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Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? for CAT 2024 is part of CAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CAT exam syllabus. Information about Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?.

Solutions for Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CAT Exam by signing up for free.

Here you can find the meaning of Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Read the following passage and answer the questions associated with each of them.Pieces of behavior, beliefs, arguments, policies, and other exercises of the human mind may all be described as rational. To accept something as rational is to accept it as making sense, as appropriate, or required, or in accordance with some acknowledged goal, such as aiming at truth or aiming at the good.The contrast between "rational coherence" and "reason", might be questioned. In principle, the answer to this question might perfectly coincide: that what agents have reason, or ought, to do just is what it would be rationally coherent for them to do, and vice versa. In several ways, however, the answers might be expected to diverge.First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one's responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one's responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, liven what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires. Suppose that the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health. Nevertheless, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means. By Subjective Desire-Based Theory Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up. If he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he achieves a kind local coherence.Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more "objective." What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent's circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent's circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory-agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole. Suppose the agent's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends. However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol. So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it. But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.Third, one might hold not a Desire-Based Theory, but a Value-Based Theory-whatever ultimate ends an agent has reason, or ought, to achieve depend not on what she desires or wills, but instead on what is of independent value. Suppose the madman's strongest, present intrinsic desire is to set off a nuclear war, and he so intends. Moreover, the madman knows that intending to press this button is a necessary and sufficient means to setting off a nuclear war. In intending to press this button, the madman would achieve a kind of coherence, both local and global. By Desire-Based Theories, the madman ought so to intend. By Value-Based Theory, this is not the case.There are several reasons to expect at least some divergence between what one has reason, or ought, to do or intend, and what it would be rationality coherent for one to do or intend. But that is perfectly compatible with partial convergence. Among the things that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is precisely to make their responses rationally coherent. Just as we ought not to torture, or ought to care for our children, we ought to be rationally coherent.Q. What according to the author is the relation between rational coherence and reason?a)Coherentb)Divergentc)Non-existentd)None of theseCorrect answer is option 'D'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CAT tests.