the presently overwhelming majority of small/weak states (over two-thirds of the 150 plus states) would challenge the lone superpower dominating the community of states. The manoeurability that the former had in a bipolar (or unavailable now, but one can, on the other hand, see that the United States either would not (or would not any longer) have the sort as some persons intermittently suggest, the United States choose to without underplaying US military/economic power, one can emphasise the United States' great interdependence on other nations— particularly the other developed nations, who are most unlikely for long to oblige, or go along with, unilateral, self centred American policies (as for example, the present US-European dispute in the case of the latter's subsidising agricultural products).

As long as the functioning of the sovereign nation-state system is corrupted by power politics— that is, so long as the system operates contrary to the theory of the system, namely, that states are sovereign, independent and equal— the policy of non alignment will remain valid and effective in international relations, irrespective of periodical, marginal changes in the system (as, indeed, it has happend so far). If the policy is rather anaemic today, so is its counterpart, alignment (and the military alliances  that accompany it). The hegemony of one or a few states over the others (that is, the corruption of the system of states) is a periodical aberration that the community of states has to endure for the time being, as indeed it has for over three centuries. As long as some states— and today over two- thirds of them— are trying to function according to the theory of the system and are urging the "democratisation of international relations," so long one can live in hope.

True, presently multilateralism and multilateral institutions are pretty weak, but the community of states has not and will not abandon them. Even with present indications, they will survive and become more effective. They have survived bipolarism, and so will they the present, seeming unipolarism.

After the tremendous progress made in the present century in the development of international law and international organisation, it seems unthinkable that they would permit the revival of the hegemony of one or more superpowers over the rest of the states. "Democratisation of international relations" is the need of the hour, and nothing (even the transient unipolarism) cannot prevent it.