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Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.
While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.
 More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.
First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.
Q. Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?
  • a)
    China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.
  • b)
    China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.
  • c)
    China holds a 30% stake in Pakistan's government.
  • d)
    China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.
Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
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Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions ...
The passage posits that China is unlikely to assume a substantial share of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan. Option A is deemed irrelevant as it fails to furnish any substantiating evidence for this assertion. Likewise, Option B is also inconsequential as it merely underscores China's investments in Pakistan, without addressing its willingness to bear a significant part of the debt restructuring load. Conversely, Option C buttresses the argument by highlighting China's substantial stake in Pakistan's government, rendering it susceptible to the repercussions of the debt crisis. Conversely, Option D runs counter to the passage's argument by suggesting that China is inclined to assist Pakistan, a viewpoint incongruent with the passage's position.
Hence, option C is the correct answer.
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Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions ...
Understanding China's Position on Debt Restructuring
The argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan is strengthened by the information that "China holds a 30% stake in Pakistan's government." Here’s why this is significant:
1. Influence and Leverage
- Holding a significant stake in the government gives China considerable influence over Pakistan's political and economic decisions.
- This influence suggests that China would be more protective of its investments and interests, making it less likely to absorb major losses during debt restructuring.
2. Risk Mitigation
- A 30% stake indicates that China has considerable financial exposure.
- China may prioritize its own economic stability and would likely resist taking on further risks that could jeopardize its investments in Pakistan.
3. Expectation of Reciprocity
- With such a stake, China may expect reciprocation from Pakistan in negotiations, particularly regarding financial burdens.
- This creates an environment where China would push back against being disproportionately affected by debt restructuring terms.
Conclusion
- While other factors, such as China being a dominant lender or its willingness to absorb some losses, are relevant, the 30% stake underscores China's vested interest in maintaining a favorable and stable financial environment in Pakistan.
- Hence, this information strongly supports the argument that China is unlikely to shoulder a significant burden in debt restructuring.
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Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.What is the most probable consequence of Chinas increasing portion of Pakistans external debt?

Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.What fundamental assumption about Chinas financial assistance to Pakistan is implied in the passage?

Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.What does the passage suggest about the IMFs approach to pressuring the government in Pakistan?

Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.What is the main reason for the rise in Chinas share of Pakistans external debt from 7.8% in 2014 to 19.2% in 2021?

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Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?
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Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? for CLAT 2024 is part of CLAT preparation. The Question and answers have been prepared according to the CLAT exam syllabus. Information about Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? covers all topics & solutions for CLAT 2024 Exam. Find important definitions, questions, meanings, examples, exercises and tests below for Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?.
Solutions for Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? in English & in Hindi are available as part of our courses for CLAT. Download more important topics, notes, lectures and mock test series for CLAT Exam by signing up for free.
Here you can find the meaning of Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? defined & explained in the simplest way possible. Besides giving the explanation of Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer?, a detailed solution for Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? has been provided alongside types of Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? theory, EduRev gives you an ample number of questions to practice Direction: Kindly read the passage carefully and answer the questions given below.While Pakistan is beset by multiple crises on the political, social and economic fronts, media attention is focused on the debt crisis and analysts are preoccupied with the question whether the IMF would soon release a last tranche of $1.1 billion out of a $6.5 billion loan programme sanctioned in July 2019 and subsequently extended and enhanced. That tranche is presented as a prerequisite for a resolution of the debt crisis facing the country. The government in Pakistan, beleaguered by multiple crises, also seems convinced by this argument and is struggling to meet conditions that have been set by the multilateral institution for release of the sum.More recently, as the US lost confidence and interest in its operations in the region and reduced lending to Pakistan, China entered the picture. Its strategic interests made Pakistan an important ally, leading to provision of large funds, including to projects that were part of the Belt and Road initiative. As a result, while the share of bilateral loans in Pakistan’s outstanding external debt remained stagnant around 28 per cent between 2014 and 2021, the share of the Paris Club creditors declined because of “aid fatigue”, whereas that of China rose sharply (from 7.8 per cent of outstanding eternal debt in 2014 to 19.2 per cent in 2021). With lending by China directed mainly to the government, China’s share in government is 30 per cent. If the burden of debt restructuring is to fall largely on bilateral creditors, then China would have to shoulder a very large proportion of that burden and suffer the most losses. This is not likely to be acceptable to China, for three reasons.First, although it has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade, it cannot be held solely responsible for the weaknesses that have pushed Pakistan to a situation where it is on the verge of default. Second, while China may be willing to take a hit to help Pakistan, it does not see why it must take most of the haircut, while multilaterals like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank go scot-free. And, finally, even to the extent that it does take a cut, it does not see why it should allow the magnitude and nature of the cut to be determined in a negotiation led by the IMF and the governments that dominate it. Given all this, it is unlikely that the IMF with its small one billion plus contribution would be able to force an early resolution. Despite this, the IMF is choosing to use that argument to pressure the government in Pakistan into adopting policies that would only worsen rather than alleviate its problems.Q.Which of the following pieces of information would further bolster the argument that China is unlikely to bear a substantial portion of the debt restructuring burden in Pakistan?a)China has been a dominant bilateral lender to Pakistan over the last decade.b)China has invested in significant projects in Pakistan as part of the Belt and Road initiative.c)China holds a 30% stake in Pakistans government.d)China is open to absorbing some financial losses to assist Pakistan.Correct answer is option 'C'. Can you explain this answer? tests, examples and also practice CLAT tests.
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