Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean Region - 1 | UPSC Mains: International Relations PDF Download

New Maritime Security Challenges in the Indian Ocean: Shared Concerns And Opportunities From Bangladesh Perspective

3 May 2021 

“Within a few generations, the world’s oceans will no longer be coloured blue. Instead, they will have been claimed by nation states and will be identified on maps according to the shades of the countries that own them”. – Alexis Dudden, Financial Times.

Setting the Context:

• The South Asian security discourse often overlooked the evolving role of the Indian Ocean in setting the future courses of international relations, trade, and security. This is a water mass bounded on the west by East Africa, on the north by the Indian subcontinent, on the east by Indochina and Australia, and on the south by the Southern Ocean off the coast of Antarctica. The Indian Ocean is the world’s third-largest ocean and constitutes about 20 per cent of the water on the Earth’s surface. The political and security dynamics in four regions – the Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Africa are linked with the politics of the Indian Ocean and craft interdependent economies and interactive strategic processes within regional systems. Hence, the ocean has intrinsic impacts on domestic politics, foreign policy behavior, and significant outside powers’ role in Asian countries.
• The South Asian countries [in that matter the Indian Ocean countries too], for their energy supply, depends on the maritime supply routes in the Indian Ocean. This is a region where the US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Chinese-led Belt Road Initiative, and the Maritime Silk Route converges and diverges, paving ways for these two countries to exercise absolute strategic advantages over one another. The geopolitics of the energy supply route dominates the energy security complex across the regions. As Kaplan (2014) mentioned: “Geopolitics is the battle for space and power played out in a geographical setting. Just as there are military geopolitics, diplomatic geopolitics and economic geopolitics, there is also energy geopolitics. For natural resources and the trade routes that bring those resources to consumers is central to the study of geography” (Kaplan, 2014). The control over the energy supply routes and the transit states are now at the core of the IPS and BRI agenda. Bangladesh and India’s dependency on the U.S., Europe, China, central, and the Middle East for energy and mercantile supply and routes will continue to be static for the foreseeable future. Hence, a peaceful and stable Indian Ocean is of paramount importance for both countries for their economic futures. However, the ocean comes with strategic impetus too.
• Although the economic and political views toward the Indian Ocean vary, its critical strategic importance linking the global power game has begun over the past two decades. Moreover, it is growing at an astronomical pace. Transiting from “sea amnesia” to “sea cognizance” among the political thinkers is gaining prominence. While the countries are increasingly becoming aware of the strategic equations, the Indian Ocean has become a theatre of nontraditional security challenges. This, too, is linked with the moral, ethical, and legal governance of the region that would require regional solutions and commitments beyond strategic thinking. The role of non-state actors and environmental threats pose high stake threats to the IOR countries, and no single country can act as a net security provider for the IORA region. These two variables can potentially stifle the movement of more than half of the world’s container traffic and one-third of all maritime traffic from between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
• To understand the scale of importance, one can look into China’s “Malacca Dilemma,” which exposes China’s vulnerability to access to the greater Indo-Pacific. Chinese access to Indo-Pacific is mainly limited to one main pass. Its ships have to travel over the South China Sea to reach that pass, which is a mess of overlapping territorial claims from countries in the region (Mullen & Poplin, 2015). Beijing lays claim to almost the entire South China Sea by virtue of what is known as the nine-dash line (Pilling, 2014).
• Interestingly, the Indian Ocean is governed through a number of ratifications of maritime agreements. Besides, regional organizations like BIMSTEC and ASEAN are placing increasing policy attention on maritime issues, and where the need exists, ad hoc cooperative structures are emerging, such as the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement (TCA) between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the  Philippines to combat maritime security threats in the Sulu-Celebes seas (Benson, 2020). In South Asia, Bangladesh resolved its maritime boundary disputes with India and Myanmar through ITLOS and UNCLOS (Rosen & Jackson, 2017). The maritime territorial disputes are a much larger concern in Southeast Asia, where a plethora of disputes in the South China Sea and between states in archipelagic Southeast Asia can undermine the region’s progress toward cooperation on maritime issues (Benson, 2020).
• Meanwhile, the IORA countries such as Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand have joined the 15-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership  which accounts for about 30% of the world’s population (2.2 billion people) and 30% of global GDP ($26.2 trillion) as of 2020, making it the biggest trade bloc in history (Nikkei Asia, 2020). The RCEP denotes a greate economic collaboration among ASEAN and its five major trading partners including China. On the other hand, intra-regional trade in South Asia accounts for approximately 5 percent of South Asia’s total trade whereas intraregional trade accounts for 25 per cent in the ASEAN region. The World Bank noted, “trade among South Asian countries currently totals just $23 billion — far below an estimated value of at least $67 billion” (World Bank, 2021). This poor intraregional trade denotes lack of cooperation among the geographically natural markets and exposes historical mistrusts and threat perceptions. As a result, IOR countries offer mixed responses to cooperation and approaches to collective security based on economic and security priorities.
• Henceforth, the purpose of this article is to review the geopolitical and geoeconomic interfaces of the Indian Ocean through the prisms of traditional and nontraditional threats. Perhaps, this article argues that over securitization of the Indian Ocean can stifle the process of developing a common agenda to govern the ocean, and the management of the Indian Ocean has to be seen through the prisms of “sea welfare” and not “sea contro”. The challenges to this ocean are evolving with the pace of human growth, the market economy, and climate change leading to volatilities. Paradoxically, the ocean is also a source of combined economic and strategic interdependence that the political actors often overlook.

The Complex Interplay between Geostrategy and Geoeconomics:

• The Indian ocean comes with a mix of geostrategic interests and geoeconomic realities. In terms of sea-politics, BRI project such as the Gwadar Port, warm water and deep seaport of Pakistan, is situated at the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz 2/3 world oil reserves. The port holds significant strategic and economic importance for both China and Pakistan as it is located at a cross-junction of international sea shipping and oil trade routes. It means that the port is linked with the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) originating from the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Hence, the Gwadar will control the oil sea routes and trade links among regions such as South Asia, Africa, Central Asia, Gulf, and Middle East (Hellenic Shipping Line, 2019). It will provide strategic leverage to Pakistan vis-à-vis India, as the port is far from Indian reach as compared to the other two Pakistani ports. In case of tensions over the Strait of Malacca, Gwadar would provide an alternate sea route. Gwadar can act as an alternative route to the Indian Ocean or South China Sea routes. On the other hand, the India-Iran infrastructure collaboration has given greater strategic importance to Chahbahar as a parallel alternative to the Gwadar port. Chahbahar comes as a part of countering the so-called “Strings of Pearl strategy” that India views as a Chinese strategic objective to encircle India.
• Perhaps, along with the politics of infrastructure, market stability in these countries depend on the Indian Ocean. Most of the oil and LNG projects for the IORA countries are dependent on the maritime route, which causes new geopolitical problems directly link with energy transport, logistics, and storage. Hence political and foreign policy risks are exacerbated by the chokepoints for energy transit routes linking the Indian Ocean. According to OPEC estimates, “79.4% of the world’s proven oil reserves are located in OPEC member countries with the bulk of OPEC oil reserves in the Middle East amounting to 64.5% of the OPEC total” (OPEC, 2019). Nearly 2/3rd of the world’s oil trade is made through maritime routes, and there are four global chokepoints for the oil trade.
• Approximately 20.7 million barrels per day, more than 60% of world maritime oil trade, of oil traffic takes place in the Strait of Hormuz (US Energy Information Administration, 2019). This is a twenty-one miles wide passage between Oman and Iran, connecting the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea, and predominantly used for oil and LNG exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia (US Energy Information Administration, 2019). Both Bangladesh and India are politically linked with these countries for human resources export, contributing to their economies through remittances and energy trade. Any geopolitical and geostrategic volatility in these countries has a direct implication on Bangladesh and India. The relation between Iran and the US-allied Gulf countries threatened to disrupt energy traffic through this Straight, leading to the reinforced geostrategic presence of the US and China in the Hormuz region.
• The Strait of Malacca is the shortest shipping route between the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and it is considered as the second most crucial oil trading choke point, located between Indonesia and Malaysia, through which 30% of global maritime crude oil trade, equivalent to 15 million barrels per day, is done (US Energy Information Administration, 2018). This Strait is of China’s vital interest since 90% of crude oil volumes flowing through the South China Sea are transited through the Strait of Malacca. This Strait is located between Africa and the Persian Gulf to connect the Asian markets with the Middle Eastern and African oil producers. Along with access to the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal is a critical chokepoint for the South Asian countries. Though the Canal is an artificial sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through the Isthmus of Suez defines the border between Africa and Asia.
• The Canal offers a more direct maritime route between the North Atlantic and northern Indian oceans via the Mediterranean and Red seas, thus avoiding the South Atlantic and southern Indian oceans and reducing the journey distance from the Arabian Sea to London, for example, by approximately 8,900 kilometers (5,500 mi) (World Shipping Council, 2020). The Suez Canal, combined with the SUMED Pipeline, is a strategic trade route that connects the Mediterranean to the Red Sea for oil, petroleum products, and LNG shipments do Europe and North America. Through the Canal, the northbound petroleum traffic connects the European and the northern American markets with the Persian Gulf. It accounts for approximately 9% of total maritime energy transport. SUMED accounted for approximately 8% of the global LNG trade (US Energy Information Administration, 2019). The southbound crude oil shipments through the Canal connect Singapore, China and India with the Middle Eastern and African oil producers. Russia accounted for the largest share of (24%) of the southbound petroleum traffic. The utility of the Canal has increased with the increases in Libyan crude oil production and exports and Qatar’s LNG production (US Energy Information Administration, 2019).
• Another chokepoint for the South Asian countries is the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. This Strait is increasingly becoming a geostrategic chokepoint for the US and China. It is a narrow passage located between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, precisely between Djibouti and Yemen. China’s first overseas military base, costing US$ 590 million, was set up in Djibouti, which significantly demonstrates The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) power projection capabilities in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The ongoing civil war in Yemen and infighting between the Saudi backed government forces and an ostensibly allied southern separatist movement, supported by UAE-backed Southern Transition Council, has put tension over the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. The Yemen tension has escalated oil prices in 2015 and has become an influential factor in determining energy prices.
• Moreover, the zero-sum game between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the Yemen crisis has become a significant power play in which the US and China are active participants. An estimated 6.2 million barrels per day of crude oil, condensate, and unrefined petroleum products start straight through this trade toward Europe, The US, and Asia (US Energy Information Administration, 2019). This Strait accounts for 9% of total maritime petroleum trade in 2017, of which 3.6 million BPD are northbound toward Europe, and 2.6 million BPD is southbound toward the Asian markets such as Singapore, China, and India (US Energy Information Administration, 2019).