The Hindu Editorial Analysis- 28th July 2025 | Current Affairs & Hindu Analysis: Daily, Weekly & Monthly - UPSC PDF Download

Protection Against Misuse

Why in News?

Punishing consensual adolescent sex goes against the true purpose of the POCSO Act.

Introduction

The POCSO Act, 2012 was enacted to protect children from sexual offences. However, there are concerns about its misuse in cases involving consensual relationships among teenagers. Legal experts and courts are calling for reforms to strike a balance between child protection and the rights of adolescents, particularly when it comes to consensual sexual activities between teenagers aged 16 to 18.

Key Objective of the POCSO Act, 2012

• The primary objective of the POCSO Act is to safeguard children from sexual offences.
• Children under 18 are considered minors, and any sexual act involving them is deemed an offence, regardless of consent.

Calls for Reform: Concerns About Criminalising Teen Relationships

• Courts and child rights activists are concerned that adolescents aged 15 to 18 in consensual relationships are facing unfair legal consequences.
• Many cases involve voluntary romantic relationships rather than abuse, highlighting the need to differentiate between exploitation and typical adolescent behaviour.

Indira Jaising’s Submission to the Supreme Court

Senior advocate Indira Jaising, acting as amicus curiae, supported legal changes regarding consensual adolescent relationships.

• She argued that consensual sex between teenagers aged 16 to 18 should not be criminalised.
• Jaising challenged the legal age of consent, suggesting that 16 is a common age for sexual maturity.
• She proposed amendments to the POCSO Act and Section 63 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

Risk of Misuse and Need for Balance

• Jaising emphasised that allowing exceptions for consensual adolescent sex would prevent misuse of the law, protect genuine victims, and preserve the Act's protective intent.

Law Commission’s 2023 Stand

• The Law Commission opposed lowering the age of consent.
• It recommended judicial discretion in cases involving consensual relationships among 16 to 18-year-olds.

Relevant Legal Provisions

• Under the POCSO Act, Indian Penal Code, and BNS, any sexual act with a person under 18 is punishable, even with their consent.
• Section 2(d) of POCSO legally defines anyone below 18 as a child, rendering their consent invalid.

High Court’s Suggestion: Narrowing the Gap

In 2021, the Madras High Court ( Vijayalakshmi vs State Rep. recommended that in consensual relationships, the age gap should be less than five years.

• This suggestion aims to protect younger adolescents from potential exploitation by older individuals.

Way Forward: Education Over Criminalisation

• There is a pressing need to educate adolescents about the legal implications of engaging in sexual activities.
• Criminalising typical teenage behaviour does not effectively address the issue of real abuse.
• The focus should remain on preventing exploitation rather than punishing consensual relationships among young people.

Conclusion

• To genuinely protect children, it is crucial for the law to differentiate between cases of abuse and consensual behaviour among adolescents.
• Implementing strict regulations without considering the context can harm young individuals involved in mutual relationships.
• Through legal reforms, judicial discretion, and educational initiatives, India can ensure child safety while respecting the evolving maturity and rights of adolescents in contemporary society.

Understanding Russia’s Taliban Gauntlet

Why is it News?

The rationale behind Russia's decision to legitimize the Taliban remains puzzling and raises questions.

Introduction

On July 3, 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry officially recognised the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), marking the peak of Russia’s gradual diplomatic engagement with the Taliban. This move came shortly after Russia agreed to upgrade bilateral ties and formally accredited Gul Hassan as the Taliban’s ambassador to Moscow. With the IEA flag now flying over the Afghan Embassy in the Russian capital, many are questioning the strategic motivations behind Russia’s decision to legitimise the Taliban regime.

A Shift in Stance after Two Decades

1996–2001: Taliban's First Rule (IEA 1.0)

• During the Taliban’s initial rise to power, Russia adopted a strongly hostile stance.
• It refused to recognize the Taliban government and withdrew its embassy in 1997.
• Instead, Russia extended military support to the Northern Alliance, the principal anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan.
• It also helped its Central Asian allies in fortifying their borders against the Taliban’s influence.
• Overall, the Taliban were perceived as a threat to Russian regional interests, prompting Russia to back anti-Taliban coalitions in the region.

2000: Chechnya Conflict

• Tensions escalated when the Taliban recognized the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and called for jihad against Russia over the Chechnya issue.
• It was estimated that around 2,500Chechen fighters received training in Afghanistan.
• This development severely strained diplomatic ties and led Moscow to consider “preventive strikes” in the region.
• The Taliban were now viewed not just as a regional nuisance, but a direct threat to Russian national security.

Post-9/11 (2001–2003)

• Following the September 11 attacks, Russia aligned with the United States and supported UN sanctions against the Taliban.
• It also backed Operation Enduring Freedom and officially designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization in 2003.
• This marked Russia’s entry into the global war on terror and opened a phase of cooperation with the U.S. to suppress Taliban influence in the region.

Early 2010s: Shift in Strategy

• By the early 2010s, Russia’s strategy began to shift from confrontation to pragmatism.
• While not officially recognizing the Taliban, it opened unofficial channels of communication with them.
• Moscow also enhanced its ties with Pakistan and focused more on countering the Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K) and combating narcotics trafficking.
• The Taliban were no longer seen as the sole threat, and the protection of Russian citizens in the region became a priority.

2010s–2020: Diplomatic Balancing

• Russia started positioning itself as a key diplomatic player in the Afghan peace process.
• It balanced its outreach between the Afghan government and the Taliban, hosting the "Moscow Format" and supporting intra-Afghan dialogue.
• Despite the Taliban being under UN sanctions, Russia invited them to participate in these talks, aiming to boost its regional influence and potentially sideline the U.S. from key negotiations.

2021: Taliban Takeover (IEA 2.0)

• When the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Russia chose to maintain its embassy in Kabul, signaling continuity in diplomatic engagement.
• Moscow expressed cautious confidence in the Taliban’s ability to govern and continued its interactions with the regime, setting itself apart as one of the few countries to preserve formal relations after the regime change.

2022–2024: Growing Security Risks

• Despite ongoing engagement, serious concerns emerged as IS-K carried out attacks on Russian interests—most notably the bombing of Russia’s Kabul Embassy in 2022 and the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow in 2024.
• These incidents intensified Moscow’s criticism of the Taliban’s failure to curb terrorism.
• Additionally, anticipated economic benefits from engagement with Afghanistan never materialized, and the broader relationship began to appear more costly than fruitful.
• Nonetheless, Afghanistan remained on Russia’s radar as a potential trade corridor, though uncertainty persisted.

Russia’s Recognition of the Taliban

Russia’s decision to recognise the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) reflects its belief that the Taliban are the only stable force in control of Afghanistan. Moscow sees the Taliban as partners in fighting terrorism, especially against groups like IS-K. This perception led to the suspension of the ban on Taliban activities in April 2025.

Legal and Security Concerns

• Despite the recognition, the Russian Supreme Court only suspended, not fully removed, the ban on the Taliban.
• The Taliban are still listed as a terrorist group in Russia’s unified federal register.
• This indicates that Russia’s security establishment remains cautious, and the decision could be reversed if Taliban cooperation fails.

Limited Immediate Gains for Russia

• The recognition is mostly symbolic, offering no immediate benefits to Russia in Afghanistan.
• Moscow’s influence in the region may not increase as a result of this move.
• While some Russian officials discuss arming the Taliban, it is uncertain how far Russia is willing to go in this partnership.

Regional Implications and Future Risks

• Russia’s move may encourage other countries, such as China and Central Asian states, to recognise the Taliban as well.
• The Taliban are likely to demand more from their partners now that a major power has officially recognised them.
• Russia’s lenient stance on the Taliban’s policies regarding inclusivity, women, and minority rights could set a pragmatic example for other countries in the region.

Conclusion

 India is not expected to be significantly affected by Russia’s recent recognition of the Taliban. New Delhi has been gradually enhancing its diplomatic engagement with the Taliban, primarily due to shared concerns over terrorism in Kashmir. India is likely to continue dialogue, trade, and humanitarian assistance with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) while withholding formal recognition. This approach of engagement without official recognition remains central to India’s Afghanistan policy.