
Revisit digital search powers under the I-T Bill 2025
Why in News?
Recently, the Finance Minister proposed in Parliament to amend the Income Tax Act, allowing tax officials to access a person’s “virtual digital space” during search and seizure operations. This proposal has raised significant concerns about privacy, government overreach, and constant monitoring.
Introduction
The Finance Minister recently proposed in Parliament, as part of the Income-Tax Bill, 2025, to grant tax officials access to a person’s “virtual digital space” during search and seizure operations. The rationale behind this proposal is the shift of financial activities to the online realm, necessitating a corresponding digital approach for tax enforcement. However, this perspective overlooks the profound implications of such a move, raising serious concerns about privacy, excessive authority, and continuous surveillance.
Current Law vs Proposed Changes
Blurring Boundaries
Aspect | Current Law (Income-Tax Act, 1961) | Proposed Changes (Income-Tax Bill, 2025) | Concerns Raised |
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Scope of Search | Allows search and seizure under Section 132, but only in physical spaces like houses, offices, and lockers. | Extends powers to cover a person’s "virtual digital space" such as emails, cloud storage, and social media accounts. | Privacy risks increase due to access to vast and often unrelated digital content. |
Basis of Search | Search must be linked to suspected undisclosed income or assets, found in physical places. | This clear link is weakened; digital spaces are broader and not always related to financial wrongdoing. | Raises questions of overreach and lack of clear purpose in digital access. |
Definition of Digital Space | Not applicable. | Includes emails, cloud drives, apps, social media, and “any other similar space” – a vague and open-ended term. | The broad definition creates a risk of misuse or undefined limits. |
Stakeholders Affected | Searches affect only the individual under investigation. | Digital data may include others’ information – friends, family, clients, or professional contacts. | Could lead to unintended privacy breaches for unrelated people. |
Authority Powers | Access was limited to physical keys and locations. | Tax officers can now override passwords or access codes to enter devices or online accounts. | It’s unclear how this will work, especially with encrypted platforms like WhatsApp. |
Impact on Professionals | Professionals like journalists were not directly targeted in searches. | Sensitive data like unpublished stories, confidential sources, or private communication could be exposed. | May threaten journalistic freedom and professional confidentiality. |
Legal Safeguards | Courts require clear evidence, and the term “reason to believe” demands substantial material. | No additional safeguards provided in the Bill for digital searches. | Violates the principle that search and seizure is a serious breach of privacy. |
Judicial View | Supreme Court treats privacy as fundamental and insists on strict application of search powers. | In 2023, SC issued interim guidelines on digital seizures and asked the government to create proper protocols. | The Bill may ignore these directions, increasing the risk of legal conflict. |
Gaps in the Proposed Provision (Income-Tax Bill, 2025)
- The proposed law lacks judicial oversight, clear limits, and protective safeguards.
- It shows a poor understanding of the depth and sensitive nature of digital data.
- Electronic devices today store layered personal, professional, and confidential content, which the law fails to account for.
- The provision prohibits disclosure of the “reason to believe,” directly going against principles of transparency and accountability.
- It may lead to unchecked intrusion by authorities without any external scrutiny or procedural balance.
Global Best Practices in Digital Search & Privacy
Canada: Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects against “unreasonable search or seizure” and requires:
- Prior authorisation
- Approval by a neutral judicial authority
- Reasonable and probable grounds for search
United States:
- The Taxpayer Bill of Rights ensures all enforcement actions are lawful and not overly intrusive.
- The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Riley vs California mandates a warrant before accessing digital data due to its deeply personal nature.
These standards highlight the need for statutory protections, due process, and proportional enforcement—something the Indian proposal currently does not reflect.
Key Issues with India’s Proposed Income Tax Provision
- The proposed law allows broad access to a person’s digital personal data.
- There is no need for a warrant, no relevance filter, and no separation between financial and non-financial data.
- This approach risks violating individual privacy by treating all digital content as fair game.
- It lacks judicial checks and offers no protective safeguards to prevent misuse.
Violation of Supreme Court’s Privacy Standards
In the landmark case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) vs Union of India, the Supreme Court laid down a four-part test for privacy restrictions:
- The action must pursue a legitimate aim.
- It must be necessary to achieve that aim.
- It must use the least intrusive method possible.
- It must satisfy the principle of proportionality.
The new tax proposal fails this test, as it allows unfettered access to personal digital data without judicial oversight and does not use the least intrusive means.
Way Forward
The way forward is not to reject digital enforcement but to ensure it is grounded in the principles of proportionality, legality, and transparency. As India moves towards a more digitised tax framework, it is essential that individual privacy is not sacrificed in the name of regulatory control. Surveillance without clear checks and accountability does not strengthen governance—it leads to overreach and potential misuse of power.
Conclusion
There is still room for correction. The Select Committee currently examining the Bill has the opportunity to address these concerns meaningfully. It can do so by narrowing the definition of ‘virtual digital space’, ensuring that judicial warrants are required before access is granted, and by making it mandatory to state clear reasons for such digital intrusion. Just as importantly, there must be a proper redress system for individuals whose rights are violated. In a democracy, strengthening enforcement should never come at the cost of fundamental freedoms.
A year later — colonial-era laws to new criminal codes
Why in News?
Technology has been beneficial, but obtaining feedback from investigating officers (IOs) is crucial because they play a vital role in effectively utilizing these tools.
Introduction
Nearly a year has passed since the implementation of three new criminal laws, replacing the old British-era regulations. The central government introduced the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) to replace the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Indian Evidence Act, respectively.
- Policemen are gradually becoming accustomed to the new laws and their provisions.
- The majority of First Information Reports (FIRs) are now being registered through the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), which is a crucial component of the Inter-operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS).
- Ensuring a smooth transition from the old laws to the new ones is vital, particularly at the police station level.
- Zero FIRs are now being directed to the appropriate police stations within the same State via the CCTNS, a feat credited to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
- A significant advancement in policing is the launch of the 'e-Sakshya' mobile app, designed to facilitate real-time evidence collection and storage.
- Developed by the National Informatics Centre (NIC) in collaboration with the MHA, the app is part of the NIC's broader responsibility for managing the ICJS, which connects various components of the criminal justice system, including police, forensic labs, prosecution, jails, and courts.
- While the transition to the new laws is primarily a technical process, the 'e-Sakshya' app is making a tangible difference in daily policing activities.
- Feedback from investigating officers (IOs) is crucial as they lead the implementation of the new laws and their input is valuable for further improvements.
Mandatory recording of pictures and videos
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) requires investigating officers (IOs) to record specific procedures using audio-video tools, making it mandatory in certain cases while optional in others. The ‘e-Sakshya’ app aligns with six critical provisions of the BNSS, facilitating the following:
- Section 105: Recording search and seizure through audio-video means.
- Section 185: Documenting search procedures conducted by police officers.
- Section 176: Videography of crime scenes to capture crucial evidence.
- Section 173: Recording witness statements for accurate and reliable testimonies.
- Section 180: Another provision for recording witness statements to ensure comprehensive documentation.
- Section 497: Managing custody and disposal of property during trials.
Although trials under the new Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for serious offenses are ongoing, IOs are finding the ‘e-Sakshya’ app beneficial in their work. The app enables them to capture photos and videos on-site, complete with geo-coordinates and time stamps, enhancing transparency in the process. This development fosters greater public trust in the procedures involved in search and seizure operations.
- Video Recording of Witnesses: Capturing witnesses on video at the crime scene prevents later denials of their presence and ensures the integrity of their statements.
- Selfie Feature for Accountability: The app's 'selfie' feature enhances accountability by preventing IOs from informally delegating investigation tasks to subordinates, thereby maintaining the quality of investigations.
- Forensic Expert Requirement: Section 176 of the BNSS mandates the presence of a forensic expert at the crime scene, improving the standards of evidence collection.
- Police Dogs for Tracking: The use of police dogs at crime scenes aids in tracking suspects and gathering additional evidence.
- Strengthening Forensic Infrastructure: The establishment of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) and a National Forensic Science University (NFSU) in Raipur, Chhattisgarh, as announced by Union Home Minister Amit Shah, will further bolster the forensic capabilities of the police.
Pending Challenges in Implementation
- Improvement in ‘e-Sakshya’ Usage: There is a need for better utilization of the ‘e-Sakshya’ app in investigations.
- Evidence Storage Access: Currently, photos and videos captured through the app are stored in Sakshya Lockers on the National Government Cloud (NGC), but courts do not have direct access to this evidence via the Inter-operable Criminal Justice System (ICJS).
- Data Submission Process: Investigating Officers (IOs) often duplicate data by copying it through CCTNS and submitting it using external devices like pen drives, along with the final case report. This leads to extra work and costs for storage devices.
Device & Access Issues
- Personal Devices for Evidence Collection: Many Investigating Officers (IOs) are still using their personal mobile phones to capture evidence, which is not ideal for official work.
- Need for New Android Phones: IOs without compatible Android phones (Version 10 or higher) had to acquire new devices, as the ‘e-Sakshya’ app requires at least 1 GB of storage space.
- Insufficient Tablets in Police Stations: Some police stations have only received a single tablet for use, which is inadequate given that multiple IOs operate from each station.
Functionality Limits in the App
- Video Duration and Quantity: Each video can be recorded for a maximum of 4 minutes, but there is no limit on the total number of videos that can be captured.
- Media Management with FIRs: If an FIR is linked, poor-quality images or videos cannot be deleted or re-recorded. Conversely, if an FIR is not linked, media can be deleted and re-captured, but only five Sakshya IDs (SIDs) can be generated offline.
- Offline Data Upload: In offline mode, data must be uploaded once the device is within network range to free up space for new evidence.
Reluctance of the Accused & Practical Difficulties
- Accused Persons' Hesitation: Accused individuals often show reluctance to be recorded when indicating locations where weapons or drugs are concealed. This reluctance poses practical challenges during investigations.
- Impact of ‘e-Sakshya’: Despite the hesitation of accused persons, the ‘e-Sakshya’ app is proving to be a transformative tool in enhancing the quality of investigations and contributing to stronger convictions. The app's features and functionalities are making a significant difference in the investigative process.
Legal Safeguards and Technical Gaps
- Hash Value and Certificate Generation: The app generates a hash value using SHA256 and a certificate to validate secondary electronic evidence, ensuring the integrity of the evidence collected.
- Expert Opinion for Cybercrime Cases: In cybercrime cases, an expert opinion is necessary for handling electronic seizures, highlighting the need for specialized knowledge in these situations.
- Notification of State Forensic Labs: Some State Forensic Labs, such as the one in Chhattisgarh, are yet to be notified under the IT Act, which is causing delays in the establishment of cyber forensic labs. This delay impacts the timely processing of cybercrime cases.
Ambiguities in Registration of Offences
- Cognisable Offences and Theft Threshold: Under Section 303(1) of the BNS, the threshold for treating thefts as cognisable offences is unclear, leading to inconsistencies in registration practices.
- Registration of Petty Organised Crimes: Petty organised crimes, such as gambling, are being registered under Section 112, despite the vague and open-ended nature of the definition, creating ambiguity in offence registration.
Use of Technology for Evidence and Medical Reports
- Video Conferencing for Evidence and Witness Examination: Section 530 of BNSS permits evidence and witness examination, including Investigating Officers (IOs), through video conferencing. However, this practice is not yet widely adopted in investigations.
- Medical Exam Reports for Rape Survivors: IOs appreciate the seven-day deadline for obtaining medical exam reports for rape survivors under Section 184 of BNSS. This timeframe is seen as beneficial for the timely handling of such sensitive cases.
- Delays in Post-Mortem Reports: Despite the positive aspects of the seven-day deadline for medical exam reports, IOs still encounter delays in receiving post-mortem reports, which can hinder the progress of investigations.
- MedLEaPR System Testing in Chhattisgarh: The MedLEaPR system, developed by NIC Haryana, is currently being tested in Chhattisgarh. This system aims to facilitate faster digital transmission of medical and post-mortem reports to the police via CCTNS, improving the efficiency of report delivery.
Conclusion
- With all States and Union Territories now implementing the new laws, it is crucial to gather feedback to assess their usability and address any challenges faced by Investigating Officers (IOs) and legal issues in courts.
- Increased Funding and Support: There is a need for enhanced funding and support for forensics and technology to ensure that IOs are not reliant on personal devices for work and that every district is equipped with its own mobile forensic lab unit.
- Continuous Improvement: Ongoing improvements in forensic and technological capabilities will contribute to the effectiveness of the new laws and the efficiency of the criminal justice system.